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5Abstract
We develop a consistent, arbitrage-free framework for valuing derivative trades with
collateral, counterparty credit risk, and funding costs. This is achieved by modifying
the payout cash-ows for the trade position. The framework is exible enough to
accommodate actual trading complexities such as asymmetric collateral and funding
rates, replacement close-out, and rehypothecation of posted collateral. We show also
how the traditional self-nancing condition is adjusted to reect the new market
realities. The generalized valuation equation takes the form of a forward-backward
SDE or semi-linear PDE. Nevertheless, it may be recast as a set of iterative equations
which can be eciently solved by our proposed least-squares Monte Carlo algorithm.
We numerically implement the case of an equity option and show how its valuation
changes when including the above eects. We also discuss the nancial impact of the
proposed valuation framework and of nonlinearity more generally. This is fourfold:
Firstly, the valuation equation is only based on observable market rates, leaving
the value of a derivatives transaction invariant to any theoretical risk-free rate.
Secondly, the presence of funding costs and default close-out makes the valuation
problem a recursive and nonlinear one. Thus, credit and funding risks are non-
separable in general, and despite common practice in banks, the related CVA, DVA,
and FVA cannot be treated as purely additive adjustments without running the risk
of double counting. To quantify the valuation error that can be attributed to double
counting, we introduce a nonlinearity valuation adjustment (NVA) and show that
its magnitude can be signicant under asymmetric funding rates and replacement
close-out at default. Thirdly, as trading parties cannot observe each others liquidity
policies nor their respective funding costs, the bilateral nature of a derivative price
6breaks down. Finally, valuation becomes aggregation-dependent and portfolio values
cannot simply be added up. This has operational consequences for banks, calling
for a holistic, consistent approach across trading desks and asset classes.
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Notations
Gt Filtration that models the ow of information of the whole market:
Ft Default-free market ltration:
Ht Filtration generated by the default events:
C ; I Default times of the counterparty and the investor respectively.
 The rst-to-default time, I ^ C :
Ft; Ht; Ct Funding cash account, risky-asset account and collateral account.
"C; ; "I; The close-out amounts on the investor's and the counterparty's default.
(t; u) The sum of the discounted contractual cash-ows from t to u.
(t; u;C) The sum of the discounted margining costs over the period (t; u].
 (C; ") The on-default cash-ow.
'(t; u;F ) The sum of the discounted funding costs over the period (t; u]:
t The rst-to-default intensity.
c+; c  The positive and negative collateral interest rates respectively:
~ct(T ) The eective funding rates from t to T , c
 
t (T )1fCt<0g + c
+
t (T )1fCt>0g:
f+; f  The borrowing and lending rates respectively:
~ft(T ) The eective funding rates from t to T , f
 
t (T )1fFt<0g + f
+
t (T )1fFt>0g:
h+; h  The risky asset borrowing and lending rates respectively:
~ht(T ) The eective hedging rates from t to T , h
 
t (T )1fHt<0g + h
+
t (T )1fHt>0g:
NC ; N I The initial margin accounts posted by the counterparty and the investor:
Mt The variation margin account.
fN;C ; fN;I The funding rates of the initial margin accounts for the counterparty
and the investor respectively.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Recent years have seen an unprecedented interest among banks in understanding
the risks and associated costs of running a derivatives business. In the wake of the
nancial crisis in 2007-2008, dealers and nancial institutions have been forced to
rethink how they value and hedge contingent claims traded either in the over the
counter (OTC) market or through central clearing house (CCPs). OTC derivatives
are bilateral nancial contracts negotiated between two default-risky entities. Yet,
prior to the crisis, institutions tended to ignore the credit risk of high-quality rated
counterparties, but as recent history has shown this was a particularly dangerous
assumption. Moreover, as banks became reluctant to lend to each other with the
crisis rumbling through the Western economies, the spread between the rate on
overnight indexed swaps (OISs) and the LIBOR rate blew up.
To keep up with this sudden change of game, dealers today make a number of
adjustments when they book OTC trades. The credit valuation adjustment (CVA)
corrects the price for the expected costs to the dealer due to the possibility that
the counterparty may default, while the so-called debt valuation adjustment (DVA)
is a correction for the expected benets to the dealer due to his own default risk.
The latter adjustment has the controversial eect that the dealer can book a prot
as his default risk increases and is very hard (if not impossible) to hedge. Finally,
dealers often adjust the price for the costs of funding the trade. In the industry,
this practice is known as a liquidity and funding valuation adjustment (LVA, FVA).
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When a derivatives desk executes a deal with a client, it hedges the trade with other
dealers in the market, posts or receives collateral, and additionally receives or pays
interest on the posted collateral. This involves borrowing or lending money and
other assets. Classical derivatives pricing theory rests on the assumption that one
can borrow and lend at a unique risk-free rate of interest, a theoretical risk-free rate
that is proxied by a number of market rates. The seminal work of Black-Scholes-
Merton showed that in this case an option on equity can be replicated by a portfolio
of equity and risk-free debt over any short period of time. Prior to the crisis, this
assumption may have been reasonable with banks funding their hedging strategies
at LIBOR. However, with drastically increasing spreads emerging as the crisis took
hold, it became apparent that LIBOR is contaminated by credit risk (besides fraud
risk) and as such is an imperfect proxy of the risk-free rate. While overnight rates
have replaced LIBOR as proxies for the risk-free rate, it would be preferable for a
pricing framework not to feature theoretical rates in the nal valuation equations.
Recent headlines such as J.P. Morgan's results in January 2014 underscores the
sheer importance of accounting for funding valuation adjustment. Michael Rapoport
reports on January 14, 2014 in the Wall Street Journal:
"[...] So what is a funding valuation adjustment, and why did it cost J.P. Morgan
Chase $1.5 billion? The giant bank recorded a $1.5 billion charge in its fourth-
quarter earnings announced Tuesday because of the adjustment { the result of a
complex change in J.P. Morgans approach to valuing some of the derivatives on its
books. J.P. Morgan was persuaded to make the FVA [Funding Valuation Adjustment]
change by an industry migration toward such a move, the bank said in an investor
presentation. A handful of other large banks, mostly in the U.K. and Europe, have
already made a similar change.
When dealing with funding costs, one may take a single deal (micro) or homo-
geneous (macro) cost view. In the micro view, funding costs are determined at deal
level. This means that the trading desk may borrow funds at a dierent rate than at
which it can invest funds, and the rates may vary across deals even in the same desk.
In a slightly more aggregate cost view, average funding spreads are applied to all
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deals yet the spread on borrowing funds may still be dierent from that on lending.
Finally, if we turn to the macro and symmetric view, funding costs of borrowing
and lending are assumed the same and a common funding spread is applied across
all deals. Clearly, the treasury department of a bank plays an active part in the
micro approach and works as an operational center, while in the macro approach it
takes more the role of a supporting function for the trading business. In this work
we stay as general as possible and adopt a micro cost view. Naturally, the macro
view is just a special case of the micro view. This will be implicit in making the
otherwise exogenously assigned funding rates a function of the specic deal value.
One should also notice that the specic treasury model one adopts also impacts the
presence of credit risk, and in particular of DVA, on the funding policy. This eect
is occasionally referred to as DVA2, but we will not adopt such terminology here.
Despite its general market acceptance, the practice of including an adjustment for
funding costs has stirred quite some controversy among academics and practitioners
(see the debate following Hull and White [53]). At the center of this controversy
is the issue that funding-contingent pricing becomes subjective due to asymmetric
information. The particular funding policy chosen by the client is not (fully) known
to the dealer, and vice versa. As a result, the price of the deal may be dierent
to either of the two parties. Theoretically, this should mean that the parties would
never close the deal. However, in reality, the dealer may not be able to recoup his
full funding costs from the client, yet traders say that funding risk was the key factor
driving bid-ask spreads wider during the crisis.
The introduction of funding risk makes the pricing problem highly recursive and
nonlinear. The price of the deal depends on the trader's funding strategies in future
paths, while to determine the future funding strategies we need to know the deal
price itself in future paths. This recursive structure was also discovered in the studies
of Pallavicini et al. [60], Crepey [39] and Burgard and Kjaer [35], yet the feature is
neglected in the common approach of adding a funding spread to the discount curve.
The inherent nonlinearity manifests itself in the valuation equations by taking the
form of a forward-backward stochastic dierential equation (in short, FBSDE) or a
semi-linear partial dierential equation (in short, PDE).
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In this thesis we develop an arbitrage-free framework for consistent valuation
of collateralized as well as uncollateralized trades under counterparty credit risk,
collateral margining and funding costs. The need to consistently account for the
changed trading conditions in the valuation of derivatives is stressed by the sheer
size of the OTC market. Indeed, despite the crisis and the previously neglected risks,
the size of derivatives markets remains staggering, the market value of outstanding
OTC derivative contracts equaled $24.7 trillion by the end of 2012 with a whopping
$632.6 trillion in notional value (as stated in Bank for International Settlements,
2013 [4]). Adopting the risk-neutral valuation principle, we derive a general pricing
equation for an OTC derivative deal where the new or previously neglected types
of risks (CVA, DVA, collateral and funding costs) are included simply as modi-
cations of the payout cash-ows. This approach can also be tailored to address
trading through a central clearing house (CCP) with variation and initial margins
as investigated in Brigo and Pallavicini [30]. In addition, we address the current
market practices in accordance with the guidelines of the International Swaps and
Derivatives Association without assuming restrictive constraints on the collateral
margining procedures and close-out netting rules. In particular, we allow for asym-
metric collateral and funding rates as well as exogenously given liquidity policies
and hedging strategies. We also discuss rehypothecation of collateral guarantees
and risk-free/replacement close-out conventions.
To explore valuation under funding costs concretely, we show how the general
pricing equation can be cast as a set of iterative equations that can be conve-
niently solved by means of least-squares Monte Carlo (see for example, Carrier
[36], Longsta and Schwartz [58], Tilley [71] and Tsitsiklis and Van Roy [72]) and
we propose an ecient simulation algorithm. Additionally, we derive a continuous-
time approximation of the solution of the pricing equation as well as the associated
FBSDE and semi-linear PDE. We study the existence and uniqueness problems for
both the FBSDE and the semi-linear PDE cases. Moreover, we present an invari-
ance theorem showing that the risk-free rate disappears from the funding inclusive
PDE, which implies that the valuation of the trade depends no longer on some un-
observable risk-free rates. In other words, valuation is purely based on observable
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market rates. The invariance theorem rst appeared implicitly in Pallavicini et al.
[60] and later in Brigo et al. [22, 23].
Valuation under funding risk poses a signicantly more complex and computa-
tionally challenging problem than standard CVA and DVA computations (except
for possibly CVA/DVA under replacement close-out), since it requires forward sim-
ulation and backward induction at the same time. In addition, FVA does not take
the form of a simple additive term as appears to be commonly assumed by market
participants. More fundamentally, this means that, by its very nature, identifying
FVA with DVA is generally wrong, and only under restrictive assumptions would
the two concepts collapse into one. Funding and Credit costs do not split up in a
purely additive way. A consequence of this is that valuation becomes aggregation-
dependent as portfolios prices do not simply add up. It is therefore dicult for
banks to create CVA and FVA desks with separate and clearcut responsibilities.
Nevertheless, banks often make such simplifying assumptions when accounting for
the various price adjustments. This can be done, however, only at the expense of
tolerating a degree of double counting in the dierent valuation adjustments.
In order to study such double counting, we introduce a nonlinearity valuation
adjustment (in short NVA) to quantify the valuation error that one makes when
treating CVA, DVA, and FVA as separate, additive terms. In particular, we exam-
ine the nancial error of neglecting nonlinearities such as asymmetric borrowing and
lending funding rates and substituting the replacement close-out at default by the
more stylized risk-free close-out. We analyze the large scale implications of nonlin-
earity of the valuation equations: non-separability of risks, aggregation dependence
in valuation, and local pricing measures as opposed to universal ones. Finally, our
numerical results conrm that NVA and asymmetric funding rates can have a non-
trivial impact on the valuation of nancial derivatives. More generally, nonlinearity
implies organizational challenges which we point out in the conclusion.
Literature Review In terms of available literature in this area, several studies
have analysed the various valuation adjustments separately, but few have tried to
build a valuation approach that consistently takes counterparty credit risk, collat-
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eralization and funding costs into account. Under unilateral default risk, i.e. when
only one party is defaultable, Brigo and Masetti [24] consider valuation of deriva-
tives with CVA, whereas particular applications of their approach are given in Brigo
and Pallavicini [28], Brigo and Chourdakis [19], and Brigo et al [27]; see Brigo et
al. [26] for a summary. Bilateral default risk appears in Bielecki and Rutkowski [7],
Brigo and Capponi [16], Brigo et al. [31], and Gregory [51] who evaluate both the
CVA and DVA of a derivative deal.
The fundamental impact of collateralization on default risk and on the credit val-
uation adjustment and debit valuation adjustment has been investigated in Cheru-
bini [38] and more recently in Brigo et al. [17] and Brigo et al. [18]. The works of
[17, 18] look at the CVA and DVA gap risk under several collateralization strate-
gies, with or without rehypothecation, as a function of the margining frequency
with wrong way risk and with possible instantaneous contagion. Minimum thresh-
old amounts and minimum transfer amounts are also considered. We also cite Brigo
et al. [26] for a list of frequently asked questions on the subject.
Assuming no default risk, Piterbarg [68] provides an initial analysis of deriva-
tive transactions under collateralization and funding risk in a stylized Black-Scholes
economy. Yet, the introduction of collateral in a world without default risk is ques-
tionable since its main purpose is to mitigate such a risk. Moreover, the study does
not consider the nonlinearities due to replacement close-out nor asymmetric fund-
ing rates. Fujii et al. [50] analyses the consequences of multi-currency features in
collateral proceedings. The basic implications of funding in presence of default risk
have been considered in Morini and Prampolini [59], see also Fries [49] and Castagna
[37].
The above works constitute a beginning for the funding costs literature. However,
these references focus only on simple nancial products, such as zero-coupon bonds
or loans, and do not oer the level of generality needed to include all the required
features in a consistent framework that can be used to manage complex products.
Thus, a general theory under the new risks is still missing. The most comprehensive
attempts are those of Burgard and Kjaer [34, 35], Crepey [39{41], Pallavicini et
al. [60, 61] and Brigo et al. [21{23]. Nonetheless, as [34, 35] resort to a PDE
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approach, their results are constrained to low dimensions. They neglect the hidden
complexities of collateral modelling and mark-to-market discontinuities at default,
and also do not state explicitly the funding assumptions for all the assets in their
replicating portfolio. The approach in the series [39{41] is more general, using
backwards stochastic dierential equations, although it does not allow for credit
instruments in the deal portfolio. We note that the papers [60, 61], [21{23] follow
the same level of generality of Crepey [40] and address the inherent nonlinearity
of the valuation problem, as well as considering dierent models of funding policy
and still accounting for CVA, DVA collateralization and rehypothecation. Wu [74]
studies the pricing problem of cash collateralized derivatives trades when credit and
funding risks are present, and proposes a PDE representation for the derivatives
price, which is solved as a Feynman-Kac formula. However, the author assumes
that the margin account earns the CSA rate for positive balance or costs the CSA
rate plus a spread for negative balance, discarding the funding benet, which is
obviously not realistic.
Brigo and Pallavicini [30] deal with the same general framework tailored to Cen-
tral Counterparties Clearing (CCPs) and standard Credit Support Annex (CSA)
trades with variation and initial margins. The paper Bis et al. [9] studies longevity
swaps under credit risk, collateralization and funding costs. Despite being applied
to the specic and atypical asset class of longevity derivatives, the paper is one of
the rst to develop a comprehensive approach to an extended pricing framework
addressing previously neglected risks.
Besides the above papers, as a testimony to the increasing eort in this research
area, books have started to include funding costs analysis; see for example Kenyon
and Stamm [56], Brigo et al. [26] and Crepey et al. [42].
In this thesis, we continue the work in [22, 23], which follows the work of [60, 61]
and consider a general pricing framework for OTC deals that fully and consistently
takes collateralization, counterparty credit risk, and funding risk into account. The
valuation framework is conceptually simple and intuitive in contrast to previous at-
tempts. It is based on the celebrated risk-neutral valuation principle and the new
risks are included simply by adjusting the payout cash-ows of the deal. The val-
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uation equation takes the form of an FBSDE or a semi-linear PDE. We show that
the traditional self-nancing condition can be adjusted to address the new market
realities. We present a numerical case study that extends the benchmark theory of
Black-Scholes for equity call options to credit gap risk (CVA/DVA after collateral-
ization), collateralization and funding costs. We nd that the precise patterns of
funding-inclusive values depend on a number of factors, including the asymmetry
between borrowing and lending rates. We stress such inputs in order to analyse their
impact on the funding inclusive price. Our numerical results conrm that funding
risk impacts non-trivially the deal price and that nonlinearity valuation adjustment
can be relevant as well.
To summarize, the nancial implications of our valuation framework are fourfold:
 Valuation is invariant to any theoretical risk-free rate and only based on ob-
servable market rates.
 Valuation is a nonlinear problem under asymmetric funding and replacement
close-out at default, making funding and credit risks non-separable.
 Valuation is no longer bilateral because counterparties cannot observe each
others liquidity policies nor their respective funding costs.
 Valuation is aggregation-dependent and portfolio values can no longer simply
be added up.
1.1 Specic contribution
In the following, we briey list the main contributions of the thesis.
1. Numerical case studies of the consistent valuation framework. This work can
be found in Chapter 5 and was originally carried out in Brigo et al. [21, 23].
2. Introduction and numerical study of the nonlinearity valuation adjustment.
This work can be found in Chapter 5 and was carried out also in Brigo et al.
[22].
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3. Analysis of the self-nancing condition of the new funding inclusive valuation
framework. The related work can be found in Chapter 4. A common mistake
in the literature and the correct formulation can be found also in Brigo et al.
[14].
4. Analysis of the formulation of the funding inclusive forward-backward SDE and
semi-linear PDE and the existence and uniqueness problem of their solutions.
The related work was conducted in Chapter 3. A preprint associated to this
research is in preparation.
1.2 Credit and debit valuation adjustment
In this section, we introduce a fundamental valuation framework for over the counter
(OTC) trades including the counterparty risk valuation adjustment, which forms
the foundation of the study we are going to conduct when more market realities are
introduced.
Due to the large amount of nancial contracts that are traded over the counter,
the importance of the credit quality of a counterparty is fundamental, and coun-
terparty credit risk is introduced when evaluating a derivative contract. Basel II
denes the counterparty credit risk as the risk that a counterparty in a nancial
contract will default prior to the nal settlement of the transaction and fail to make
the future obligatory payments. When investing in default risky assets, market par-
ticipants will charge a risk premium to account for the counterparty credit risk. As
a result, the value of a contingent claim with a defaultable counterparty will be
smaller than the value of the same claim with a non-defaultable counterpary. Our
goal in this section is to discuss how to quantify such a dierence, and introduce
a general arbitrage-free valuation framework taking into account the counterparty
credit risk.
Probabilistic Framework We postulate the following probabilistic assumption
throughout the section. Let T 2 R+ be the expiry time of the derivative deal.
Consider a ltered probability space (
;G; (Gt)t2[0;T ];Q), where Q is the risk-neutral
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probability measure, 
 represents the set of all possible outcomes of the random
experiment, and the -algebra G represents the set of events A 2 
. The ltration
(Gt)t2[0;T ] models the ow of information of the whole market up to time t, including
default. The default time  is dened on this probability space and is a G-stopping
time. This space is endowed with a right-continuous and complete sub-ltration
(Ft)t2[0;T ] called the default-free market ltration, which represents all the observable
market quantities except for default events. Therefore, we have Gt = Ft _ Ht with
Ht = (f  ug; u  t) being the right-continuous ltration generated by the
default events. Moreover, we adopt the notational convention that Et is the risk-
neutral expectation conditional on the ltration Gt.
1.2.1 Unilateral counterparty risk
Let's rst consider the valuation problem where only one of the two parties is de-
faultable. Taking the viewpoint of the default-free party, the problem is to compute
the adjustment to the default-free price of the deal when entering a nancial trade
with a counterparty that has a positive probability of defaulting before the maturity
of the trade. Such adjustment is called unilateral credit valuation adjustment (in
short UCVA). UCVA has been studied for example by Sorensen and Bollier in [70]
and by Bielecki and Rutkowski in [7]. Brigo and Masetti in [24] considered pricing
with UCVA under netting, whereas Cherubini [38] discussed UCVA with collateral
in some stylized cases.
General pricing formula Consider the case when the investor is default-free. At
the time of default  < T , the investor will calculate the net present value (in short
NPV) being the residual value of the deal until maturity. If the NPV is negative to
the investor, the investor will pay in full the NPV to the defaulted conterparty. If
the NPV is positive to the investor, the investor will face a loss and receive only a
recovery fraction of the NPV, denoted as R. In the case where no default happens,
i.e.  > T , the derivative trade is the same as in the default-free case.
We denote by (t; T ) the sum of the discounted (at the risk-free rate) payo at
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time t < T happening over the time period (t; T ]. We have immediately
NPV () = E [(; T )]:
The defaultable derivative price denoted as Vt at time t <  can be calculated as
Vt = Et
n
1f>Tg(t; T ) + 1f<Tg
h
(t; ) +D(t; )

R(NPV ())+   ( NPV ())+
io
;
where we use the short hand nations X+ := maxfX ; 0g and X  := minfX ; 0g.
D(t; u) is the risk-free (and funding-free) discount factor, given by the ratio
D(t; u) =
Bt
Bu
; (1.1)
where
dBt = rtBtdt
is the bank account driven by the risk-free instantaneous interest rate r and associ-
ated to the risk-neutral measure Q. The rate r is assumed to be (Ft)t2[0;T ] adapted.
Applying the properties of conditional expectations, the following result can be
proved.
Proposition 1.2.1 (General unilateral counterparty risk pricing formula
[24]). At time t <  , the price of the derivative trade under counterparty credit risk
is
Vt = Et[ (t) ]  LGDEt

1ft<TgD(t; )(NPV ())+

;
where LGD = 1   R is the loss given default, and the recovery rate R is assumed to
be deterministic.
We notice that the counterparty risk adjusted deal price consists of the default-
free deal price and an adjustment term which is called credit valuation adjustment
denoted by CVA given as
CVA(t) = LGDEt

1ft<TgD(t; )(NPV ())+

: (1.2)
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The CVA term takes the form of an option price, more specically, a call option on
the NPV with zero strike, only when default happens (  T ). Including couterparty
credit risk into valuation makes the pricing model dependent, even when the original
valuation is model independent (for instance an interest rate swap).
However, it has been made clear that the unilateral assumption of the counter-
party credit risk was not realistic during the nancial crisis. If both parties in a
transaction may default, the counterparty risk adjustment becomes a bilateral one.
Indeed, the bilateral nature of counterparty risk has been recognised by market
participants.
1.2.2 Arbitrage-free valuation of bilateral counterparty risk
In this section, we consider the valuation problem when the default possibility of the
investor is included, in contrary to the previous section. The bilateral counterparty
risk was rst introduced by Due and Huang in [46], where a valuation model ac-
counting for the default of both parties was presented. Bielecki and Rutkowski [7]
gave a general formula for bilateral counterparty risk evaluation and Brigo and Cap-
poni [16] developed a pricing formula for bilateral counterparty risk valuation adjust-
ment (BCVA) considering the sequence of default events to avoid double counting.
The introduction of bilateral counterparty risk brings in the symmetry: the coun-
terparty risk adjustment to the investor is the opposite of that to the counterparty.
The adjustment driven by the default of the party who calculates the deal value is
called debit valuation adjustment (in short DVA) which is a positive value added on
to the deal price. However, DVA has some counter-intuitive features, as it increases
the mark-to-market when the party's credit quality worsens.
We denote by I and C the default times of the investor and counterparty,
respectively, both being G-stopping times. Recall that Gt = Ft _ Ht, and the
right-continuous ltration generated by the default events either of the investor
or of the counterparty Ht =  (fI  ug _ fC  ug; u  t). The stopping time
 = minfC ; Ig is the rst to default time.
Unlike the unilateral counterparty risk pricing, we need to consider at the rst
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default time  which party is the defaulting party, namely,  = I or  = C . Let's
dene the following six events:
A = fI  C  Tg B = fI  T  Cg C = fC  I  Tg
D = fC  T  Ig E = fT  I  Cg F = fT  C  Ig:
(1.3)
Remark 1.2.2. Throughout this thesis, we assume that there is no simultaneous
default. In practice, the case when two parties of a transaction default simultaneously
is very rare, and the liquidation procedures in such a case are not clear. Therefore,
we postulate that the probability of the event I = C is zero - the default times of
the two entities are never equal. Of course, the two default times can be very close.
One party can default very closely to the other party with high probability.
Taking the point of view of the investor, at t < T the adjusted price of a deal
including bilateral counterparty risk can be calculated as
Vt =Et
n
1fE[Fg(t; T )
+ 1fC[Dg
h
(t; C) +D(t; C)

RC(NPV (C))
+   ( NPV (C))+
i
+ 1fA[Bg
h
(t; I) +D(t; I)

(NPV (I))
+  RI( NPV (I))+
io
;
where RC and RI denote respectively the recovery fraction of the counterparty and
the investor. If there is no default event (only the events E and F happen), the
above pricing formula reduces to the classical risk-neutral valuation formula. If the
investor is taken as default-free (event A and B will not happen), the pricing formula
will reduce to the unilateral counterparty risk pricing case.
An application of the properties of conditional expectation yields the following
result for bilateral counterparty risk pricing.
Proposition 1.2.3 (General bilateral counterparty risk pricing formula
[15]). At time t <  , the price of the derivative trade under bilateral counterparty
risk is
Vt = Et[ (t; T ) ]  LGDC Et

1fC[DgD(t; C)(NPV (C))+

+ LGDI Et

1fA[BgD(t; I)( NPV (I))+

;
(1.4)
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where LGDC = 1 RC and LGDI = 1 RI are the loss given default to the counterparty
and the investor, and the recovery rates are assumed to be deterministic.
Again, we see that the adjusted price is the sum of the risk-free deal price, the
price of a short call option position if the counterparty defaults rst, and the price of
a long put option position if the investor defaults rst, where both options have zero
strikes. The adjustment added to the risk-free price to account for the counterparty
credit risk is the so called bilateral counterparty risk valuation adjustment (BCVA),
which can be either positive or negative. It is composed of a credit valuation adjusted
term and a debit valuation adjustment term, denoted by CVA and DVA respectively.
Taking the viewpoint of the investor, these terms can be expressed as
BCV A(t) = DVA(t)  CVA(t);
CVA(t) = LGDC Et

1fC[DgD(t; C)(NPV (C))+

; (1.5)
DVA(t) = LGDI Et

1fA[BgD(t; I)( NPV (I))+

:
Unlike the unilateral credit valuation adjustment, when considering bilateral coun-
terparty risk, both parties can agree on the adjustment term being added to the
default-free deal price. Indeed, the CVA of the investor is the DVA of the counter-
party, whereas the CVA of the counterparty is the DVA of the investor.
The inclusion of DVA has been controversial. One objection is that one party
books positive mark-to-market when its credit quality worsens. The defaulting party
would gain if it defaults and to price this component might appear unusual. More-
over, the hedging of DVA is very dicult as the institution cannot sell CDS protec-
tion on their own name. In practice, the hedging is done by selling protection on
some highly correlated names.
In the following sections, we analyse some practical consequences of the bilateral
counterparty risk valuation adjustment.
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1.2.3 Close-out convention
When closing a deal, we have a choice of which close-out convention to use: the risk-
free close-out, or the replacement close-out. The close-out amount is the net present
value (NPV) of the deal that is computed when the rst default happens for default
settlement. A risk-free close-out amount is the NPV calculated when assuming the
surviving party to be default-free, whereas a replacement close-out amount is the
NPV computed by taking into account the credit quality of the surviving party upon
default of the rst entity. Clearly, such a replacement close-out can be dierent
from a risk-free one, and the counterparty risk valuation adjustment can change
dramatically depending on the choice of close-out convention. From the perspective
of valuation continuity, the replacement close-out is consistent with the counterparty
risk valuation adjustment, whereas the risk-free close-out introduces a dependence
of counterparty risk for a pre-default evaluation but discards any future obligation
for the surviving party on the default event.
Risk-free Close-out Under a risk-free close-out, upon the rst default event, the
default probability for the surviving party will not be considered, so the NPV is
computed as a risk-free price of the deal at the rst default time, namely,
NPV (i) = Ei [ (i; T ) ] ; for i 2 fI; Cg:
Therefore, the bilateral counterparty risk pricing formula at any time t <  reads,
Vt = Et[ (t; T ) ]  LGDC Et

1fC[DgD(t; C) (EC [ (C ; T ) ])
+ 
+ LGDI Et

1fA[BgD(t; I) ( EI [ (I ; T ) ])+

;
(1.6)
Replacement Close-out When replacement close-out is used in the settlement
of a default, we take into account the default risk of the surviving party. In other
words, the DVA of the surviving party needs to be included in the NPV calculation,
NPV (C) = EC [ (C ; T ) ] + DVAI(C); NPV (I) = EI [ (I ; T ) ] + DVAC(I);
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where DVAi denotes the debit valuation adjustment viewed from the perspective of
party i, i 2 fI; Cg, dened as (1.5). Therefore, the bilateral counterparty risk
pricing formula at any time t <  reads,
Vt = Et

1fE[Fg(t; T )

+ Et
n
1fC[Dg
h
(t; C) +D(t; C)

RC (EC [ (C ; T ) ] + DVAI(C))
+
  ( EC [ (C ; T ) ] DVAI(C))+
io
+ Et
n
1fA[Bg
h
(t; I) +D(t; I)

( EI [ (I ; T ) ] DVAC(I))+
 RI(EI [ (I ; T ) ] + DVAC(I))+
io
:
The above formula was also expressed in [25] for t <  , as
Vt = Et[ (t; T ) ]
+ Et
n
1fC[DgD(t; C)
h
DVAI(C)  LGDC(EC [ (C ; T ) ] DVAI(C))+
io
+ Et
n
1fA[BgD(t; I)
h
LGDI(DVAC(I)  EI [ (I ; T ) ])+  DVAC(I)
io
:
(1.7)
Risk-free or Replacement? The risk-free close-out does not require an assess-
ment of the default probability of the surviving party, and all contracts with the
same payo will have the same close-out value, which to a large extent, simplies the
valuation problem. Due to the computational simplicity, risk-free close-out seems
more preferable. However, intuitively, replacement close-out is more fair. The re-
placement close-out is consistent with the counterparty risk valuation adjustment
as the counterparty risk is considered throughout the valuation. Brigo and Morini
[25] provided a quantitative analysis of the consequences of the dierent close-out
conventions. They showed that for a simple derivative, assuming risk-free close-out,
the bilateral counterparty risk adjustment formula is not consistent with the mar-
ket practice on uncollateralized claims which, on the contrary, can be avoided with
replacement close-out. The paper also studied the eects of the two close-out con-
ventions in terms of default contagion. If a replacement close-out is used, there will
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be lower recovery for creditors. If, on the other hand, a risk-free close-out is used,
there will be unexpected losses aecting also the debtors of the defaulted entity,
which is at odds with standard counterparty risk for products like bonds and loans.
1.2.4 Double counting: rst to default
A certain degree of double counting can be included when a bilateral counterparty
risk inclusive valuation is carried out. One possible issue is when the rst to de-
fault close-out proceeding is neglected. In the industry, a simplication of bilateral
counterparty risk valuation adjustment is sometimes used, see for example Picoult
[67]. This simplied expression allows one to consider the bilateral counterparty
risk as a simple combination of the unilateral counterparty risk which may seem
to be desirable. However, the approach does not conform with the fact that when
the rst default event happens, close-out proceedings start and the transaction is
closed. Moreover, it ignores the default dependence between the two parties in the
transaction.
A Simplied Formula We rst recall that the full bilateral counterparty risk
pricing formula is given in (1.4) and the counterparty risk valuation adjustments
are dened in (1.5). If a risk-free close-out is in force, the bilateral counterparty
risk pricing follows equation (1.6), whereas for the replacement close-out case, one
should use the pricing formula (1.7).
In the unilateral case, only one of the two parties is considered to be defaultable.
We write the unilateral credit valuation adjustment (UCVA) and unilateral debit
valuation adjustment (UDVA) as
UCVAI(t) = LGDC Et

1fCTgD(t; C)(NPV (C))
+

; (1.8)
UDVAI(t) = LGDI Et

1fITgD(t; I)( NPV (I))+

;
where the NPV () is calculated as the residual risk-free price of the deal as the
survival party is default free. Notice that the unilateral credit valuation adjustment
evaluated by the investor due to the default possibility of the counterparty is equiv-
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alent to the debit valuation adjustment of the counterparty due to its own default
risk, precisely,
UCVAI(t) = UDVAC(t):
We now consider a simplied case of the bilateral counterparty risk adjustment
where the rst to default is neglected. More precisely, instead of considering all of
the six events (1.3), we only study the following three scenarios:
fC  Tg; fI  Tg and fT < minfI ; Cgg:
In this case, each adjusted term is computed as if only one of the two parties is
defaultable since the rst to default is no longer checked. Therefore, the dependence
between the defaults of the two parties is not required in determining the adjusted
price.
Risk-free Close-out In the case of risk-free close-out, the simplied adjusted
price, denoted as V t , can be computed as
V t = Et[ (t; T ) ]  LGDC Et

1fCTgD(t; C) (EC [ (C ; T ) ])
+ 
+ LGDI Et

1fITgD(t; I) ( EI [ (I ; T ) ])+

= Et[ (t; T ) ]  UCVAI(t) + UCVAC(t):
The bilateral counterparty risk valuation adjustment in this case is simply the dif-
ference of two UCVA, which dramatically simplies the calculation and gives great
practical advantage.
Replacement Close-out The main assumption of the simplied formula is
that each term is computed as in the unilateral case (only one of the parties can
default), and the default party would be the one that defaults rst in the full bilateral
case. Therefore, when replacement close-out is used, the simplied adjusted price
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can be calculated as
V t = Et[ (t; T ) ]
+ Et
n
1fCTgD(t; C)
h
DVAI(C)  LGDC(EC [ (C ; T ) ] DVAI(C))+
io
+ Et
n
1fITgD(t; I)
h
LGDI(DVAC(I)  EI [ (I ; T ) ])+  DVAC(I)
io
= Et[ (t; T ) ]
  Et

1fCTgD(t; C)LGDC

EC [ (C ; T ) ]
+
+ Et

1fITgD(t; I)LGDI

  EI [ (I ; T ) ]
+
=Et[ (t) ]  UCVAI(t; T ) + UCVAC(t; T );
which is identical to the simplied formula with risk-free close-out. Here, the second
equality holds because each term is calculated as if only one of the two names is
defaultable, so the DVA associated to the default-free party will be zero.
The Impact of the Simplication In the full adjusted pricing formula, six
events (1.3) are considered. However, in the simplied version, we only considered
three cases: fC  Tg, fI  Tg and fT < minfI ; Cgg. Since E [ F = fT <
minfI ; Cgg, events A, C, D are contained in fC  Tg, and events A, B, C are
contained in fI  Tg, the double counting is then obvious. For t < minfI ; Cg,
we have
1fA[Bg   1fITg =  1fC<I<Tg;
1fC[Dg   1fCTg =  1fI<C<Tg:
Therefore, the dierence of the full bilateral counterparty risk valuation and the
simplied version is
Vt   V t = Et

1fI<C<TgD(t; C)LGDC

EC [ (C ; T ) ]
+
  Et

1fC<I<TgD(t; I)LGDI

  EI [ (I ; T ) ]
+
:
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As we see, the dierence is due to the so called second to default term.
The impact of the rst to default time was closely studied in Brigo et al. [12],
where the authors considered the errors caused by the simplication in two sim-
ple products: a zero coupon bond and an equity forward contract, and presented
a number of cases where the simplied formula diers considerably from the full
formula.
1.2.5 Wrong way risk
The full valuation formula in (1.4) depends on the joint distribution of the default
times and the underlying asset. Wrong way risk (in short WWR) is the risk the
investor has when the underlying portfolio and the default of the counterparty are
\correlated" in the worst possible way from the investor's perspective. Wrong way
risk has been studied in the literature in dierent asset classes. For example, Brigo
and Tarenghi [32, 33] analyse the counterparty risk valuation adjustment on Equity,
Brigo and Masetti [24] examine CVA with netting, and Brigo et al. [27] consider the
particular case of an Equity Return Swap with counterparty risk. Counterparty risk
valuation adjustment on commodities with WWR is analysed in Brigo and Bakkar
[11]. In interest rate products, Brigo and Pallavicini [28] incorporate the WWR
in a stochastic intensity model which is correlated with the multi-factor short rate
process driving the interest rate dynamics, whereas Brigo et al. [31] introduce
methods for bilateral counterparty risk adjustment and allow also for correlation
between the default times of the investor and counterparty. Brigo and Chourdakis
[19] consider counterparty risk for Credit Default Swaps (CDS) in the presence of
correlation between default of the counterparty and default of the CDS reference
credit, but the paper only deals with unilateral and asymmetric counterparty credit
risk. Crepey et al. [43] model wrong way risk for CDS with counterparty credit
risk using a Markov chain copula model, whereas Lipton and Sepp [57] introduce a
structural model with jumps. Brigo and Capponi [15] include the default risk of the
investor by using a trivariate copula function on the default times to model default
dependence.
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Other subjects related to the counterparty risk adjusted pricing problem include
collateralization and close-out netting rules, which will be closely studied in the next
chapter.
1.3 Structure of the thesis
The thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 describes the general pricing framework
with collateralization, credit, debit and funding valuation adjustments. We derive an
iterative solution of the pricing equation as well as a continuous time approximation.
In Chapter 3 we discuss the consistent valuation framework in a continuous time
setting. We give both FBSDE and semi-linear PDE expressions for the deal price
in the consistent framework and discuss the existence and uniqueness conditions
in each case. The invariance theorem stating that the pricing framework does not
depend on the theoretical risk-free rate is given at the end of the chapter. Chapter 4
addresses an important problem with the self-nancing condition used in a derivative
pricing framework with funding, collateral and discounting. We give the correct
derivation by specifying the gain processes, the price processes and the dividend
processes. We also show how the traditional self-nancing condition is adjusted in
our market settings. Chapter 5 describes a least-square Monte Carlo algorithm and
provides numerical results on deal positions in European call options on equity under
the benchmark model of Black and Scholes. A nonlinearity valuation adjustment
(NVA) is introduced and computed. Chapter 6 provides details about how the
consistent valuation framework can be tailored to address other market realities.
We discuss a valuation framework which includes also the costs/benets from assets
borrowing/lending. We then study when the trade is cleared by a central clearing
house (CCP) or governed by bilateral Credit Support Annex (CSA) with variation
and initial margins. Moreover, we consider the case when the margin period of risk
is included. We conclude the thesis in the last section and hint at the nancial
implications.
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Chapter 2
Consistent Valuation Framework
In this chapter we develop a general arbitrage-free valuation framework for over
the counter (OTC) derivative deals. The chapter claries how the traditional pre-
crisis derivative price is consistently adjusted to reect the new market realities of
counterparty credit risk, collateralization and funding risk.
We refer to the two parties of an OTC deal as the investor or dealer (\I") on one
side, and the counterparty or client (\C") on the other side. Recall the probabilistic
set-up in section 1.2. Fixing a nite time horizon of the deal, T 2 R+, we dene our
risk-neutral pricing model on a ltered probability space (
;G; (Gt)t2[0;T ];Q), where
Q is the risk-neutral probability measure. The ltration (Gt)t2[0;T ] models the ow of
information of the whole market, including credit, such that the default times of the
investor I and the counterparty C are G-stopping times, and we have Gt = Ft_Ht
with the default-free market ltration given by (Ft)t2[0;T ] and the ltration generated
by the default events denoted by Ht =  (fI  ug _ fC  ug; u  t). Throughout
this work, we adopt the notational convention that Et is the risk-neutral expectation
conditional on the ltration Gt (unless otherwise specied), while Ei denotes the
conditional risk-neutral expectation given the stopped ltration Gi for i 2 fI; Cg.
Moreover, we exclude the possibility of simultaneous defaults for simplicity, and
dene the time of the rst default event among the two parties as the stopping
time,
 := (I ^ C):
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In the sequel we adopt the view of the investor and consider the cash-ows and
consequences of the deal from his perspective. In other words, when we price the
deal we obtain the value of the position to the investor. As we will see, with funding
risk this price will often not just be the value of the deal to the counterparty with
an opposite sign.
The gist of the valuation framework is conceptually simple and rests neatly on
the classical nance disciplines of risk-neutral pricing and discounting cash-ows.
When a dealer enters into a derivative deal with a client, a number of cash-ows are
exchanged, and just like valuation of any other nancial claim, discounting these
cash in- or outows gives us a deal price. Post-crisis market practice distinguishes
four dierent types of cash-ow streams occurring once a trading position has been
entered:
(i) Cash-ows coming directly from the derivative contract such as payos, coupons,
dividends, etc. We denote by (t; T ) the sum of all the discounted (at the risk-free
rate) cash-ows of a given contract happening over the time period (t; T ], where
 is an arbitrary cadlag process with nite variation. The process  models all
discounted cash-ows which are either paid out from or added to the wealth of a
contract. This is where classical derivatives pricing would usually stop and the price
of a derivative contract with maturity T would be given by
Vt = Et [ (t; T )] :
This price assumes no credit risk of the parties involved and no risk of funding the
trade.
However, present-day market practice requires the price to be adjusted by taking
further cash-ow transactions into account:
(ii) Cash-ows required by collateral margining. If the deal is collateralized, cash-
ows happen in order to maintain a collateral account that in the case of default
will be used to cover any losses. (t; T ;C) denotes the sum of the discounted (at the
risk-free rate) margining costs over the period (t; T ] with C denoting the collateral
account.
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(iii) Cash-ows exchanged once a default event has occurred. We let  (C; ") denote
the on-default cash-ow with " being the residual value of the claim traded at
default.
Lastly, (iv) cash-ows required for funding the deal. We denote the sum of the
discounted (at the risk-free rate) funding costs over the period (t; T ] by '(t; T ;F )
with F being the cash account needed for funding the deal.
Collecting all the terms and taking expectation under the risk-neutral pricing
measure, we obtain a consistent adjusted price V of a derivative deal taking into
account counterparty credit risk, collateral margining costs and funding costs
Vt(C;F ) = Et [ (t; T ^ ) + (t; T ^  ;C) + '(t; T ^  ;F ) (2.1)
+1ft<<TgD(t; ) (C; ")

;
where D(t; ) is the risk-free discount factor dened in (1.1).
By using a risk-neutral valuation approach, we see that only the payout needs
to be adjusted under collateralization, counterparty credit and funding risks. In the
following sections we will expand the terms in (2.1) and carefully discuss how to
compute them.
2.1 Valuation under collateralization and close-out netting
The ISDA master agreement is the most commonly used framework for full and
exible documentation of OTC derivative transactions and is published by the In-
ternational Swaps and Derivatives Association ([54]). Once agreed between two
parties, the master agreement sets out standard terms that apply to all deals en-
tered into between those parties. The ISDA master agreement lists two tools to
mitigate counterparty credit risk: collateralization and close-out netting. Collater-
alization of a deal means that the party which is out-of-the-money is required to
post collateral { usually cash, government securities or highly rated bonds { corre-
sponding to the amount payable by that party in the case of a default event. The
credit support annex (CSA) to the ISDA master agreement denes the rules under
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which the collateral is posted or transferred between counterparties. Close-out net-
ting means that in the case of default all transactions with the counterparty under
the ISDA master agreement are consolidated into a single net obligation which then
forms the basis for any recovery settlements.
Risk-neutral evaluation of counterparty risk taking into account the collateral-
ization and close-out netting rules can be dicult due to the complexity of clauses.
Early literature dealing with collateral inclusive pricing commonly assume that the
collateral is a risk-free asset such as in Alavian et al. [1] and Assefa et al. [3].
Brigo et al. in [18] generalized an arbitrage-free framework for valuation including
collateralization and possible rehypothecation.
The purpose of this section is to develop a model independent formula for OTC
deals, inclusive of collateralization mitigation and close-out netting convention, be-
fore we introduce the funding risk. We will analyse the margining costs required by
the collateralization, taking into account the counterparty credit eects and netting
rules at close-out.
2.1.1 Collateral convention and margin account
Collateralization of a deal usually happens according to a margining procedure.
Such a procedure involves that both parties post collateral amounts to or withdraw
collateral amounts from the collateral account C according to their current exposure
on a pre-xed time-grid ft1; : : : ; tn = Tg during the life of the deal. We dene the
collateral account Ct at t 2 [0; T ] to be a stochastic process adapted to the ltration
Gt. The terms of the margining procedure may, furthermore, include independent
amounts, minimum transfer amounts, thresholds, etc., as described in [18]. However,
here we adopt a general description of the margining procedure that does not rely
on the particular terms chosen by the parties.
Collateral accounts in general can be any type of assets (both defaultable and
risk-free), which can be liquidated at the default time. In this thesis, we assume that
the collateral account is a risk-free cash account. Furthermore, we postulate that for
each new deal, a new collateral account is opened, and when a default event happens
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or when the maturity of the trade is reached, the collateral account is closed. In
particular, Ct = 0 for all t  0 and Ct = 0 for all t  T . Upon the closure of
the collateral account, any remaining collateral held by the collateral taker will be
returned to the collateral provider.
Without loss of generality, we consider a collateral account C held by the investor.
Moreover, we assume that the investor is the collateral taker when Ct > 0 and
the collateral provider when Ct < 0. The CSA ensures that the collateral taker
remunerates the account C at an accrual rate. If the investor is the collateral taker,
he remunerates the collateral account by the accrual rate c+t (T ), while if he is the
collateral provider, the counterparty remunerates the account at the rate c t (T ).
c+t (T ) and c
 
t (T ) are Ft-adapted, thus are also Gt-adapted processes. To x ideas,
let us resort to a toy example.
Example. (Collateral example) Suppose we are at time t1 during the trade of an
equity return swap, and that the swap value is negative now with a mark to market
equal to $2M (2 Million USD) in favour of our counterparty. In this case we have
Ct1 =  $2M in the collateral account, posted by us in the past margining activity.
Since Ct1 =  $2M < 0, we receive collateral interest c , say 1% annually, on this.
With simple compounding we will receive 1%$2M1=250 = $80 on this day. Now
time moves to the next day at t2 = t1 + 1=250, the market swings heavily, the mark
to market turns around and goes to +$2M to us, or  $2M for the counterparty, so
that we expect to receive $2M in collateral while we take back the amount we had
posted previously from the collateral account. As we receive collateral, Ct2 = $2M ,
we now have to pay interest c+ to the counterparty, say 1:2% annually, so that we
pay 1:2%$2M1=250 = $96 as interest over the next day. Clearly we see that the
asymmetry of rates makes the interest on collateral posted or received on an opposite
mark to market not symmetric. We will return to this example later on.
More generally, to understand the cash-ows originating from collateralization of
the deal, let us consider the consequences of the margining procedure to the investor.
At the rst margin date, say t1, the investor opens the account and posts collateral
if he is out of the money, i.e. if Ct1 < 0, which means that the counterparty is the
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collateral taker. On each of the following margin dates tj, j 2 f2; : : : ; n   1g, the
investor posts collateral according to his exposure as long as Ctj < 0. As collateral
taker, the counterparty pays interest on the collateral at the accrual rate c tj(tj+1)
between the following margin dates tj and tj+1. We assume that interest accrued
on the collateral is saved into the account and thereby directly included in the
margining procedure and the close-out. Finally, if Ctn < 0 on the last margin date
tn, the investor closes the collateral account given no default event has occurred
in between. Similarly, for positive values of the collateral account (Ctj > 0), the
investor is instead the collateral taker. The counterparty faces corresponding cash-
ows at each margin date, and is entitled to interest payments from the investor at
the rate c+tj(tj+1) for the associated margin period. If we do not take into account the
default events and sum up all the discounted margining cash-ows of the investor
and the counterparty occurring within the time interval [t; (T ^ )], we obtain the
following expression for the margining cash-ows denoted as  (t; T ^  ;C).
 (t; T ^  ;C) =
n 1X
j=1
1ftj<g
 
D(t; tj)Ctj  D(t; tj+1)(tj; tj+1)

(2.2)
+
n 1X
j=1
1ftj< <tj+1gD(t; tj+1)(tj; tj+1) ;
where
(tj; tj+1) :=
C tj
P c
 
tj (tj+1)
+
C+tj
P c
+
tj (tj+1)
;
denotes the value of the collateral account accrued from date tj to date tj+1 as
required by the CSA, and the (collateral) zero-coupon bond is dened as P c

t (T ) :=
[1 + (T   t)ct(T )] 1.
We use the short-hand notation X+ := max(X ; 0) and X  := min(X ; 0), so for
a random variable X we have X = X+ + X .
Moreover, we assume that the probability of default at a particular time is zero.
In other words, the distribution of the default times  is assumed to be continuous
so that Q( = u) = 0 for all u  0. We dene the eective accrual collateral rate
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~ct(T )
1 as
~ct(T ) := c
 
t (T )1fCt<0g + c
+
t (T )1fCt>0g: (2.3)
From (2.2) the price of the collateral margining cash-ows is obtained by taking
the risk-neutral expectation to the discounted cash-ows
Et[  (t; T ^  ;C) ] = Et

(t; T ^  ;C) + 1f<TgD(t; )C 

;
where we introduce the pre-default value C  of the collateral account as
C  :=
n 1X
j=1
1ftj<<tj+1gCtj
P (tj+1)
P ~ctj(tj+1)
; (2.4)
and the collateral margining costs (t; T ^  ;C) entering (2.1) are dened as
(t; T ^  ;C) :=
n 1X
j=1
1ft6tj<(T^)gD(t; tj)Ctj
 
1  Ptj(tj+1)
P ~ctj(tj+1)
!
; (2.5)
with the zero-coupon bond P ~ct (T ) := [1 + (T   t)~ct(T )] 1, and the risk-free zero
coupon bond, related to the risk-free rate r, given by Pt(T ).
The pre-default value of the collateral account may be dierent from the actual
value of the collateral account at default since part or all of the collateral may be
rehypothecated. In accordance with the CSA, this pre-default value of the collateral
account is used to compute the netted exposure at close-out. In particular, we will
rst net the exposure against the pre-default value of the collateral C , and then
treat any remaining collateral as an unsecured claim.
Let j be the year fraction between tj and tj+1. If we adopt a rst order expansion
(for small c and r), we can approximate
(t; T ^  ;C) 
n 1X
j=1
1ft6tj<(T^)gD(t; tj)Ctjj
 
rtj(tj+1)  ~ctj(tj+1)

; (2.6)
1We stress the slight abuse of notation here: A plus and minus sign does not indicate that the
rates are positive or negative parts of some other rate, but instead it tells which rate is used to
accrue interest on the collateral according to the sign of the collateral account.
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where with a slight abuse of notation we call ~ct(T ) and rt(T ) the continuously (as
opposed to simple) compounded interest rates associated with the bonds P ~c and P .
This last expression clearly shows a cost of carry structure for collateral costs. If
C is positive to the investor, then the investor is holding collateral and will have
to pay (hence the minus sign) an interest c+, while receiving the natural growth r
for cash, since we are in a risk-neutral world. In the opposite case, if the investor
posts collateral, the collateral account value C is negative to the investor and the
investor receives interest c  while paying the risk-free rate, as should happen when
one shorts cash in a risk-neutral world.
A crucial role in collateral procedures is played by rehypothecation. We discuss
rehypothecation and its inherent liquidity risk in the following.
Rehypothecation Liquidity Risk Often the CSA grants the collateral taker
relatively unrestricted use of the collateral for his liquidity and trading needs un-
til it is returned to the collateral provider. This unrestricted use includes selling
collateral to a third party and lending or selling the collateral under a \repo" agree-
ment. Rehypothecation is widespread as a practice, since it can lower the costs of
remuneration of the provided collateral. However, while without rehypothecation
the collateral provider can expect to get any excess collateral returned after hon-
oring the amount payable on the deal, if rehypothecation is allowed, the collateral
provider has to face the risk of losing a fraction or all of the excess collateral in case
of default on the collateral taker's part. Indeed, when the collateral is rehypoth-
ecated, the collateral taker leaves the collateral provider as an unsecured creditor
with respect to the collateral reimbursement.
We denote the recovery fraction on the rehypothecated collateral by R0I when the
investor is the collateral taker and by R0C when the counterparty is the collateral
taker. Recall that we dened in Chapter 1 that the general recovery fraction on
the market value of the deal that the investor receives in the case of default of
the counterparty is denoted by RC , while RI is the recovery fraction received by
the counterparty if the investor defaults. All such quantities are dened on a unit
notional. The collateral provider typically has precedence over other creditors of
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the defaulting party in getting back any excess capital, which means RI 6 R0I 6 1
and RC 6 R0C 6 1. If no rehypothecation is allowed and the collateral is kept
safely in a segregated account, we have that R0I = R
0
C = 1. We do not rule out the
case where the collateral losses are treated as standard unsecured debit losses upon
default events, namely, when R0 = R.
Example. (Collateral example continued) As in our previous case, suppose we
have posted $2M in the collateral account and we receive 1% annual interest from
the counterparty. If the counterparty can rehypothecate collateral, they can use this
collateral and post it in another trade, and gain interest on that. This will oset
the $80 daily cost they pay us and ease their funding costs. Clearly we may also like
to rehypothecate collateral when we receive it, for the same reason. Suppose how-
ever that the mark to market moves in our favour at t2 as in the previous example
to +$2M . We move to t2 but before the counterparty may post $2M collateral it
defaults. This is the worst case. Not only we face a loss on our mark to market,
since there is no collateral in the account to cover our loss, but also when we go to
the account to take back at least the collateral we posted the previous day, we nd
that we can only get a recovery of that since the counterparty had rehypothecated
our collateral and has now defaulted. We may only receive a recovery on that collat-
eral. If the recovery rate R0C is 20%, we will receive back only 20% $2M , namely
$400; 000, losing $2M on the mark to market of today and $1:6M on the collateral
posted yesterday.
Detailed analysis for the impact of rehypothecation on the pricing of counterparty
risk was carried out in Brigo et al. [18] for interest-rate derivatives and in Brigo et
al. [17] for credit derivatives.
Perfect Collateralization Let's consider a special case for the counterparty risk
valuation including collateralization{perfect collateralization. By perfect collateral-
ization, we mean when the collateral margining is done in continuous time, with
continuous mark-to-market of the deal upon default events. Under perfect collater-
alization, the collateral account is dened as the sum of the mark-to-market of the
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deal and the collateral margining costs at any time t < T , namely,
Ct := Et[ (t; T ) + (t; T ;C) ] ;
and the close-out amount is equivalent to the collateral price,
"C; = "I; = C :
Here "I; is the close-out amount on the counterparty's default priced at time  by
the investor and "C; is the close-out amount computed by the counterparty if the
investor defaults.
Recall the adjusted price of a deal before introducing the funding risk is calcu-
lated by taking the risk-neutral expectation of the contractual cash-ows and the
margining cash-ows, written as
Vt(C) = Et

(t; T ^ ) + (t; T ^  ;C) + 1ft<<TgD(t; )C

: (2.7)
Under the assumption of perfect collateralization, the above expression can be sim-
plied as
Vt(C) = Et[ (t; T ) + (t; T ;C) ] = Ct: (2.8)
If we consider two adjacent margining dates in the discrete setting tj and tj+1,
with 1  j  n  1, tn = T , by substituting the expression for margining cash-ows
into equation (2.8) up to maturity, we get
Vtj(C) =
P ~ctj(tj+1)
Ptj(tj+1)
Etj

D(tj; tj+1) Vtj+1(C) + (tj; tj+1)

; Vtn(C) = 0:
Making use of the recursive nature, we can write
Vt(C) = Et
"
n 1X
j=1
(tj; tj+1)D(t; tj)
jY
i=1
P ~cti(ti+1)
Pti(ti+1)
#
:
In the perfect collateralization case, collateral margining and mark-to-market are
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assumed to be carried out continuously in time. Taking the limit of the above
expression, one has
Vt(C) = Et
 Z T
t
e 
R s
t ~cudu(s; s+ ds)

: (2.9)
Therefore, the adjusted price of a deal under perfect collateralization is obtained
by taking the expected value of the future cash ows discounted at the eective
collateral rate ~c. One interesting result is that the risk-free rate r disappears from
the valuation formula.
2.1.2 Close-out netting rules
In case of default all terminated transactions under the ISDA master agreement
with a given counterparty are netted and consolidated into a single claim. This also
includes any posted collateral to back the transactions. In this context the close-out
amount plays a central role in calculating the on-default cash-ows. The close-out
amount is the costs or losses that the surviving party incurs when replacing the
terminated deal with an economic equivalent. Clearly, the close-out amount is not
symmetric to the two parties, since the size of these costs will depend on which
party survives. We dene the close-out amount as
" := 1f=C<Ig"I; + 1f=I<Cg"C; ; (2.10)
where "I; is the close-out amount on the counterparty's default priced at time 
by the investor and "C; is the close-out amount computed by the counterparty
if the investor defaults. Bearing in mind that the investor and the counterparty
may evaluate close-out amount dierently, we always consider the deal from the
investor's viewpoint in terms of the sign of the cash-ows involved. This means that
if the close-out amount "I; as measured by the investor is positive, the investor
is a creditor of the counterpaty, while if it is negative, the investor is a debtor of
the counterparty. Analogously, if the close-out amount "C; to the counterparty but
viewed from the investor is positive, the investor is a creditor of the counterparty,
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and if it is negative, the investor is a debtor to the counterparty.
We note that the ISDA documentation is, in fact, not very specic in terms of
how to actually calculate the close-out amount. Since 2009 ISDA has allowed for
the possibility to switch from a risk-free close-out rule to a replacement close-out
rule that includes the DVA of the surviving party in the recoverable amount. Parker
and McGarry [65] and Weeber and Robson [73] show how a wide range of values of
the close-out amount can be produced within the terms of ISDA. We refer to Brigo
et al. [18] and the references therein for further discussions on these issues. Here,
we adopt the approach of [18] listing the cash-ows of all the various scenarios that
can occur if default happens. Our aim is to determine the present value of all cash
ows taking into account the collateral margining procedures and close-out netting
rules upon default events.
We start by considering all possible scenarios that may arise upon the rst default
event. For example, if the counterparty defaults rst (" = "I; ), one of the following
four dierent scenarios can happen:
1. If the investor has a positive exposure on the default of the counterparty and
the counterparty has posted collateral to the investor, then the on-default
cash-ow is given as the investor's exposure netted by any available collateral
1 ("I; ) = 1f=C<Tg1f">0g1fC >0g
 
RC("   C )+ + ("   C ) 

:
2. If the investor has a positive exposure on counterparty's default but the in-
vestor has posted collateral to the counterparty, then the investor suers a loss
on the whole exposure and on the collateral if it has been rehypothecated
2 ("I; ) = 1f=C<Tg1f">0g1fC <0g (RC"  R0CC ) :
3. If the investor has a negative exposure towards the counterparty and the coun-
terparty has posted collateral to the investor, then the investor returns the
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collateral and pays the full exposure to the creditors of the counterparty
3 ("I; ) = 1f=C<Tg1f"<0g1fC >0g ("   C ) :
4. If the investor has a negative exposure but has posted collateral to the counter-
party, then the exposure is netted with the posted collateral and the investor
pays any remaining exposure or receives any excess collateral
4 ("I; ) = 1f=C<Tg1f"<0g1fC <0g
 
("   C )  +R0C("   C )+

:
Similarly, we can list the cash-ows exchanged under all the scenarios in the case
when the investor defaults rst, where " = "C; :
5. If the close-out amount to the counterparty is positive from the investor's
point of view on the default of the investor, and the collateral is posted by the
counterparty to the investor, then the investor receives the remaining exposure
netted by the collateral, or pays any excess collateral
5 ("C; ) = 1f=I<Tg1f">0g1fC >0g
 
("   C )+ +R0I("   C ) 

:
6. If the counterparty has a negative exposure, i.e. " > 0 from the investor's
point of view, and the investor has posted collateral to the counterparty, then
the counterparty pays the full exposure to the investor and returns the collat-
eral
6 ("C; ) = 1f=I<Tg1f">0g1fC <0g("   C ) :
7. If the close-out amount to the counterparty is negative seen by the investor,
and the counterparty has posted collateral to the investor, then the counter-
party would face a loss on the exposure and a possible loss on the collateral if
it has been rehypothecated
7 ("C; ) = 1f=I<Tg1f"<0g1fC >0g(RI"  R0IC ) :
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8. If the counterparty have a positive exposure, i.e. " < 0, viewed by the
investor, and the investor has posted collateral to the counterparty, then the
on-default cash-ow is given as the exposure netted by any available collateral
8 ("C; ) = 1f=I<Tg1f"<0g1fC <0g
 
("   C )+ +RI("   C ) 

:
If we aggregate all these cash-ows and the pre-default value of collateral account,
we have the discounted on-default cash-ow given as
 (C; ") = C  + 
1
 ("I; ) + 
2
 ("I; ) + 
3
 ("I; ) + 
4
 ("I; )
+ 5 ("C; ) + 
6
 ("C; ) + 
7
 ("C; ) + 
8
 ("C; ):
Combining the above cash-ow with the contractual cash ows and the cash
ows from the collateral margining, and taking expectation under the risk-neutral
pricing measure, we reach the following proposition.
Proposition 2.1.1. The collateral inclusive bilateral counterparty risk valuation
adjusted pricing formula (without considering funding and investing costs) at time
t <  is given by
Vt(C) = Et

(t; T ^ ) + (t; T ^  ;C) + 1ft<<TgD(t; ) (C; ")

; (2.11)
where the on-default cash-ow is dened as
 (C; ") := 1f=C<Ig
 
"I;   LGDC("+I;   C+ )+   LGD0C(" I;   C  )+

+ 1f=I<Cg
 
"C;   LGDI(" C;   C  )    LGD0I("+C;   C+ ) 

: (2.12)
We dene the loss-given-default as LGDC := 1   RC, and the collateral loss-given-
default due to rehypothecation as LGD0C := 1 R0C.
Proof. The rst two terms in the pricing formula (2.11) are straightforward. We
focus on the simplication of the on-default cash-ow term which has been broken
down into the pre-default collateral value and eight default cases. We now combine
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the cases step by step:
1 ("I; ) + 
2
 ("I; )
= 1fC<Ig1f"I;<0g
h
1fC >0g("I;   C )
+ 1fC <0g

("I;   C )  +R0C("I;   C )+
i
= 1fC<Ig1f"I;<0g
h
("I;   C )  1fC <0g

("I;   C )+  R0C("I;   C )+
i
= 1fC<Ig
h
1f"I;<0g("I;   C )  LGD0C(" I;   C  )+   1f"I;>0gLGD0CC  
i
;
For case 3 and 4, we have
3 ("I; ) + 
4
 ("I; )
= 1fC<Ig1f"I;>0g
h
1fC >0g

("I;   C )  +RC("I;   C )+

+ 1fC <0g(RC"I;  R0CC )
i
= 1fC<Ig1f"I;>0g
h
(RC"I;  R0CC ) + 1fC >0g

("I;   C )  LGDC("I;   C )+
  (RC"I;  R0CC )
i
= 1fC<Ig
h
1f"I;>0g(RC"I;  R0CC ) + 1f"I;>0g1fC >0g(LGDC"I;   LGD0CC )
  LGDC("+I;   C+ )+ + 1fC <0gLGDC"+I;
i
:
Combining the above 4 cases yields
1 ("I; ) + 
2
 ("I; ) + 
3
 ("I; ) + 
4
 ("I; )
= 1fC<Ig
h
"I;   C    LGDC("+I;   C+ )+   LGD0C(" I;   C  )+
i
:
Using a similar technique, we can calculate the sum of the rest of cash ows:
5 ("C; ) + 
6
 ("C; )
= 1fI<Cg
h
1f"C;>0g("C;   C )  LGD0I("+C;   C+ )    1f"C;<0g1fC >0gLGD0IC 
i
;
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and
6 ("C; ) + 
7
 ("C; )
= 1fI<Cg
h
1f"C;<0g(RI"C;  R0IC ) + 1f"C;<0g1fC <0g(LGDI"C;   LGD0IC )
  LGDI(" C;   C  )  + 1f"C;<0g1fC >0gLGDI"C;
i
:
Therefore, the sum of the cash ows of cases 5-8 is
5 ("C; ) + 
6
 ("C; ) + 
7
 ("C; ) + 
8
 ("C; )
= 1fI<Cg
h
"C;   C    LGDI(" C;   C  )    LGD0I("+I;   C+ ) 
i
:
Putting all terms together with the pre-default value of the collateral account, we
arrive at expression (2.12) for the on-default cash-ow.
If both parties agree on the exposure, namely "I; = "C; = " , when we take the
risk-neutral expectation in (2.12), we see that the price of the discounted on-default
cash-ow,
Et[1ft<<TgD(t; ) (C; ")] = Et[1ft<<TgD(t; ) " ]  CVA(t; T ;C) + DVA(t; T ;C);
(2.13)
is the present value of the close-out amount reduced by the collateralized CVA and
DVA terms
CVA(t; T ;C) := Et

1f=C<TgD(t; )CVAcoll()

;
DVA(t; T ;C) := Et

1f=I<TgD(t; )DVAcoll()

; (2.14)
and
CVAcoll(s) =
 
LGDC("
+
I;s   C+s )+ + LGD0C(" I;s   C s )+
  0;
DVAcoll(s) =  
 
LGDI("
 
C;s   C s )  + LGD0I("+C;s   C+s ) 
  0:
Also, observe that if rehypothecation of the collateral is not allowed, the terms
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multiplied by LGD0C and LGD
0
I drop out of the CVA and DVA calculations.
In order to aid the reader, for the rest of the thesis, we will simplify the model
by assuming that both parties agree on the exposure, i.e. "I; = "C; = " , unless
otherwise stated.
2.2 Valuation under funding risk
The hedging strategy that perfectly replicates the no-arbitrage price of a derivative
is formed by a position in cash and a position in a portfolio of hedging instruments.
When we talk about funding of a derivative deal, we essentially mean the cash
position that is required to establish the hedging strategy, and with funding costs
we refer to the costs of maintaining this cash position. If we denote the cash account
by F and the risky-asset account by H, we get
Vt = Ft +Ht :
In the classical Black-Scholes-Merton theory, the risky part H of the hedge would
be a delta position in the underlying stock, whereas the risk-less part F would be a
position in the risk-free bank account.
If the deal is collateralized, the margining procedure is included in the deal
denition insuring that funding of the collateral is automatically taken into account.
Moreover, if rehypothecation is allowed for the collateralized deal, the collateral taker
can use the posted collateral as a funding source, and thereby reduce or maybe even
eliminate the costs of funding the deal. Thus, we have the following two denitions
of the funding account:
(i) If rehypothecation of the posted collateral is forbidden, we have
Ft := Vt  Ht; (2.15)
(ii) If such rehypothecation is allowed, then
Ft := Vt  Ht   Ct: (2.16)
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By implication of (2.16) and (2.15) it is obvious that, at time t, if the funding
account Ft > 0, the dealer needs to borrow cash to establish the hedging strategy.
Correspondingly, if the funding account Ft < 0, the hedging strategy requires the
dealer to invest surplus cash. Specically, we assume the dealer enters a funding
position on a discrete time-grid ft1; : : : ; tmg during the life of the deal. Given two
adjacent funding times tj and tj+1, for 1  j  m 1, the dealer enters a position in
cash equal to Ftj at time tj. At time tj+1 the dealer redeems the position again and
either returns the cash to the funder if it was a long cash position and pays funding
costs on the borrowed cash, or he gets the cash back if it was a short cash position
and receives funding benets as interest on the invested cash. We assume that these
funding costs and benets are determined at the start date of each funding period
and charged at the end of the period.
The price of the contracts used by the investor to fund the deal, without loss of
generality, are assumed to be adapted processes. Let P
~f
t (T ) represent the price of a
borrowing (or lending) contract measurable at t where the dealer pays (or receives)
one unit of cash at maturity T > t. We introduce the eective funding rate ~ft as
a function: ~ft = f(t; F;H;C), assuming that it depends on the cash account Ft,
hedging account Ht and collateral account Ct. Moreover, the zero-coupon bond
corresponding to the eective funding rate is dened as
P
~f
t (T ) := [1 + (T   t) ~ft(T )] 1:
If we assume that the dealer hedges the derivatives position by trading in the
spot market of the underlying asset(s), and the hedging strategy is implemented
on the same time-grid as the funding procedure of the deal, the sum of discounted
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cash-ows from funding the hedging strategy during the life of the deal is equal to
'(t; T ^  ;F;H)
=
m 1X
j=1
1ft6tj<(T^)gD(t; tj)
 
Ftj   (Ftj +Htj)
Ptj(tj+1)
P
~f
tj(tj+1)
+Htj
Ptj(tj+1)
P
~f
tj(tj+1)
!
=
m 1X
j=1
1ft6tj<(T^)gD(t; tj)Ftj
 
1  Ptj(tj+1)
P
~f
tj(tj+1)
!
: (2.17)
This is, strictly speaking, a discounted payout and the funding cost or benet at
time t is obtained by taking the risk neutral expectation of the above cash-ows.
For a trading example giving more details on how the above formula for ' originates
see [20].
As we can see from equation (2.17), the dependence of the hedging account
dropped o from the funding procedure. For modelling convenience, we can dene
the eective funding rate ~ft faced by the dealer as
~ft(T ) := f
 
t (T )1fFt<0g + f
+
t (T )1fFt>0g : (2.18)
A related framework would be to consider the hedging account H as being perfectly
collateralized and to use the collateral to fund the hedging account, so that there is
no funding cost associated with the hedging account.
As before with collateral costs, we may rewrite the cash ows for funding as a
rst order approximation in continuously compounded rates ~f and r associated to
the relevant bonds. We obtain
'(t; T ^  ;F ) 
m 1X
j=1
1ft6tj<(T^)gD(t; tj)Ftjj

rtj(tj+1)  ~ftj(tj+1)

; (2.19)
where j is the time fraction between tj and tj+1. To help clarify the process, we
look at the following toy example.
Example. (Equity call option example) We consider a one period Binomial
model for the stock price where the current stock price is S0 = $100 and moves to
S1, which can be either $125 or $75 in one years time. Let us consider a one year
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expiry call option on this stock with strike $100. The option payo V1 will then be
either $25 or $0 at expiry. We now investigate what happens at each time step if
we sell this option.
At time 0 we receive cash V0 from selling the option and we put cash C0 into
the collateral account. We borrow S0 ($100) amount of cash from the treasury
and buy  units of the stock to set up the delta hedging portfolio. At this step, the
risky-asset account is given by H0 = S0 and the funding cash account is given by
F0 = V0   C0  H0.
Now we consider the cash-ows in one year. We pay V1 to the counterparty to
close the deal. We sell the stock and receive S1 (either $125 or $75 depending
on the state of the world). Finally, we get back the collateral and receive interest at
the collateral rate c+ resulting in a net cash-ow of C0(1+c
+). The net amount that
is borrowed from the treasury is given by F0, which accrues at the funding borrowing
rate f+ and generates a cash-ow of (V0   C0  H0)(1 + f+).
The sum of all the net cash-ows yields
(V0   C0  H0)(1 + f+)  V1 + C0(1 + c+) + S1
= (V1   V0)  f+V0 + (f+   c+)C0  (S1   S0)  f+H0;
which needs to be zero over this period in order to avoid arbitrage and replicate the
option. We therefore obtain the following two equations in our binomial model:
(25  V0)  f+V0 + (f+   c+)C0  (125  100)  f+100 = 0; (2.20)
(0  V0)  f+V0 + (f+   c+)C0  (75  100)  f+100 = 0: (2.21)
If we assume perfect collateralization, i.e. C0 = V0, and that the collateral rate is
c+ = 1% and the borrowing rate is f+ = 1:2%, we nd that the derivative price V0
is $12:97 and the delta hedge is  = 0:5.
We should also mention that, occasionally, we may include the eects of repo
markets or stock lending in our framework. In general, we may borrow/lend the
cash needed to establish H from/to our treasury, and we may then use the risky
Chapter 2. Consistent Valuation Framework 53
asset in H for repo or stock lending/borrowing in the market. This means that
we could include the funding costs and benets coming from this use of the risky
asset. In this chapter we assume that the bank Treasury automatically recognizes
this benet/cost to us at the same rate ~f used for cash, but for a more general
framework involving repo rate ~h see Chapter 6 for a quick discussion and see for
example [20, 61] for a more detailed analysis.
The particular positions entered by the dealer to either borrow or invest cash
according to the sign and size of the funding account depend on the bank's liquidity
policy. In the following we discuss two possible cases: One that the dealer can fund
at rates set by the bank's treasury department, and another that the dealer goes to
the market directly and funds his trades at the prevailing market rates. As a result,
the funding rates and therefore the funding eect on the price of a derivative deal
depends intimately on the chosen liquidity policy.
2.2.1 Treasury funding
If the dealer funds the hedge through the bank's treasury department, at time t,
the treasury determines the funding rates ft faced by the dealer. We assume an
average of funding costs and benets is applied across all deals, regardless of the
specic deal. This leads to two curves as functions of maturity: one for borrowing
funds f+ and one for lending funds f .
After entering a funding position Ftj at time tj, for 1  j  m   1, the dealer
faces the following discounted cash-ow
j(tj; tj+1;F ) :=  NtjD(tj; tj+1) ; (2.22)
with
Ntj :=
F tj
P f
 
tj (tj+1)
+
F+tj
P f
+
tj (tj+1)
:
Under this liquidity policy, the treasury { and not the dealer himself { is in charge
of debt valuation adjustments due to funding-related positions. Also, being entities
of the same institution, both the dealer and the treasury disappear in case of the
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default of the institution without any further cash-ows being exchanged and we
can neglect the eects of funding in this case. So, when default risk is considered,
this leads to the following denition of the funding cash ows
j(tj; tj+1;F ) := 1f>tjgj(tj; tj+1;F ) :
Thus, the risk-neutral price of the cash-ows due to the funding positions entered
at time tj is
Etj

j(tj; tj+1;F )

=  1f>tjg
 
F tj
Ptj(tj+1)
P f
 
tj (tj+1)
+ F+tj
Ptj(tj+1)
P f
+
tj (tj+1)
!
:
If we consider a sequence of such funding operations at each time tj during the life
of the deal, we can dene the sum of the cash-ows coming from all the borrowing
and lending positions opened by the dealer to hedge the trade up to the rst-default
event as follows,
'(t; T ^  ;F ) :=
m 1X
j=1
1ft6tj<(T^)gD(t; tj)
 
Ftj + Etj

j(tj; tj+1;F )

=
m 1X
j=1
1ft6tj<(T^)gD(t; tj)
 
Ftj   F tj
Ptj(tj+1)
P f
 
tj (tj+1)
  F+tj
Ptj(tj+1)
P f
+
tj (tj+1)
!
:
In terms of the eective funding rate, this expression collapses to
'(t; T ^  ;F ) :=
m 1X
j=1
1ft6tj<(T^)gD(t; tj)Ftj
 
1  Ptj(tj+1)
P
~f
tj(tj+1)
!
; (2.23)
where the zero-coupon bond corresponding to the eective funding rate is dened as
P
~f
t (T ) := [1+(T t) ~ft(T )] 1. This is, strictly speaking, a discounted payout and the
funding cost or benet at time t is obtained by taking the risk-neutral expectation
of the above cash-ows.
As before with collateral costs, we may rewrite the cash ows for funding as a
rst order approximation in continuously compounded rates ~f and r associated to
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the relevant bonds. We obtain
'(t; T ^  ;F ) 
m 1X
j=1
1ft6tj<(T^)gD(t; tj)Ftjj

rtj(tj+1)  ~ftj(tj+1)

: (2.24)
2.2.2 Market funding
If the dealer funds the hedging strategy directly in the market { and not through the
bank's treasury { the funding rates are determined by prevailing market conditions
and are often deal specic. This means that the rate f+ the dealer can borrow funds
at may be dierent from the rate f  at which funds can be invested. Moreover, these
rates may dier across deals depending on the deals' notional, maturity structures,
dealer-client relationship, and so forth. Similar to the liquidity policy of treasury
funding, we assume a deal's funding operations are closed down in the case of default.
Furthermore, as the dealer now operates directly on the market, he needs to include
a debit valuation adjustment due to his funding positions when he marks-to-market
his trading books. For simplicity, we assume that the funder in the market is default-
free so no funding CVA needs to be accounted for. The discounted cash-ows from
the borrowing or lending position, incorporated with the default probability of the
dealer, between two adjacent funding times tj and tj+1, for 1  j  m  1, is given
by
j(tj; tj+1;F ) := 1f>tjg1fI>tj+1gj(tj; tj+1;F )
  1f>tjg1fI<tj+1g(LGDI" F;I   "F;I )D(tj; I) ;
or equivalently,
j(tj; tj+1;F ) := 1f>tjg1fI>tj+1gj(tj; tj+1;F )
  1f>tjg1fI<tj+1g(RI" F;I + "+F;I )D(tj; I) ;
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where j(tj; tj+1;F ) is as dened in (2.22), and "F;t is the close-out amount calcu-
lated by the funder on the dealer's default as
"F;I :=  NtjPI (tj+1) :
To price this funding cash-ow, we take the expectation under the risk-neutral prob-
ability measure
Etj

j(tj; tj+1;F )

= Etj
"
 1f>tjg1fI>tj+1gD(tj; tj+1)
 
F tj
P f
 
tj (tj+1)
+
F+tj
P f
+
tj (tj+1)
!
 1f>tjg1fI<tj+1gD(tj; I)
 
F tj
P f
 
tj (tj+1)
+RI
F+tj
P f
+
tj (tj+1)
!
PI (tj+1)
#
:
Since PI (tj+1) = EI [D(I ; tj+1) ], we can write the above expectation as
Etj

j(tj; tj+1;F )

= Etj
(
 1f>tjg1fI>tj+1gD(tj; tj+1)
 
F tj
P f
 
tj (tj+1)
+
F+tj
P f
+
tj (tj+1)
!
 EI
"
1f>tjg1fI<tj+1gD(tj; tj+1)
 
F tj
P f
 
tj (tj+1)
+RI
F+tj
P f
+
tj (tj+1)
!#)
=  Etj
(
1f>tjgD(tj; tj+1)
"
1fI>tj+1g
 
F tj
P f
 
tj (tj+1)
+
F+tj
P f
+
tj (tj+1)
!
+ 1fI<tj+1g
 
F tj
P f
 
tj (tj+1)
+RI
F+tj
P f
+
tj (tj+1)
!#)
=  Etj
(
1f>tjgD(tj; tj+1)
 
F tj
P f
 
tj (tj+1)
+
F+tj
P f
+
tj (tj+1)
(RI + 1fI>tj+1gLGDI)
!)
:
If we dene the zero-coupon funding bond for borrowing cash adjusted for the
dealer's credit risk as
P f
+
t (T ) :=
P f
+
t (T )
ETt

LGDI1fI>Tg +RI
 ;
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with the expectation on the right hand side being taken under the T -forward mea-
sure, we can write the risk-neutral price of the cash-ows due to the funding positions
at time tj as
Etj

j(tj; tj+1;F )

=  1f>tjg
 
F tj
Ptj(tj+1)
P f
 
tj (tj+1)
+ F+tj
Ptj(tj+1)
P f
+
tj (tj+1)
!
:
Naturally, since the seniority could be dierent, one might assume a dierent re-
covery rate on the funding position than on the derivatives deal itself (see [39]).
Extensions to this case are straightforward.
Now, summing up the discounted cash-ows from the sequence of funding oper-
ations through the life of the deal, we get
'(t; T ^  ;F ) :=
m 1X
j=1
1ft6tj<T^gD(t; tj)
 
Ftj + Etj

j(tj; tj+1;F )

=
m 1X
j=1
1ft6tj<T^gD(t; tj)
 
Ftj   F tj
Ptj(tj+1)
P f
 
tj (tj+1)
  F+tj
Ptj(tj+1)
P f
+
tj (tj+1)
!
:
Notice that, if we set RI = 1 (so that LGDI = 0), we get that P
f+
t (T ) is equal to
P f
+
t (T ), and we recover the previous example.
To avoid cumbersome notation, we will not explicitly write P f
+
in the sequel,
but just keep in mind that when the dealer funds directly in the market then P f
+
needs to be adjusted for funding DVA. Thus, in terms of the eective funding rate,
we obtain (2.17).
2.3 General pricing equations for OTC contracts
In the previous section we analysed the discounted cash-ows of a derivative deal
and we developed a framework for consistent valuation of such deals under collat-
eralization, counterparty credit risk and funding risk. The arbitrage-free pricing
framework is captured in the following theorem.
Theorem 2.3.1 (General pricing equation). The consistent arbitrage-free price
Vt(C;F ) of collateralized OTC derivative deals with counterparty credit risk and
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funding costs takes the form
Vt(C;F ) = Et [ (t; T ^ ) + (t; T ^  ;C) + '(t; T ^  ;F ) (2.25)
+1ft<<TgD(t; ) (C; ")

;
where
1. (t; T ^ ) is the discounted cash-ows from the contract's payo structure up
to the rst-default event.
2. (t; T ^  ;C) is the discounted cash-ows from the collateral margining proce-
dure up to the rst-default event and is dened in (2.5).
3. '(t; T ^ ;F ) is the discounted cash-ows from funding the hedging strategy up
to the rst-default event and is dened in (2.17).
4.  (C; ") is the on-default cash-ow with close-out amount " and is dened in
(2.12).
If funding and collateral margining costs are discarded, while collateral is re-
tained for loss reduction at default, this pricing equation collapses to the formula
derived in [18] for the price of a derivative under bilateral counterparty credit risk.
If further collateral guarantees are dropped, the formula reduces to the bilateral
credit valuation formula in Proposition 1.2.3.
While the pricing equation is conceptually clear { we simply take the expectation
of the sum of all discounted cash-ows of the deal under the risk-neutral measure
{ solving the equation poses a recursive, nonlinear problem. The future paths of
the eective funding rate ~f depend on the future signs of the funding account F ,
i.e. whether we need to borrow or lend cash on each future funding date. At
the same time, through the relations (2.16) and (2.15), the future sign and size of
the funding account F depend on the adjusted price V of the deal which is the
quantity we are trying to compute in the rst place. One crucial implication of
this recursive structure of the pricing problem is the fact that FVA is generally not
just an additive adjustment term, in contrast to CVA and DVA. More importantly,
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the conjecture identifying the DVA of a deal with its funding is wrong in general.
Only in the unrealistic setting where the dealer can fund an uncollateralized trade
at equal borrowing and lending rates, i.e. f+ = f , do we achieve the additive
structure often assumed by practitioners. If the trade is collateralized, we need to
impose even further restrictions as to how the collateral is linked to price of the
trade V .
Remark 2.3.2. The law of one price. On the theoretical side, the pricing equa-
tion shakes the foundation of the celebrated Law of One Price prevailing in classical
derivatives pricing. Clearly, if we assume no funding costs, the dealer and coun-
terparty agree on the price of the deal as both parties can { at least theoretically {
observe the credit risk of each other through CDS contracts traded in the market and
the relevant market risks, thus agreeing on CVA and DVA. In contrast, introduc-
ing funding costs, they will not agree on the FVA for the deal due to asymmetric
information. The parties cannot observe each others' liquidity policies nor their re-
spective funding costs associated with a particular deal. As a result, the value of
a deal position will not generally be the same to the counterparty as to the dealer
just with an opposite sign. In principle, this should mean that the dealer and the
counterparty would never close the trade, but in practice trades are executed as a
simple consequence of the fundamental forces of supply and demand. Nevertheless,
among dealers it is a general belief that funding costs were one of the main factors
driving the bid-ask spreads wider during the recent nancial crisis.
Finally, as we adopt a risk-neutral valuation framework, we implicitly assume
the existence of a risk-free interest rate. Indeed, since the valuation adjustments
are included as additional cash-ows and not as ad-hoc spreads, all the cash-ows
are discounted by the risk-free discount factor D(t; T ) in (2.25). Nevertheless, the
risk-free rate is merely an instrumental variable of the general pricing equation.
We clearly distinguish market rates from the theoretical risk-free rate avoiding the
false claim that the over-night rates (e.g., EONIA) are risk-free. In fact, as we will
show later in continuous time, if the dealer funds the hedging strategy of the trade
through cash accounts available to him { whether as rehypothecated collateral or
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funds from the treasury, repo market, etc. { the risk-free rate vanishes from the
pricing equation.
2.3.1 Discrete-time formulation
Our purpose in this section is to turn the recursive pricing equation (2.25) into
a set of iterative equations that can be solved numerically. The use of the least-
squares Monte Carlo methods is already standard in CVA and DVA calculations
(for example in Brigo and Pallavicini [28]). To this end, we introduce the auxiliary
function
(tj; tj+1;C) := (tj; tj+1^)+(tj; tj+1^ ;C)+1ftj<<tj+1gD(tj; ) (C; ") (2.26)
which denes the cash-ows of the deal occurring between time tj and tj+1 adjusted
for collateral margining costs and default risks. We stress the fact that the close-
out amount used for calculating the on-default cash-ow still refers to a deal with
maturity T . If we then solve pricing equation (2.25) at each funding date tj in the
time-grid ft1; : : : ; tn = Tg, we obtain the deal price V at time tj as a function of
the deal price on the next consecutive funding date tj+1,
Vtj = Etj

Vtj+1D(tj; tj+1) +
(tj; tj+1;C)

+
1f>tjg
 
Ftj   F tj
Ptj(tj+1)
P f
 
tj (tj+1)
  F+tj
Ptj(tj+1)
P f
+
tj (tj+1)
!
;
Furthermore, we have the terminal condition Vtn := 0 on the nal date tn =
T . Recall the denitions of the funding account in (2.16) if no rehypothecation of
collateral is allowed and in (2.15) if rehypothecation is permitted. We can substitute
the two equations of F and then solve the above equation for the positive and
negative parts of the funding account respectively. The outcome is a discrete-time
iterative solution of the recursive pricing equation, provided in the following theorem.
Theorem 2.3.3 (Discrete-time solution of the general pricing equation).
We may solve the full recursive pricing equation in Theorem 2.3.1 as a set of
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backward-iterative equations on the time-grid ft1; : : : ; tn = Tg with Vtn := 0. For
 < tj, we have
Vtj = 0;
while for  > tj, we have
(i) if re-hypothecation is forbidden:
 
Vtj  Htj

= P
~f
tj(tj+1)

Etj+1tj

Vtj+1 +
(tj; tj+1;C) Htj
D(tj; tj+1)

;
(ii) if re-hypothecation is allowed:
 
Vtj   Ctj  Htj

= P
~f
tj(tj+1)

Etj+1tj

Vtj+1 +
(tj; tj+1;C)  Ctj  Htj
D(tj; tj+1)

;
where the expectations are taken under the Qtj+1-forward measure.
The  sign in the theorem is supposed to stress the fact that the sign of the
funding account, which determines the eective funding rate, depends on the sign
of the conditional expectation. Further intuition may be gained by moving to the
continuous time setting which is the case we will now turn to.
2.3.2 Continuous-time formulation
Let us consider a continuous-time approximation of the general pricing equation. In
the following, we assume that rehypothecation is allowed, but similar results hold if
this is not the case. This implies that collateral margining, funding procedures and
hedging strategies are executed in continuous time. By taking the time limit, we
have the following expressions for the discounted cash-ow streams of the deal
(t; T ^ ) =
Z T^
t
D(t; s)(s; s+ ds);
(t; T ^  ;C) =
Z T^
t
(rs   ~cs)CsD(t; s)ds;
'(t; T ^  ;F ) =
Z T^
t
(rs   ~fs)FsD(t; s)ds;
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where as before, (t; t+ dt) is the payo coupon process of the derivative contract
and rt is the risk-free rate. These last two equations can be immediately derived by
looking at the approximations given in equations (2.6) and (2.24).
Then, putting all the above terms together with the on-default cash-ow as
in Theorem 2.3.1, and substituting the funding account as dened in (2.16), the
recursive pricing equation yields
Vt =
Z T
t
Et

D(t; s)
 
1fs<g(s; s+ ds) + 1f2dsgs(C; ")
 
+
Z T
t
Et

1fs<g(rs   ~cs)CsD(t; s)

ds+
Z T
t
Et
h
1fs<g(rs   ~fs)FsD(t; s)
i
ds:
(2.27)
By recalling equation (2.13), we can write the following
Proposition 2.3.4. The value Vt of the claim under credit gap risk, collateral and
funding costs can be written as
Vt = Vt   CVAt + DVAt + LVAt + FVAt (2.28)
where Vt is the price of the deal when there is no credit risk, no collateral, and
there is no funding costs. LVA is a liquidity valuation adjustment accounting for the
costs/benets of collateral margining, FVA is the funding costs/benets for the deal
hedging strategy, and CVA/DVA are the familiar credit and debit valuation adjustments
after collateralization. These dierent adjustments can be written by rewriting for-
mula (2.27). One obtains
Vt =
Z T
t
Et

D(t; s)1f>sg

(s; s+ ds) + 1f2dsg"s

(2.29)
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and the valuation adjustments
CVAt =
Z T
t
Et

D(t; s)1f>sg1fs=C<IgCVAcoll(s)

ds
DVAt =
Z T
t
Et

D(t; s)1f>sg1fs=I<CgDVAcoll(s)

ds
LVAt =
Z T
t
Et

D(t; s)1f>sg(rs   ~cs)Cs

ds
FVAt =
Z T
t
Et

D(t; s)1f>sg(rs   ~fs)Fs

ds
As usual, CVA and DVA are both positive, while LVA and FVA can be either positive or
negative. Notice that if ~c equals the risk-free rate, LVA vanishes. FVA vanishes if the
funding rate ~f is equal to the risk-free rate.
The proof is immediate. Notice that equation (2.29) simplies further under a
risk-free close-out
" = V :
Indeed, in such a case the presence of  does not alter the present value. In fact
one can show that, since the unwinding at  happens at the fair price V and with
recovery one, this is equivalent, in terms of valuation at time t, to valuing the whole
deal:
Vt =
Z T
t
Et

D(t; s)(s; s+ ds)

:
Remark 2.3.5. Separability? As pointed out earlier and in Pallavicini et al. [60],
valuation formula (2.28) is not really splitting risk components in dierent terms.
For example, to determine ~f , one needs to know future signs of F and hence future
V 's. Such future V 's depend on all risks together, and so does ~f . Hence interpreting
the ~f -dependent term FVA as a pure funding adjustment is misleading. Similarly, if
we adopt a replacement close-out at default where " = V , then the CVA and DVA
terms will depend on future V 's, and hence on all other risks as well. Therefore, CVA
is no longer a pure credit valuation adjustment. If enforcing the above separation
a posteriori after solving the total equation for V , then one has to be careful in
interpreting this as a real split of risks.
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A further point concerns the presence of the short rate rt in the terms above.
Since rt is a theoretical rate with no direct market counterpart, this decomposition is
not ideal. To implement the pseudo-decomposition, one would have to proxy rt with
a real market rate, such as an overnight rate.
2.3.3 Formulation under the market ltration F
Recalling equation (2.16), we may rewrite equation (2.27) as
Vt =
Z T
t
Et
  
1fs<g(s; s+ ds) + 1f2dsgs(C; ")

D(t; s)

+
Z T
t
Et
h
1fs<g( ~fs   ~cs)CsD(t; s)
i
ds
+
Z T
t
Et
h
1fs<g(rs   ~fs)
 
Vs  Hs

D(t; s)
i
ds:
We now adopt an immersion hypothesis and switch to the default-free market l-
tration (Ft)t0. This step implicitly assumes a separable structure of our complete
ltration (Gt)t0. In other words, Gt is generated by the pure default-free market l-
tration Ft and by the ltration generated by all the relevant default times monitored
up to t.
We can easily describe an event which belongs to the -algebra Gt on the set
ft < g. For example, if the event A 2 Gt, then there exists some event B 2 Ft such
that A \ ft < g = B \ ft < g. Therefore, for any Gt-measurable random variable
X, there exists an Ft-measurable random variable x, such that 1ft<gX = 1ft<gx.
The following lemma in Bielecki and Rutkowski [7] (Section 5.1) explains how
the information expressed by ltration G relates to the one expressed by ltration
F .
Lemma 2.3.6. For any integrable F-measurable random variable X and t 2 [0; T ],
we have
Et

1ft<gX

= 1ft<g
E

1ft<gXjFt

E

1ft<gjFt
 :
An extension of the above lemma when dealing with a predictable process instead
of a simple random variable can be found in Bielecki et al. [6], as follows:
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Lemma 2.3.7. Suppose that 's is a G-predictable process. Consider a default time
 with F-intensity . The following equality then holds:
Et
 Z ^T
t
'sds

= 1ft<g E
Z T
t
e 
R s
t udu e'sds j Ft ; (2.30)
where e's is an Fs-measurable variable such that 1fs<tg's = 1fs<tge's.
We now assume that the basic portfolio cash ows (0; t) are Ft-measurable and
that default times of all parties are conditionally independent given ltration F (see
also Brigo and Pallavicini [30] for the full details in the present set-up). The above
lemmas allow us to rewrite the previous price equation under the default-free market
ltration F as
Vt = 1f>tg
Z T
t
Et[ ((s; s+ ds) + ss(C; ")ds)D(t; s; r + )jF ]
+ 1f>tg
Z T
t
Et
h
( ~fs   ~cs)CsD(t; s; r + )jF
i
ds (2.31)
+ 1f>tg
Z T
t
Et
h
(rs   ~fs)
 
Vs  Hs

D(t; s; r + )jF
i
ds;
where t is the rst-to-default intensity and the discount factor is dened asD(t; s; ) :=
e 
R s
t udu for some F -adapted process u. Notice that we use the same notations for
the processes under both ltrations for notational simplicity.
We need to stress that the above continuous formulation is not a pricing formula
for the deal. The recursive nature of our consistent valuation framework is hidden
in the fact that the paths of the eective funding rates ~f depend on the future signs
of the funding account F , which is dened as V  C H. Although in the equations,
it looks like the dierent adjustments are achieved as additive decompositions, in
fact the dependence of the future adjusted price V is still present and there is no
real decomposition. Nevertheless, in the case of symmetric funding rates, we have
f+ = f , and the dependence no longer exists. However, such an assumption that
one can borrow and fund at the same rate is unrealistic.
We will continue the discussion of the consistent valuation framework in contin-
uous time in later chapters.
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Chapter 3
Funding Inclusive Valuation in a
Continuous Time Setting
In this chapter, we continue the study of a consistent valuation framework including
credit risk, collateralization and funding risk in the continuous time setting using
both a forward-backward stochastic dierential equation approach and a semi-linear
partial dierential equation approach.
3.1 FBSDE approach
Forward-backward stochastic dierential equations (FBSDEs) have been widely used
for pricing and optimization problems in mathematical nance. The earliest version
of such an FBSDE was introduced by Bismut [10] in 1973, with a decoupled form,
namely, a system of a usual (forward) stochastic dierential equation and a (linear)
backward stochastic dierential equation (in short, BSDE). In 1983, Bensoussan [5]
proved the well-posedness of general linear BSDEs by using the martingale represen-
tation theorem. The rst well-posedness result for nonlinear BSDEs was proved in
1990 by Pardoux and Peng [62], while studying the general Pontryagin-type maxi-
mum principle for stochastic optimal controls. El Karoui et al. [48] in 1997 provided
an overview for the use of BSDEs in the eld. In this section, we continue the study
of a consistent valuation framework in continuous time, adopting a BSDE approach.
Throughout this section, we consider a probability space (
;F ; (Ft);Q), where
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f(Ft); t 2 [0:T ]g is the ltration generated by the Brownian motion W , and Q is the
risk-neutral probability measure.
3.1.1 Introduction to FBSDEs
In this section we will introduce some usual assumptions and important theorems
on forward-backward stochastic dierential equations (in short FBSDEs).
Consider the triplet (X; Y; Z) = f(Xt; Yt; Zt); t 2 [0; T ]g of square-integrable FT -
adapted processes with values in RnRmRmd, satisfying the following FBSDE:
dXt = (t;Xt; Yt; Zt)dt+ (t;Xt; Yt; Zt)dWt; X0 = x0; (3.1)
dYt =  B(t;Xt; Yt; Zt)dt+ ZtdWt; YT = 	(XT ); (3.2)
or, equivalently,
Xt = x0 +
Z t
0
(s;Xs; Ys; Zs)ds+
Z t
0
(s;Xs; Ys; Zs)dWs;
Yt = 	(XT ) +
Z T
t
B(s;Xs; Ys; Zs)ds 
Z T
t
ZsdWs;
where the coecient mappings are given by  : [0; T ]  Rn  Rm  Rmd 7! Rn,
 : [0; T ] Rn  Rm  Rmd 7! Rmd, B : [0; T ] Rn  Rm  Rmd 7! Rm and the
terminal condition is given by the map 	 : Rn 7! Rm. The process X is the forward
component of the FBSDE and B(t;Xt; Yt; Zt) is the so called driver of the FBSDE.
The above FBSDE is called a coupled FBSDE. When the solution (Y; Z) of the
BSDE (3.2) does not interfere with the forward component (3.1), or more precisely,
(t;Xt; Yt; Zt) = (t;Xt) and (t;Xt; Yt; Zt) = (t;Xt), the FBSDE is said to be
decoupled.
The existence and uniqueness of the solution to the system (3.1) and (3.2) was
rst addressed by Pardoux and Peng in [62], after which an extensive literature has
been published on this topic. Here we adopt the results in [62] for the case of a
decoupled FBSDE.
Assumption 1. The coecient functions are continuous with respect to (x; y; z) 2
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Rn  Rm  Rmd, and satisfy: There exist constants K > 0 and p  1=2, such that
for all t; x; x1; x2; y1; y2; z1; z2,
(i) j(t; x1)  (t; x2)j+ j(t; x1)  (t; x2)j  K jx1   x2j ;
(ii) j(t; x)j+ j(t; x)j  K (1 + jxj) ;
(iii) jB(t; x; y1; z1) B(t; x; y2; z2)j  K (jy1   y2j+ jz1   z2j) ;
(iv) jB(t; x; 0; 0)j+j	(x)j K(1 + jxjp):
Notice that under the above assumption, the forward SDE (3.1) has a unique
strong solution Xt (see Karatzas and Shreve [55]). We follow the existence and
uniqueness study in [62], and have the following theorem.
Theorem 3.1.1 (Exisitence and uniqueness of decoupled FBSDEs). If As-
sumption 1 is in force, then there exists a unique adapted triplet (X; Y; Z) which
solves the FBSDE system (3.1) and (3.2).
In the case of a coupled FBSDE, we follow the study in Delarue [44] and have
the following results.
Assumption 2. The coecient functions are continuous with respect to (x; y; z) 2
RnRmRmd, and satisfy: There exist constants K > 0 and  > 0 such that for
all t; x; x1; x2; y; y1; y2; z; z1; z2,
(i) j(t; x1; y1; z1)  (t; x2; y2; z2)j+ j(t; x1; y1; z1)  (t; x2; y2; z2)j
 K (jx1   x2j+ jy1   y2j+jz1   z2j) ;
(ii) j(t; x; y; z)j+ j(t; x; y; z)j+ jB(t; x; y; z)j+j	(x)j K (1 + jyj+jzj) ;
(iii) jB(t; x; y1; z1) B(t; x; y2; z2)j+j	(x1) 	(x2)j
 K (jx1   x2j+jy1   y2j+ jz1   z2j) ;
(iv) 8 2 Rn, h; a(t; x; y)i  jj2, where h ; i is the euclidean scalar product on
Rn and the function a is dened as follows on [0; T ] Rn  Rm,
8(t; x; y) 2 [0; T ] Rn  Rm; a(t; x; y) = (t; x; y)(t; x; y):
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Theorem 3.1.2 (Exisitence and uniqueness of coupled FBSDEs). If As-
sumption 2 is satised, then there exits a unique solution (X; Y; Z) to the FBSDE
system (3.1) and (3.2).
3.1.2 Consistent valuation framework in terms of FBSDE
In this section we derive the FBSDE expression for the collateralized, credit and
funding risks inclusive consistent valuation equation built up in Chapter 2. We then
discuss the existence and uniqueness of the solution to such an FBSDE.
Derivation of the FBSDE for the Funding Equation
Let's start by looking at the continuous time pricing equation derived in Chapter 2,
at time t <  ,
Vt =
Z T
t
Et[ ((s; s+ ds) + ss(C; ")ds)D(t; s; r + )jF ]
+
Z T
t
Et
h
( ~fs   ~cs)CsD(t; s; r + )jF
i
ds
+
Z T
t
Et
h
(rs   ~fs)
 
Vs  Hs

D(t; s; r + )jF
i
ds;
where the discount factor is dened as D(t; s; ) := e 
R s
t udu. Multiplying both sides
of the above equation by D(0; t; r + ) gives us
VtD(0; t; r + ) =
Z T
t
Et
h
(rs   ~fs)
 
Vs  Hs

D(0; s; r + )jF
i
ds
+
Z T
t
Et
h 
(s; s+ ds) + ss(C; ") + ( ~fs   ~cs)Cs

D(0; s; r + )jF
i
ds: (3.3)
Our aim is to obtain a BSDE expression for Vt, so we introduce the following process
Xt :=
Z t
0

(s; s+ ds) + ss(C; ") + ( ~fs   ~cs)Cs
+ (rs   ~fs)
 
Vs  Hs
 
D(0; s; r + )ds:
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We can now construct an F -martingale by adding Xt to both sides of (3.3), and we
have
VtD(0; t; r + ) +Xt = Et[XT jF ] : (3.4)
We dene Mt = Et[XT jF ]. Dierentiating both sides of (3.4) with respect to t
yields
 (rt + t)D(0; t; r + ) Vtdt+D(0; t; r + )d Vt + dXt = dMt:
Now substitute Xt into the above equation and we have
 (rt+t) Vtdt+d Vt+(t; t+dt)+
h
tt(C; ") + ( ~ft   ~ct)Ct + (rt   ~ft)
 
Vt  Ht
i
dt
= dMt=D(0; t; r + ): (3.5)
Let dM0t = dMt=D(0; t; r+ ). Since the process (Mt)t0 is a closed F -martingale
under the risk-neutral probability measure,
R t
0
dM0u is a local Ft-martingale. As-
suming that
R t
0
dM0u is adapted to the Brownian ltration (W ), we can then apply
the martingale representation theorem, and write
R t
0
dM0u =
R t
0
ZudWu for Zu being
a (W )-predictable process.
Recall that the on-default cash-ow t(C; ") depends on the close-out amount "
and the collateral amount C. If we adopt a replacement close-out rule, the close-out
amount is equivalent to the adjusted full deal price, i.e. "t = Vt. Additionally, if we
assume that the collateral amount is a function of the full deal price, the on-default
cash-ow is then a function of the full deal price. More precisely, we can denote
t(C; ") = (t; Vt) for some adapted function .
Moreover, we dene a process  by
tdt = (t; t+ dt); (3.6)
for a small time period dt, where t is assumed to be Ft-adapted. We can then
rewrite equation (3.5) as follows,
d Vt =  
h
t   t Vt + ~ft(Ct   Vt +Ht)  ~ctCt   rtHt + t(t; Vt)
i
dt+ZtdWt: (3.7)
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Furthermore, assume that the price process Vt satises the following smoothness
assumptions:
Vt = V (t; St) and Vt 2 C1;2
 
[0; T ] R+ ; (3.8)
and also that the underlying risk factor follows the SDE
dSt = (t; St; Vt)dt+ (t; St; Vt)dWt:
We can then apply Ito^'s formula to Vt yielding
d Vt =
@ V
@t
dt+ (t; St; Vt)
@ V
@S
dt+
1
2
(t; St; Vt)
2@
2 V
@S2
dt+ (t; St; Vt)
@ V
@S
dWt: (3.9)
Now, we match the dWt terms in (3.9) and in (3.7) and we have that
Zt = (t; St; Vt)
@ V
@S
:
This leads to the following theorem:
Theorem 3.1.3. Dene a stochastic process Yt = Vt. Suppose there exists a four
dimensional deterministic linear function H such that the hedging process Ht satises
Ht = H(t; St; Yt; Zt). Assume that the close-out amount is taken to be the adjusted
full price of the deal, i.e. "t = Vt, and also that the collateral account is proportional
to the adjusted deal price such that Ct = t Vt, for some Ft-predictable process t  1
a.s.. The consistent funding inclusive valuation framework introduced in Chapter 2
can then be expressed in terms of the following (coupled) forward-backward stochastic
dierential equation (FBSDE) :
dSt = (t; St; Yt)dt+ (t; St; Yt)dWt; S0 = s0;
dYt =  B(t; St; Yt; Zt)dt+ ZtdWt; YT = 0; (3.10)
B(t; St; Yt; Zt) = t + t(t; Yt)  tYt + ~ft(t   1)Yt   ~cttYt   (rt   ~ft)H(t; St; Yt; Zt);
where s0 is the initial underlying stock price, and B(t; St; Yt; Zt) is the driver of the
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FBSDE.
Furthermore, if the stock price follows the Black-Scholes dynamics, and delta hedging
is used, i.e. Ht =
@ V
@S
St, then the funding inclusive valuation (decoupled) FBSDE
can be written as:
dSt = rtStdt+ tStdWt; S0 = so;
dYt =  B(t; St; Yt; Zt)dt+ ZtdWt; YT = 0; (3.11)
B(t; St; Yt; Zt) = t   tYt + ~ft

(t   1)Yt + Zt
t

  ~cttYt   rt
t
Zt + t(t; Yt):
Proof. The proof of the coupled FBSDE expression is immediate from the derivation
above. In the decoupled case, because Zt = (t; St; Vt)
@ V
@S
= tSt
@ V
@S
, we have that
the delta hedging account is Ht = St
@ V
@S
= Zt=t. The result is then straightforward
after substituting the expression for Ht (in terms of Zt) into the driver of the BSDE
of the coupled case.
Remark 3.1.4. In most realistic cases the dynamic of the underlying asset will have
a risk-neutral type drift and a volatility part that will lead to a decoupled structure.
3.1.3 Existence and uniqueness of solution to the funding inclusive
FBSDE
For both the decoupled and the coupled cases, we postulate the following assump-
tion.
Assumption 3. The coecients in the forward components are uniformly Lipschitz-
continuous in time.
Under Assumption 3, (i) and (ii) in Assumption 1 and (i) in Assumption 2 hold.
In fact this is a very standard assumption since it guarantees the existence and
uniqueness of the underlying price process St.
Recall that the terminal conditions of the FBSDEs of (3.10) and (3.11) are both
	(ST ) = YT = 0. The following result shows that under some assumptions on the
market rates, the drivers of the FBSDEs are uniformly Lipschitz-continuous, and so
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there exists a unique solution. Note that in the case of the coupled FBSDE (3.10),
we have to deal with the stochastic dependence of the rates involved in the driver.
We postulate that all the rates depend only on t; St; Yt, namely,
~ft = f(t; St; Yt); ~ct = c(t; St; Yt); t = (t; St; Yt); rt = r(t; St; Yt):
Theorem 3.1.5. Suppose Assumption 3 is satised. If all the rates ~f , ~c and r
in the decoupled case are bounded, and functions f; c; ; r in the coupled case are
deterministic and bounded, then there exist unique solutions for both the coupled
and the decoupled FBSDEs dened in Theorem 3.1.3.
Proof. Let's rst consider the decoupled FBSDE (3.11). Since under Assumption 3
(i; ii) in Assumption 1 hold, we show that the driver (3.11) is Lipschitz-continuous
and has linear growth, so that Assumption 1 is satised.
Let's rst look at the driver of the FBSDE (3.11). It can be rewritten as
B(t; St; Yt; Zt) =t   tYt   rt
t
Zt + f
+
t

(t   1)Yt + Zt
t
+
+ f t

(t   1)Yt + Zt
t
 
  c+t t(Yt)+   c t t(Yt)  + t(t; Yt)
=t   tYt   rt
t
Zt + f
+
t

(t   1)Yt + Zt
t

  c+tYt
+
 
f t   f+t

(t   1)Yt + Zt
t
 
  (c t   c+t )t(Yt)  + t(t; Yt)
=t +
 
f+t (t   1)  c t t   t

Yt +
(f+t   rt)
t
Zt
+
 
f t   f+t

(t   1)Yt + Zt
t
 
  (c t   c+t )t(Yt)  + t(t; Yt):
We know that the sum of Lipschitz-continuous functions is still Lipschitz-continuous.
SplitB(t; St; Yt; Zt) into the sum of four terms, i.e. B(t; St; Yt; Zt) = B1(t; St; Yt; Zt)+
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B2(t; St; Yt; Zt) +B3(t; St; Yt; Zt) +B4(t; St; Yt; Zt), with
B1(t; St; Yt; Zt) = t +
 
f+t (t   1)  c t t   t

Yt +
(f+t   rt)
t
Zt;
B2(t; St; Yt; Zt) =
 
f t   f+t

(t   1)Yt + Zt
t
 
;
B3(t; St; Yt; Zt) = (c
 
t   c+t )t(Yt) ;
B4(t; St; Yt; Zt) = t(t; Yt):
Let's rst look at a general function of the form
eB(t; s; y; z) := eaty  ebtz; (3.12)
where the coecients eat and ebt are bounded. For any t; s; y1; y2; z1; z2,
j eB(t; s; y1; z1)  eB(t; s; y2; z2)j
= j(eaty1  ebtz1)  (eaty2  ebtz2)j
 jeatjjy1   y2j+jebtjjz1   z2j
= maxfjeatj; jebtjg 
 eatmaxfjeatj; jebtjg
 jy1   y2j+
 ebtmaxfjeatj; jebtjg
 jz1   z2j
!
 maxfjeatj; jebtjg(jy1   y2j+jz1   z2j):
Dene a constant K > 0 such that K = maxfjeatj; jebtjg. We have
 eB(t; s; y1; z1)  eB(t; s; y2; z2)  K(jy1   y2j+jz1   z2j);
and so functions of the form (3.12) are Lipschitz-continuous. Since B1 is of the form
(3.12), and ~ft, ~ct, rt and t are bounded, B1(t; s; y; z) is then K-Lipschitz-continuous
with
K = max
f+t   rtt
 ; f+t (t   1)  c t t   t :
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Next, let's look at functions of the form
bB(t; s; y; z) := bAt(baty  bbtz) ; (3.13)
where bAt, bat and bbt are all bounded. For any t; s; y1; y2; z1; z2, let's consider the
following cases:
(1) If baty1  bbtz1 < 0 and baty2  bbtz2 > 0, then
 bB(t; s; y1; z1)  bB(t; s; y2; z2) =  bAt(baty1  bbtz1)

 bAt(baty1  bbtz1)  bAt(baty2  bbtz2)  j bAtbatjjy1   y2j+j bAtbbtjjz1   z2j
= maxfj bAtbatj; j bAtbbtjg 
 bAtbatmaxfj bAtbatj; j bAtbbtjg
 jy1   y2j
+
 bAtbbtmaxfj bAtbatj; j bAtbbtjg
 jz1   z2j
!
 maxfj bAtbatj; j bAtbbtjg(jy1   y2j+jz1   z2j):
Therefore, bB(t; s; y; z) is K-Lipschitz-continuous with K = maxfj bAtbatj; j bAtbbtjg.
(2) If baty1   bbtz1 < 0 and baty2   bbtz2 < 0, bB(t; s; y; z) is of the form (3.12) and is
then Lipschitz-continuous.
(3) The case when baty1 bbtz1 > 0 and baty2 bbtz2 < 0 is similar to (1) and bB(t; s; y; z)
is Lipschitz-continuous.
(4) If baty1  bbtz1 > 0 and baty2  bbtz2 > 0,
j bB(t; s; y1; z1)  bB(t; s; y2; z2)j= 0:
bB(t; s; y; z) is obviously Lipschitz-continuous.
Combining the four observations, we can conclude that functions of the form (3.13)
are Lipschitz-continuous. Notice that both the terms B2(t; s; y; z) and B3(t; s; y; z)
in the driver of the funding FBSDE are of the form (3.13) so are both Lipschitz-
continuous functions. Moreover, since "I = "C = Yt, the on-default cash-ow can be
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expressed as
(t; Yt) = Yt  Q( 1 = C < I)LGDC(Yt)+ +Q( 1 = I < C)LGDI( Yt)+:
Thus,
B4(t; s; y; z) = t

Yt  Q( 1 = C < I)LGDC(Yt)+ +Q( 1 = I < C)LGDI( Yt)+

= tYt + tQ( 1 = C < I)LGDC( Yt)    tQ( 1 = I < C)LGDI(Yt) :
Because t is bounded, the rst term tYt is Lipschitz, and the second and third
terms are of the form (3.13) which was shown to be Lipschitz. So B4(t; s; y; z) is
also Lipschitz-continuous.
Collecting everything, we can now conclude that the driver B(t; s; y; z) of the
funding FBSDE (3.11) is Lipschitz-continuous in Yt and Zt. Moreover, since all the
rates are bounded, B(t; s; y; z) has linear growth. According to Theorem 3.1.1, there
exists a unique solution (St; Yt; Zt) to FBSDE (3.11).
In the case of the coupled FBSDE (3.10), since Assumption 3 is in force and
all the rates are bounded, (i; iv) in Assumption 2 are satised. Moreover, since
all functions of the rates are deterministic and bounded, we can then adopt the
previous result for the decoupled case and conclude that (ii; iii) in Assumption 2
are satised. According to Theorem 3.1.2, there then exists a unique solution to the
coupled FBSDE (3.10).
3.2 Semi-linear PDE approach
There exists a very strong link between FBSDEs and quasi-linear parabolic systems
of partial dierential equations (in short PDEs). Following the study in [62], Peng in
[66] gave a probabilistic formula for the given solution of a system of parabolic partial
dierential equations. Pardoux and Peng then in [63] showed that a given function
expressed in terms of the solution to the BSDE solves a certain system of parabolic
PDEs. Their results generalised the well known Feynman-Kac formula. Later, in
Pardoux and Tang [64], the authors deduced that, under certain assumptions, the
Chapter 3. Funding Inclusive Valuation in a Continuous Time Setting77
solution of the FBSDE provides a viscosity solution to the quasi-linear parabolic
PDE.
A PDE of order m is called quasi-linear if it is linear in the derivatives of order
m with coecients that depend on the independent variables and derivatives of the
unknown function or order strictly less than m. Quasi-linear PDEs are categorised
into two: Semi-linear and Non-semilinear. A quasi-linear PDE where the coecients
of derivatives of order m are functions of the independent variables only is called a
semi-linear PDE.
In this section, we continue the study of the consistent valuation framework in
the continuous time setting. We nd the consistent valuation equation takes the
form of a semi-linear PDE. Our aim is to obtain such a semi-linear PDE form of
the funding inclusive valuation equation, nd the condition of the existence and
uniqueness of the solution to the PDE and study the properties of the solution.
3.2.1 From a FBSDE to a semi-linear PDE
In this section, we focus on the decoupled case. We postulate that ~ft = f(t; St; Yt),
~ct = c(t; St; Yt), t = (t; St; Yt) and rt = r(t; St; Yt), where functions f; c; ; r are
deterministic and bounded. We also assume that the price process V has su-
cient smoothness, as required in (3.8). Let's now look at equations (3.7) and (3.9).
Keep in mind that in the decoupled case, we have (t; St; Yt; Zt) = (t; St) and
(t; St; Yt; Zt) = (t; St). Equating the drift and the diusion terms of d V in the
equations, we obtain the following for  > t (for the ease of notation, from now on
we denote Ht = H(t; St; Yt; Zt)),
t   t Vt + ~ft(Ct   Vt +Ht)  ~ctCt   rtHt + t(t; Vt) + @
V
@t
+ (t; St)
@ V
@S
+
1
2
(t; St)
2@
2 V
@S2
= 0; Zt = (t; St)
@ V
@S
:
(3.14)
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Therefore, the adjusted deal price V satises the following semi-linear PDE for all
(t; s) 2 [0; T ] R+:
@t(t; s) + (t; s)@s(t; s) +
1
2
(t; s)2@2s(t; s) +B (t; s; (t; s); (@s)(t; s)) = 0;
(T; s) = 0;
(3.15)
where B (t; s; (t; s); (@s)(t; s)) is the driver of the FBSDE dened in Theorem
3.1.3.
3.2.2 Existence and uniqueness of the solution to the funding inclu-
sive PDEs
In this section we seek a link between the funding inclusive FBSDE and PDE (3.15)
without postulating the smoothness assumption (3.8) for the price process V . Let's
now return to the FBSDE (3.10) in a decoupled case where (t; St; Yt; Zt) = (t; St)
and (t; St; Yt; Zt) = (t; St). For (t; s) 2 [0; T ]  R+, let fSt;su ; t  u  Tg denote
the diusion process S on the time interval [t; T ], starting at time t from the point
s. More precisely, for t  u  T ,
dSt;su = (u; S
t;s
u )du+ (u; S
t;s
u )dWu;
St;st = s;
dY t;su =  B(u; St;su ; Y t;su ; Zt;su )du+ Zt;su dWu;
Y t;sT = 0:
(3.16)
In this section we shall discuss the existence and uniqueness of viscosity, weak
and classical solutions to the semi-linear parabolic PDE associated to the above
FBSDE.
We recall that in Section 3.1 we showed that under the assumptions in Theorem
3.1.5, the funding inclusive valuation FBSDE (3.16) has a unique solution. El Karoui
et al. in [47] showed that the solution (St;su ; Y
t;s
u ; Z
t;s
u ) to FBSDE (3.16) is Markovian
in the sense that these processes can be expressed through deterministic functions
of u and St;su . More precisely,
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Theorem 3.2.1. Under Assumption 1, there exists two measurable deterministic
functions (t; s) and d(t; s) such that the solution (St;su ; Y
t;s
u ; Z
t;s
u ) of FBSDE (3.16)
is given by
8u  T; Y t;su = (u; St;su ) and Zt;su = d(u; St;su )(u; St;su ):
We now show that the FBSDE's solution is a viscosity solution of some non-linear
PDE.
Viscosity solution
In order to avoid restrictive assumptions on the coecients in (3.16), we will consider
the PDE (3.15) in the viscosity sense. We start with dening the notion of viscosity
solution of (3.15).
Denition 3.2.1. Let  2 C ([0; T ] R+) satisfy (T; s) = 0, s 2 R+.  is said
to be a viscosity subsolution (resp. supersolution) of (3.15) if for any ' 2
C1;2((0; T )  R+) and (t; s) 2 (0; T )  R+ such that '(t; s) = (t; s) and (t; s) is a
minimum of '  ,
@t'(t; s) + (t; s)@s'(t; s) +
1
2
(t; s)2@2s'(t; s) +B (t; s; '(t; s); (@s')(t; s))  0
(resp. @t'(t; s)+(t; s)@s'(t; s)+
1
2
(t; s)2@2s'(t; s)+B (t; s; '(t; s); (@s')(t; s))  0):
 2 C ([0; T ] R+) is called a viscosity solution of (3.15) if it is both a vis-
cosity subsolution and supersolution of (3.15).
We now have the following results due to Pardoux and Peng [63].
Theorem 3.2.2. If the mapping s 7! B(t; s; 0; 0) is continuous and Assumption 1
is satised, then (t; s) := Y t;st is a viscosity solution of PDE (3.15).
We have proved in Theorem 3.1.5 that when the coecients in the forward
components are uniformly Lipschitz-continuous in time (Assumption 3), and the
rates ~f , ~c and r are all bounded, Assumption 1 is in place. Hence, according to
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Theorem 3.2.2 it is easy to see that the funding inclusive valuation PDE (3.15)
associated to FBSDE (3.16) has a viscosity solution.
For a more complete theory, one should also study the uniqueness of the solution
to the semi-linear PDE (3.15). However, the uniqueness of the viscosity solution is
by no means trivial. Moreover, to consider a hedging strategy, one needs to compute
the derivative of the deal price process with respect to the underlying price process,
which does not exist when the deal price process is a viscosity solution. Therefore,
from a practical point of view, we will not include the uniqueness discussion here.
Regular solution
In this section we are interested in the relationship between FBSDE (3.16) and
regular solutions of the semi-linear PDE (3.15).
Classical solution We will rst study the classical solution. Lp-estimates of the
diusion solution as well as its rst and second derivatives are required in order to
show the solution to the semi-linear PDE is classical. The following theorem in El
Karoui et al. [47] gives a probabilistic interpretation for solutions of the semi-linear
PDE (3.15) using the solution of the Markovian FBSDE (3.16).
Theorem 3.2.3. (El Karoui et al. [47]) Suppose that Assumption 1 is in force and
that the functions ,  and B are C3 with bounded derivatives. Then:
(i) ((u; St;su ); @s(u; S
t;s
u )(u; S
t;s
u )) is the solution of the FBSDE (3.16) in the
time interval [u; T ] if  2 C1;2([0; T ]  R+) is a classical solution of PDE
(3.15). In addition, for any t < T , (u; s) = Y t;st .
(ii) If (St;su ; Y
t;s
u ; Z
t;s
u ) is the unique solution of the FBSDE (3.16), then (t; s) :=
Y t;st , 0  t  T , s 2 R+ belongs to C([0; T ]R+) and is a classical solution of
the PDE (3.15).
Weak solution As we can see, only under some very restrictive smoothness as-
sumptions on the coecients does the semi-linear PDE (3.15) have a classical so-
lution. If we assume that the driver B of the FBSDE (3.16) is merely a Lipschitz
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function, we need to consider the solution in a weak sense. We rst introduce the
following Hilbert space:
H :=  2 L2  [0; T ] R+ j r 2 L2  [0; T ] R+	 :
Here, we adopt the convention of a weak solution in [47]. We say that a solution
 2 H of PDE (3.15) is a weak solution if the following relation holds for all ' 2
C1;1c ([0; T ] R+):
Z T
u
((t; ); @t'(t; )) dt+ ((u; ); '(u; )) +
Z T
u
E((t; ); '(t; ))dt
=
Z T
u
(B(t; ; (t; ); (r)(t; )); '(t; )) dt;
where (; ') =
R
R+ (x)'(x)dx is the scalar product in L2 and
E(; ') =
Z
R+

(r)(r') + 'r

1
2
r + 

'

dx
is the energy of the system associated with the PDE.
The following theorem in [47] gives the weak Feynman-Kac's formula for the
solution of PDE (3.15).
Theorem 3.2.4. Assume that functions  and  are C2 and C3 respectively, and with
bounded derivatives. Further, suppose that the function B is uniformly Lipschitz in
(y; z) with Lipschitz constant K, i.e.
jB(u; s; y1; z1) B(u; s; y2; z2)j K(jy1   y2j+jz1   z2j):
Then there exists a unique weak solution  2 H of the PDE (3.15). Moreover,
(t; s) = Y t;st and r = Zt;st , where f(St;su ; Y t;su ; Zt;su ); t  u  Tg is the solution of
FBSDE (3.16) and
Y t;su = (u; S
t;s
u ); Z
t;s
u = (r)(u; St;su ):
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3.2.3 Invariance of valuation with respect to the short rate
In this section, we show that the value of a deal does not depend explicitly on the
theoretical risk-free rate. We start by assuming that the underlying St is a tradable
asset. In the convention of the decoupled case (3.11), the underlying follows the
Black-Scholes type dynamic. According to the standard no-arbitrage theory, the
drift of the underlying asset is the risk-free rate under the risk-neutral probability
measure, more precisely, for t  u  T ,
dSt;su = r(u)S
t;s
u du+ (u)S
t;s
u dWu;
St;st = s:
(3.17)
If we assume that the smoothness assumption (3.8) of the price process is satised,
namely, V (t; St) = Y
t;s
t 2 C1;2([0; T ]  R+), we can rewrite equations (3.14), such
that V satises the following equations for t <  ,
@t(t; s) + rts@s(t; s) +
1
2
(t)2s2@2s(t; s) +
~ft ((  1)  ~ct  t) (t; s)
 

rt   ~ft

H(t; s; (t; s); Zt) + t + t(t; (t; s)) = 0; Zt = (t)s@s(t; s):
Observe that @s(t; s)s =
Zt;st
(t)
is the delta-hedging process. Therefore, we choose
H(t; s; (t; s); Zt) = @s(t; s)s =
Zt
(t)
. For the ease of notation, from now on we
denote Ht = H(t; s; (t; s); Zt) and t = (t; (t; s)). The equation (3.15) collapses
to
(@t   ~ft   t + L ~ft )(t; s) + ( ~ft   ~ct)Ct + tt + t = 0;
(T; s) = 0;
(3.18)
for (t; s) 2 [0; T ] R+, where the innitesimal generator L ~ft is dened as follows,
L ~ft (t; s) := ~ftHt + L2t(t; s) := ~ftHt +
1
2
(t; s)2
@2
@s2
:
We can see that the pre-default PDE no longer depends on the risk-free rate rt.
Equation (3.18) may be solved numerically as in Crepey [40]. On the other hand, we
can also express the pre-default PDE as an expectation, as we show in the following
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theorem:
Theorem 3.2.5 (Continuous-time solution of the general pricing equation).
If we assume collateral rehypothecation and delta-hedging, then the funding inclusive
adjusted deal price can be expressed as
Vt =
Z T
t
E ~ft
h
s + ss + ( ~fs   ~cs)Cs

D(t; s; ~f + ) j F
i
ds: (3.19)
where the expectation is taken under the pricing measure Q ~f for which the underlying
risk factors grow at the eective funding rate ~f if no dividend is paid.
Proof. Assume (t;Xt) is a solution to the PDE (3.18), with boundary condition
(T;XT ) = 0;
where Xt satises the SDE
dXt = ~ftXtdt+ tXtdW
~f
t ;
with W
~f
t being the Brownian motion under the pricing measure Q
~f where the un-
derlying risk factor X grows at the rate ~f .
For s > t, s  T , dene a process
Ys =
Z s
t
h
( ~fu   ~cu)Cu + uu + u
i
D(t; u; ~f + )du+D(t; s; ~f + )(s;Xs):
If we dene F (u;Xu; Cu; Vu) = ( ~fu   ~cu)Cu + uu + u, then we can write
Ys =
Z s
t
F (u;Xu; Cu; Vu)D(t; u; ~f + )du+D(t; s; ~f + )(s;Xs):
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Dierentiating Ys, we get
dYs = dD(t; s; ~f + )(s;Xs) +D(t; s; ~f + )d(s;Xs) + dD(t; s; ~f + )d(s;Xs)
+ d
Z s
t
F (u;Xu; Cu; Vu)D(t; u; ~f + )du

= D(t; s; ~f + )

@ss + ~fsXs
@s
@Xs
+
1
2
2sX
2
s
@2s
@X2s
  ( ~fs + s)s + F (s;Xs; Cs; Vs)

ds
+D(t; s; ~f + )sXs
@s
@Xs
dW
~f
s :
Since s is a solution to the PDE (3.18), the ds term can be cancelled and we obtain
YT = Yt +
Z T
t
D(t; s; ~f + )sXs
@s
@Xs
dW
~f
s :
Therefore, the process Y is a continuous local martingale. If we take the conditional
expectation with respect to the ltration Ft, we have
E ~ft [YT j F ] = E
~f
t [Yt j F ] = (t;Xt):
The solution to the PDE (3.18) is therefore
(t;Xt) = E
~f
t
Z T
t
F (s;Xs; Cs; Vs)D(t; s; ~f + )ds+D(t; T ; ~f + )(T;XT ) j F

= E ~ft
Z T
t

s + ss + ( ~fs   ~cs)Cs

D(t; s; ~f + )ds j F

:
Theorem 3.2.5 decomposes the deal price V into three intuitive terms. The rst
term is the value of the deal cash ows, discounted at funding plus credit. The
second term is the price of the on-default cash-ow in excess of the collateral, which
includes the CVA and DVA of the deal after collateralization. The last term collects
the cost of collateralization. In addition, we see that any dependence on the hedging
strategy H can be dropped by taking all expectations under the pricing measure Q ~f .
At this point it is very important to appreciate once again that ~f depends on F ,
and hence on V .
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Remark 3.2.6. (Deal dependent pricing measure, local risk neutral mea-
sures). Since the pricing measure depends on ~f which in turn depends on the very
value V we are trying to compute, we have that the pricing measure becomes deal
dependent. Every deal or portfolio has a dierent pricing measure.
Finally, we stress once again a very important invariance result that rst ap-
peared in [61] and [26]. The proof of the following theorem is immediate by inspec-
tion and follows directly from our analysis.
Theorem 3.2.7. (Invariance of the valuation equation with respect to the
short rate rt). Equations (3.18) or (3.19) for valuation under credit, collateral
and funding costs are completely governed by market rates; there is no dependence
on a risk-free rate rt and the nal price is invariant to it. This conrms our earlier
conjecture that the risk-free rate is merely an instrumental variable of our valuation
framework and we do not, in fact, need to know the value of such a rate.
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Chapter 4
The Self-nancing Condition
In this chapter, we present an outline of the derivation of the self-nancing condi-
tion used in a derivative pricing framework with the presence of funding risk and
collateral margining. The derivation is done in a way that claries the structure
of the relevant funding accounts. This clarication is achieved by properly distin-
guishing between price processes, dividend processes and gains processes. Without
this explicit distinction the resulting self-nancing condition can be erroneous, as
we illustrate in the case of two papers: Piterbarg [68] and Burgard and Kjaer [35]
in the rst section. We then in the second section follow a study carried out by
Bielecki and Rutkowski [8] and show how the adjusted self-nancing condition ts
in our funding inclusive valuation framework.
4.1 A common mistake
This section is an update of the papers [13] and [14]. In this section we address
an important problem with the self-nancing condition used in the derivative pric-
ing framework in [68] and [35]. In the rst paper, the self-nancing condition is
equivalent to assuming that the equity position is self-nancing on its own with-
out including the cash position. In the second paper, the self-nancing condition
is equivalent to assuming that a sub-portfolio is self-nancing on its own, contrary
to the assumption that the whole portfolio is self-nancing. The error stems from
a failure in applying the stochastic Leibnitz rule and is present even in mainstream
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textbooks such as Hull [52] (see also a discussion with explicit calculations in Shreve
[69] Exercise 4.10). It is important to highlight the issue not only because [68] is
highly quoted at industrial conferences worldwide in the practitioners' space, while
[35] has received extensive exposure, but also to provide a useful tool in the our-
ishing research on the valuation of the cost of funding.
We then provide an alternative derivation for the funding formula using the self-
nancing condition. We show that the nal result in [68] is correct, even if the
related self-nancing condition is not. In the process, we raise a further question on
the appropriateness of the replication approach described in that paper.
4.1.1 The self-nancing condition and the problem in [68]
In the traditional derivative pricing in the Black-Scholes setting, replication is achieved
by borrowing/lending at the risk-free rate. In modern practice funding costs are an
important consideration in replication, especially when considering repo, unsecured
funding and collateral accounts with dierent rates, as was done in the paper by
Piterbarg [68].
Integral to the replication argument used for derivative pricing in [68] is the
use of a self-nancing trading strategy, and with respect to this we highlight the
following problem. (We note that the same problem aects the proofs in [35]).
Formula (2) in [68] reads, for the portfolio  that replicates the derivative V
(here we use identical notation to the paper [68]):
V (t) = (t) = (t)S(t) + (t) (4.1)
where S is the \price process" of the underlying asset, and  is the \cash amount
split among a number of accounts [...]".
Then [68] continues in reference to \equation (2)", which is (4.1) above:
\On the other hand, from (2), by the self-nancing condition
d(t) = dV (t) (t) dS(t)
[...]"
(4.2)
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We argue that the above formulation of the self-nancing condition is wrong. It
is enough to directly dierentiate both sides of equation (4.1) to obtain:
dV (t) = d((t)S(t)) + d (t) (4.3)
and combine this last equation (4.3) with (4.2) to obtain:
d((t)S(t)) = (t) dS(t) (wrong): (4.4)
In light of the assumptions in [68], equation (4.4) is wrong because it would imply
that the position in the risky asset S is self-nancing on its own, in that the change
in the total value of the position, namely d((t)S(t)), is funded by the asset market
movements alone: (t) dS(t).
A further consequence of the above error follows immediately from the stochastic
Leibnitz rule, leading to:
dt = 0 (wrong), (4.5)
and indeed if equity needs to be self-nancing on its own, the only possibility is that
the amount of equity is constant (there is no re-balancing of the single position).
We briey point out also that, in the reference book Hull [52], equation (14.12)
and (14.13) yield exactly the same problem we are discussing here.
4.1.2 The self-nancing condition and the problem in [35]
Burgard and Kjaer in [35] consider credit risk in addition to funding costs by allowing
corporate bonds of the two parties of the derivative transaction in the replicating
portfolio. However, the same problem aects their self-nancing condition.
Specically, in that work it is stated explicitly that the portfolio consisting of
the stock S, the bond PB of party B, the bond PC of party C and (t) cash is
self-nancing. This portfolio value can be written as in the rst equation following
equation (3.2) of [35], namely (we use identical notation):
 V^ (t) = (t) = (t)S(t) + B(t)PB(t) + C(t)PC(t) + (t): (4.6)
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The self-nancing condition stated in equation (3.3) of [35] reads:
 dV^ (t) = (t)dS(t) + B(t)dPB(t) + C(t)dPC(t) + d(t): (4.7)
The reader can clearly see where the problem is: if we now dierentiate equation
(4.6) and equate the resulting equation with (4.7) we immediately obtain:
d ((t)S(t) + B(t)PB(t) + C(t)PC(t)) = (t)dS(t) + B(t)dPB(t) + C(t)dPC(t)
(wrong): (4.8)
This is wrong because it implies that the portfolio of the three assets:
S; PB; PC
is self-nancing, which is clearly at odds with [35] stating instead that the entire
portfolio:
S; PB; PC ; Cash account
is self-nancing.
This is the same problem that aicts the self-nancing condition in [68], except
that here it is distributed across more than one asset.
4.1.3 Presentation of the correct formulation in the framework of [68]
Since the derivation of the result is important, as it provides a description of the
funding account and of the funding strategy, we believe it is appropriate at this
point to illustrate the proper formulation of the self-nancing condition in the case
of [68].
We point out that we do not discuss the assumptions in [68], not least because of
some inconsistencies that we could not reconcile. Specically, it is mentioned that
the spread between the funding rate and the short (CSA) rate can be thought of
as stochastic, and its dynamics follow a one-factor Gaussian model in the related
example. Since the short (CSA) rate and the repo rate are assumed to be determin-
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istic, it follows that at least the funding rate is stochastic. Indeed, the replicating
portfolio contains a certain amount of cash V (t) C(t) borrowed from (lent to) the
treasury desk at the unsecured funding rate rF . However, this funding rate is driven
by the Brownian motion WF driving the funding spread, which is distinct from the
Brownian motion W driving the stock price (the two are assumed to be correlated
in the example of this article). But this distinction is neither made clear, nor taken
into account in the replication argument.
In light of this we rather concentrate on the correct formulation of the self-
nancing condition in the framework of [68], but further assuming deterministic rates
to avoid the potential inconsistencies described above. For a more comprehensive
framework going beyond [68] assumptions and including explicit default modeling,
collateral modeling, rehypothecation and debit valuation adjustments we refer the
reader elsewhere, for example Pallavicini et al. [60] or Crepey [39], and especially
to Bielecki and Rutkowski [8] who analyze the matter from a rigorous point of view
in the specic context of replication (see also Antonov and Bianchetti [2]).
One of the problems in the above derivation is that it does not distinguish be-
tween gains processes, price processes and dividend processes, and not doing so
brings about the error highlighted in equation (4.4). We present below the correct
formulation (for the full theory see Due [45]).
We start with a ltered probability space (
;F ; fFtg;Q), with the ltration
fFtgt0 generated by a Brownian motion W . We consider a stock with price dy-
namics given by a geometric Brownian motion with deterministic coecients:
dSt = (t)Stdt+ (t)StdWt: (4.9)
The nancial market consists of a vector A = fAi : 1  i  ng of traded assets
available for hedging claims. At time t  0 each asset Ai has a price PAit and has
had since inception a cumulative dividend DAit . The gains process of asset Ai is
dened in terms of the price and cumulative dividend processes by:
GAit := P
Ai
t +D
Ai
t ; t  0: (4.10)
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A trading strategy  is an Ft-predictable square-integrable stochastic process
having as components the numbers of units of each asset held at time t:
t = (
1
t ; 
2
t ; : : : ; 
n
t ):
The time t value of the portfolio that results from employing the strategy  is
given as:
V t := 
1
tP
A1
t + : : :+ 
n
t P
An
t ; (4.11)
while the gains (prots/losses) generated by holding a position it in asset Ai is
itdG
Ai
t . By relation (4.10) this is coming from changes in the price of the asset and
from changes in the cumulative dividend process (new dividends).
A trading strategy  is self-nancing if:
V t = V

0 +G

t ; t  0; (4.12)
where the gains process associated with  is:
dGt := 
1
t dG
A1
t + : : :+ 
n
t dG
An
t ; G

0 = 0: (4.13)
This implies in particular that the only change in the value of the portfolio comes
from the change in the gains process associated with the strategy , namely,
dV t = dG

t ; (4.14)
or, using (4.11) and (4.13), from the changes in the gains processes of the assets:
d(1tP
A1
t + : : :+ 
n
t P
An
t ) = 
1
t dG
A1
t + : : :+ 
n
t dG
An
t :
However, in general it is true that:
d(1tP
A1
t + : : :+ 
n
t P
An
t ) 6= 1t dPA1t + : : :+ nt dPAnt : (4.15)
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Indeed, the trading strategy  being self-nancing does not imply that:
dGAit = dP
Ai
t
for the single asset i. Clearly, if all single assets have null dividend process, it follows
that the self-nancing condition for the strategy implies an equality in (4.15), but
more generally this does not hold.
Finally, a claim Y with payo V Yt at time 0  t  T is replicated by the strategy
 if the value V  of the portfolio corresponding to this strategy satises:
V Yt = V

t ; (4.16)
for all t  0 and up to the claim maturity T .
We now apply the above framework to the setup in [68]. Here the vector A of
assets characterizing the nancial market has the following components: A1 is a
repo contract for the risky stock given in (4.9), A2 is a collateral account (like a
cash account), and A3 is the funding account (opened for example with the internal
treasury). The collateral account is used to post an amount related to the claim
value, and the funding account is used to borrow/invest as necessary to replicate
the claim, so the only source of randomness in the assets of this market is the
one-dimensional Brownian motion W driving the stock price (4.9).
The price processes for these assets are denoted by:
PA1t = 0; P
A2
t = Ct; P
A3
t = t; t  0; (4.17)
where Ct is a market observable collateral requirement at time t and t is to be
determined below.
From the point of view of an investor holding these assets, the incoming stock
dividends rD(t)Stdt and the outgoing repo interest payments rR(t)Stdt are accounted
for in the gains process GA1t associated with the repo on stock, so as to maintain
Chapter 4. The Self-nancing Condition 93
the zero price PA1t of the repo contract. It leads to the following gains processes:
dGA1t = dSt + (rD(t)  rR(t))Stdt;
dGA2t = rC(t)Ctdt;
dGA3t = rF (t)tdt;
(4.18)
where rD(t) is the rate at which stock dividends are paid at time t, rR(t) is the
short rate at time t on funding secured via repo, rC(t) is the short rate at time t of
cash/collateral, and rF (t) is the time t short rate for unsecured funding.
The dividend processes for the three assets are written using (4.10) as follows:
dDA1t = dG
A1
t   dPA1t =dSt + (rD(t)  rR(t))Stdt; DA10 = 0;
dDA2t = dG
A2
t   dPA2t =rC(t)Ctdt  dCt; DA20 = 0;
dDA3t = dG
A3
t   dPA3t =rF (t)tdt  dt; DA30 = 0:
(4.19)
We seek a trading strategy  to replicate a derivative Y with time t value V Yt . The
strategy  = (1; 2; 3) is chosen to be, for some yet unknown process :
1t = t; 
2
t = 1; 
3
t = 1: (4.20)
(We remark that here the single asset dividend processes are not null, so (4.15)
reminds us that attention is needed in devising the correct setup.)
The time t value V t of the replicating portfolio obtained from strategy  given
by (4.20) is obtained from (4.11) with the prices (4.17):
V t = t 0 + 1Ct + 1t: (4.21)
This gives a funding account price of t = V

t  Ct = V Yt  Ct (V Y = V  by (4.16)).
Contrast the replicating condition (4.21) with (4.1): the replicating portfolio has
interests in the stock price via the dividend process (4.19) of the repo, but doesn't
hold the stock.
Note that by replacing t = V
Y
t  Ct into equations (4.17), (4.18) and (4.19) the
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dynamics of the price, gains and dividend processes can be expressed in terms of
the market observable quantities:
St; Ct; V
Y
t :
Then the gains process (4.13) associated with  is:
dGt = t [dSt + (rD(t)  rR(t))Stdt] + 1 [rC(t)Ctdt] + 1 [rF (t)(V t   Ct)dt]: (4.22)
The self-nancing condition for the strategy  can be obtained using (4.14), with
dGt given by the equation (4.22) above.
We have thus proved that for the market in [68] with assets: repo on stock,
collateral account and unsecured funding account, the self-nancing condition for
the trading strategy  that replicates a claim Y requires:
dV t = t [dSt + (rD(t)  rR(t))Stdt] + 1 [rC(t)Ctdt] + 1 [rF (t)(V t   Ct)dt]: (4.23)
On the other hand, assuming that the payo can be written as V Yt = v
Y (t; S)
for some C1;2 function vY , Ito^'s formula gives:
dvY (t; St) = v
Y
t (t; St)dt+
@vY
@S
dSt +
1
2
@2vY
@S2
d(St)
2: (4.24)
Equating the right hand sides of the equations (4.23) and (4.24) gives:
vYt (t; St) +
1
2
@2vY
@S2
(t)2S2t =
@vY
@S
(t; St)(rD(t)  rR(t))St
+ rC(t)Ct + rF (t)(v
Y (t; St)  Ct);
t =
@vY
@S
(t; St): (4.25)
With (4.25) we have now completely identied the strategy (4.20) that replicates
the claim, so the pricing derivation may continue as in [68] with their \equation (3)".
Summarizing, the wrong self-nancing condition implies that the portfolio with-
out cash is self-nancing on its own (see (4.4) and (4.8)). Fortunately, the error can
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be corrected and the correct self-nancing condition can be derived rigorously. We
showed how to do this in the setup of [68], casting light on the necessary distinction
between dividend processes, price processes and gains processes, and obtaining the
correct self-nancing condition (4.23).
While the original published versions of [68] and [35] have the problems we have
signaled in this article, the authors of [68] and [35] have updated the online versions
of their articles with our proposed corrections following personal communication
with us at the time the research report [13] (upon which the present section is
based) appeared.
Nonetheless, we think it is necessary and useful to specify the setting explicitly
in this section, since a sound funding theory depends crucially on nancing costs,
and the violation of the self-nancing condition is an important problem.
4.2 Self-nancing condition in our framework
In the following, we will show how the traditional self-nancing condition is ad-
justed to reect the new market realities of funding risk and collateralization in our
framework. By adjusting the self-nancing condition, we can derive our consistent
valuation framework using only market observable quantities. The analysis carried
out in this section is inspired by the work conducted by Bielecki and Rutkowski in
[8], where the authors provided a theoretical underpinning for a unied framework
for the nonlinear approach to hedging and pricing of OTC contracts. However, the
default events and close-out conventions were not discussed.
Our goal is to derive the consistent valuation framework set up in the previous
chapters using the adjusted self-nancing condition. We start by giving the classical
denition of a self-nancing strategy.
We denote 0 all contractual cash ows directly generated by a derivative from
the point of view of the investor (without discounting). Note that 0(t; T ) = (t;T )
D(t;T )
,
and 0 is an arbitrary cadlag process of nite variation. A trading strategy (';0)
will be used to replicate all cash ows 0, where ' = (;  ) is a dynamic replicating
portfolio that consists of a risky asset S and a cash account B. For model simplicity,
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we assume that there is only one risky asset in this set-up that pays no dividend.
Denition 4.2.1. (Self-nancing strategy) A trading strategy (';0) is said to
be self-nancing if the wealth process given by
Vt(';
0) := tSt +  tBt; (4.26)
satises
dVt(';
0) = tdSt +  tdBt   d0t: (4.27)
We assume that the account will be empty at the end of the derivative trade, in
particular, we have VT (') = 0.
4.2.1 Dierent lending and borrowing rates
As a rst adjustment to the classical pricing framework, we introduce dierent
unsecured borrowing and lending rates. Denoting the cash account in the replicating
strategy (';0) associated with a contract 0 by an F -adapted stochastic process
F , we have
Ft = Vt(')  tSt: (4.28)
Let's now introduce dierent lending and borrowing cash accounts:
Ft = Ft1fFt0g + Ft1fFt<0g = F
+
t + F
 
t ; (4.29)
where F+t stands for the cash value the investor needs to borrow in order to establish
the replicating strategy, and F t represents the surplus cash value from the replicat-
ing strategy that can be used for assets lending. We use the short-hand notation
X+ := max(X ; 0) and X  := min(X ; 0).
We denote by Blt and B
b
t the strictly positive cash account processes correspond-
ing to the lending and borrowing accounts respectively. Formally, we postulate that
 ltB
l
t = (Vt(')  tSt) ;  btBbt = (Vt(')  tSt)+:
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where for all t 2 [0; T ],
 lt = (B
l
t)
 1(Vt(')  tSt)   0;  bt = (Bbt ) 1(Vt(')  tSt)+  0: (4.30)
We assume that at any time simultaneous lending and borrowing is prohibited,
namely,  lt 
b
t = 0.
We say that the wealth process of a portfolio ' = (;  l;  b) given by
Vt(') = tSt +  
l
tB
l
t +  
b
tB
b
t (4.31)
is self-nancing if the following condition is satised:
dVt(') = tdSt +  
l
tdB
l
t +  
b
tdB
b
t   d0t: (4.32)
If we further assume that the account processes Bb and Bl are absolutely continu-
ous, and the corresponding borrowing and lending rates are denoted by F -adapted
processes f+ and f  respectively (one may assume f+t  f t for all t 2 [0; T ] to
avoid arbitrage opportunity), the following relations hold:
dBlt
Blt
= f t dt;
dBbt
Bbt
= f+t dt;
and the dynamic of the wealth process Vt(') (4.32), can be re-written as
dVt(') = tdSt + f
 
t (Vt(')  tSt) dt+ f+t (Vt(')  tSt)+dt  d0t: (4.33)
4.2.2 Trading strategies under collateralization
When a deal is collateralized, we need to consider our problem in both scenarios
when rehypothecation is forbidden and allowed. As introduced in Chapter 2, when
rehypothecation is forbidden, the collateral will be kept in segregated accounts,
whereas if rehypothecation is allowed, the collateral can be used as a source of
funding by the collateral taker. Again, we assume that the collateral to be a risk-
free cash account. We denote the cash collateral account by a stochastic process C,
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with
Ct = Ct1fCt0g + Ct1fCt<0g = C
+
t + C
 
t ;
where C+t stands for the cash value of collateral received, whereas C
 
t represents
the cash value of collateral posted, both from the investor's point of view for any
0  t < T . As before we set CT = 0.
Collateral trading with segregated accounts
If rehypothecation is not allowed, cash collateral will be placed in segregated ac-
counts. The collateral amount that is received can not be used for trading. The
wealth process V (') of the collateralized trading strategy (';0; C) should not ex-
plicitly depend on the collateral process. Therefore, the value of the replicating
portfolio is
Vt(') = tSt +  
l
tB
l
t +  
b
tB
b
t ;
which is the same as (4.31). However, the self-nancing condition reads
dVt(') = tdSt +  
l
tdB
l
t +  
b
tdB
b
t   dt   d0t; (4.34)
where
 ltB
l
t = (Vt(')  tSt) ;  btBbt = (Vt(')  tSt)+;
and we denote the costs/benets from the collateral margining account as t.
In order to determine dt, we examine carefully what happens during collateral
margining. We assume that the collateral processes are absolutely continuous with
accrual rates c+t when Ct  0 and c t when Ct < 0. Both the rates c+ and c  are
F -adapted processes. At time t 2 [0; T ), if the investor is the collateral provider,
i.e. Ct < 0, he needs to borrow cash for the collateral amount C
 
t from the cash
borrowing account Bbt at the borrowing rate f
+
t , and receives interest from the
counterparty on the posted collateral at the accrual rate c t . On the other hand, if the
investor is the collateral taker, i.e. Ct > 0, he needs to pay the counterparty interest
at the collateral accrual rate c+t , and (perhaps unlikely in practice) receives from
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the collateral custodian interest for the positive cash amount C+t in the segregated
account at some rate denoted by an F -adapted process rC;+t . Formally, we have the
following expression for dt,
dt = (f
+
t   c t )C t dt+ (rC;+t   c+t )C+t dt: (4.35)
Collateral trading with rehypothecation
For the case when rehypothecation is allowed, the collateral taker has the right to
use the posted collateral for his liquidity and trading needs. In other words, at time
t 2 [0; T ), when the investor is the collateral taker, he is granted an unrestricted use
of the full collateral amount C+t received from the counterparty and pays interest on
C+t at collateral accrual rate c
+
t . However, if the investor is the collateral provider,
namely Ct < 0, he is entitled to interest payments on the posted collateral amount
C t at collateral rate c
 
t .
In the case of collateral rehypothecation, the posted collateral can be used to
reduce the funding costs of the collateral taker. The cash account for the trading
strategy is then dened as
Ft = Vt(')  tSt   Ct: (4.36)
Moreover, the wealth process V (') reads
Vt(') = tSt +  
l
tB
l
t +  
b
tB
b
t + Ct; (4.37)
and the dynamics of Vt(') follows
dVt(') = tdSt +  
l
tdB
l
t +  
b
tdB
b
t   dt   d0t; (4.38)
where
 ltB
l
t = (Vt(')  tSt   Ct) ;  btBbt = (Vt(')  tSt   Ct)+:
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We assume that the cash collateral posted by the investor is also funded by the same
cash accounts which fund the replicating strategy (at rates f  and f+ as dened
before).
If the collateral account processes are absolutely continuous, the costs/benets
of the margining account is then given by
dt =  c t C t dt  c+t C+t dt: (4.39)
Assume that the borrowing and lending account processes are absolutely continuous.
Adopting the notations ~f and ~c from Chapter 2 for the eective funding rate (2.18)
and the eective collateral accrual rate (2.3) respectively, the above dynamics of the
wealth process Vt(') for the rehypothecation case can be expressed as
dVt(') = tdSt + ~ft(Vt(')  tSt   Ct)dt+ ~ctCtdt  d0t; (4.40)
or equivalently,
dVt(') = tdSt + ~ft(Vt   tSt)dt  ( ~ft   ~ct)Ctdt  d0t: (4.41)
Let's now discuss how the adjusted self-nancing condition (4.41) can be used
to derive our consistent pricing equation.
4.2.3 Funding risk inclusive pricing formula
From now on, we assume that rehypothecation is allowed, but analogous results hold
for the case where collateral is placed in segregated accounts.
We consider a replicating portfolio (';0; C) associated with a contract 0. The
wealth process V (') is given in (4.37) and we have that the dynamic of V (') is
given in (4.41).
In order to derive the consistent valuation framework set up in the previous
chapters, we now dene a new process ~Vt('), associated with an arbitrary self-
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nancing trading strategy ', as follows,
~Vt(') := Vt(') +B

t
Z t
0
h
(s   ~fs)(Vs(') Hs) + ( ~fs   ~cs)Cs + s
i
(Bs )
 1ds;
(4.42)
where Ht = tSt is the hedging account. We use the notation tdt = (t; t + dt)
with 0(t; T )D(t; T ) =
R T
t
D(t; s)(s; s+ds), and Bt is an arbitrary process of nite
variation, such that for t  0,
dBt = tB

t dt; B

0 > 0:
Assumption 4. There exists a probability measure Q such that the process S=B
is a Q-local martingale.
Notice that if the rate  is the risk-free rate, the measure Q is then the risk-
neutral probability measure and Assumption 4 is satised in a typical market model
(such as Black-Scholes model).
Proposition 4.2.1. The process ~V (')=B with ~V (') dened in (4.42) is a Q-local
martingale.
Proof. To prove ~V (')=B is a Q-local martingale, it is sucient to show that
d
 
~Vt(')
Bt
!
= td

St
Bt

:
By applying Ito^'s formula to both sides of the above equation, we obtain (we drop
' from the notation in the following proof for notational simplicity)
1
Bt
(d ~Vt   ~VtdB

t
Bt
) =
t
Bt
(dSt   StdB

t
Bt
);
which is equivalent to showing that
d ~Vt   t ~Vtdt = t(dSt   tStdt):
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Applying Ito^'s formula to ~Vt yields
d ~Vt = dVt + (t   ~ft)(Vt  Ht)dt+ ( ~ft   ~ct)Ctdt+ d0t + t( ~Vt   Vt)dt:
Now substituting the self-nancing condition property of (';0; C), i.e. equation
(4.41), we obtain
d ~Vt   t ~Vtdt =tdSt + ~ft(Vt   tSt)dt  ( ~ft   ~ct)Ctdt  d0t + (t   ~ft)(Vt  Ht)dt
+ ( ~ft   ~ct)Ctdt+ d0t + t ~Vtdt  tVtdt  t ~Vtdt
=tdSt + t(Vt  Ht)dt  tVt
=tdSt   ttStdt
as we were required to show.
Using the result in Proposition 4.2.1 and the terminal condition VT (') = 0, we
establish the following theorem.
Theorem 4.2.2. Suppose that Assumption 4 is in force. In the case of collateral
rehypothecation and delta-hedging, the price of a derivative contract with contractual
cash-ow 0 that is replicated by a self-nancing trading strategy (';0; C) is given
by
Vt(') = Et

Bt
Z T
t

(s   ~fs)(Vs(') Hs) + ( ~fs   ~cs)Cs + s

(Bs )
 1ds j F

:
(4.43)
where the expectation is taken under some pricing measure Q for which the under-
lying risk factors grow at the rate  if no dividend is paid.
Proof. According to Proposition 4.2.1 the process ~Vt(')=B

t dened as (4.42) is a
Q-local martingale. Therefore, for t 2 [0; T ],
~Vt(')=B

t = Et
h
~VT (')=B

T j F
i
;
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which implies that
~Vt(')
Bt
=
Vt(')
Bt
+
Z t
0
h
(s   ~fs)(Vs(') Hs) + ( ~fs   ~cs)Cs + s
i
(Bs )
 1ds
= Et

VT (')
BT
+
Z T
0
h
(s   ~fs)(Vs(') Hs) + ( ~fs   ~cs)Cs + s
i
(Bs )
 1ds j F

:
Since VT (') = 0, we can obtain
V Ht (') = Et

Bt
Z T
t

(s   ~fs)(Vs(') Hs) + ( ~fs   ~cs)Cs + s

(Bs )
 1ds j F

:
We notice that if we set the rate  in Theorem 4.2.2 to be the risk-free rate rt,
the pricing equation (4.43) becomes
Vt(') = Et
Z T
t

(rs   ~fs)(Vs(') Hs) + ( ~fs   ~cs)Cs + s

D(t; s)ds j F

;
which is the same as the pricing equation (2.31) in continuous time without credit
default events.
If, however, we set  equal to the funding rate ~f , the valuation equation (4.43)
becomes
Vt(';
0; C) = E ~ft
Z T
t

( ~fs   ~cs)Cs + s

D(t; s; ~f) ds j F

;
which coincides with the result in Theorem 3.2.5 without the introduction of coun-
terparty default risk (and the close-out conventions).
4.2.4 Funding risk inclusive PDE
Again, we consider the wealth process Vt(') corresponding to a self-nancing repli-
cating strategy (';0; C) associated with a contract 0. The dynamic of the wealth
process Vt(') follows
dVt(') = tdSt + ~ft(Vt   tSt)dt  ( ~ft   ~ct)Ctdt  d0t; (4.44)
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with terminal condition VT (') = 0.
Now assume that the price process Vt(') satises the smoothness Assumption
3.8, and also that the underlying risk factor S follows the following SDE (we drop
' from the notation here for simplicity)
dSt = (t; St)dt+ (t; St)dWt:
We can then apply Ito^'s formula to Vt(') giving us
dVt =
@V
@t
dt+ (t; St)
@V
@S
dt+
1
2
(t; St)
2@
2V
@S2
dt+ (t; St)
@V
@S
dWt: (4.45)
Equating the right hand sides of equations (4.44) and (4.45), we can write

@V
@t
  t(t; St) + (t; St)@V
@S
+
1
2
(t; St)
2@
2V
@S2
  ~ftVt + ~fttSt
+( ~ft   ~ct)Ct + t
i
dt+

 (t; St)t + (t; St)@V
@S

dWt = 0:
Since the coecient of the diusion term needs to be zero, we have
t =
@V
@S
;
substituting which into the the drift term yielding,
@V
@t
  ~ftVt + ~ft@V
@S
St +
1
2
(t; St)
2@
2V
@S2
+ ( ~ft   ~ct)Ct + t = 0:
Observe that @V
@S
St is the delta-hedging process. If we dene the hedging account
Ht =
@V
@S
St, the price process of the hedging portfolio V satises the following semi-
linear PDE,
@(t; s)
@t
  ~ft(t; s) + ~ftHt + 1
2
(t; s)2
@2(t; s)
@s2
+ ( ~ft   ~ct)Ct + t = 0;
(T; s) = 0:
(4.46)
Comparing the above PDE to the pre-default PDE (3.18) we obtained previously,
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we see that the two semi-linear PDEs are identical if there is no counterparty credit
risk (hence nor the on-default cash-ow).
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Chapter 5
Numerical Results
This chapter provides a numerical study of the valuation framework outlined in
the previous chapters. We investigate the impact of funding risk on the price of a
derivatives deal under default risk and collateralization. Also, we analyse the valua-
tion error of ignoring nonlinearties of the general valuation problem. Specically, to
quantify this error, we introduce the concept of a nonlinearity valuation adjustment
(in short, NVA). A generalized least-squares Monte Carlo algorithm is proposed
inspired by the simulation methods of Carriere [36], Longsta and Schwartz [58],
Tilley [71], and Tsitsiklis and Van Roy [72] for pricing American-style options. As
the purpose is to understand the fundamental implications of funding risk, we focus
on relatively simple deal positions in European call options. However, the Monte
Carlo method we propose below can be applied to more complex derivative contracts,
including derivatives with bilateral payments.
5.1 Monte Carlo algorithm
Recall the recursive structure of the general pricing equation: The deal price depends
on the funding decisions, while the funding strategy depends on the future price
itself. The intimate relationship among the key quantities makes the pricing problem
computationally challenging.
We consider K default scenarios during the life of the deal { either obtained
by simulation, bootstrapped from empirical data, or assumed in advance. For each
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rst-to-default time  corresponding to a default scenario, we compute the price of
the deal V under collateralization, close-out netting and funding costs. The rst
step of our simulation method entails simulating a large number of sample paths
N of the underlying risk factors X. We simulate these paths on the time-grid
ft1; : : : ; tm = T g with step size t = tj+1   tj from the assumed dynamics of the
risk factors. T  is equal to the nal maturity T of the deal or the consecutive time-
grid point following the rst-default time  , whichever occurs rst. For simplicity,
we assume the time periods for funding and hedging decisions and collateral margin
payments coincide with the simulation time grid.
Given the set of simulated paths, we solve the funding strategy recursively in
a dynamic programming fashion. Starting one period before T , we compute for
each simulated path the funding decision F and the deal price V according to the
set of backward-inductive equations of Theorem 2.3.3. The algorithm then proceeds
recursively until time zero. Ultimately, the total price of the deal is computed as
the probability weighted average of the individual prices obtained in each of the K
default scenarios.
The conditional expectations in the backward-inductive funding equations are
approximated by across-path regressions based on least squares estimation similar
to Longsta and Schwartz [58]. We regress the present value of the deal price at time
tj+1, the adjusted payout cash ow between tj and tj+1, the collateral account and
funding account at time tj on basis functions  of realizations of the underlying risk
factors at time tj across the simulated paths. To keep notation simple, let us assume
that we are exposed to only one underlying risk factor, e.g. a stock price. Extensions
to higher dimensions are straightforward. Specically, the conditional expectations
in the iterative equations of Theorem 2.3.3, taken under the risk-neutral measure,
are equal to
Etj

tj(
Vtj+1)

= tj  (Xtj); (5.1)
where we have dened tj(
Vtj+1) := D(tj; tj+1)
Vtj+1 +
(tj; tj+1;C) Ctj Htj . Note
the Ctj term drops out if rehypothecation is not allowed. The usual least-squares
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estimator of  is then given by
^tj :=

 (Xtj) (Xtj)
 1  (Xtj) tj( Vtj+1): (5.2)
Orthogonal polynomials such as Chebyshev, Hermite, Laguerre, and Legendre may
all be used as basis functions for evaluating the conditional expectations. We nd,
however, that simple power series are quite eective and that the order of the poly-
nomials can be kept relatively small. In fact, linear or quadratic polynomials, i.e.
 (Xtj) = (1; Xtj ; X
2
tj
), are often enough.
Further complexities are added, as the dealer may { realistically { decide to
hedge the full deal price V . Now, the hedge H itself depends on the funding strat-
egy through V , while the funding decision depends on the hedging strategy. This
added recursion requires that we solve the funding and hedging strategies simulta-
neously. For example, if the dealer applies a delta-hedging strategy, we can write,
heuristically,
Htj =
@ V
@X

tj
Xtj 
Vtj+1   (1 + tj ~ftj) Vtj
Xtj+1   (1 + tj ~ftj)Xtj
Xtj : (5.3)
We obtain, in the case of rehypothecation, the following system of nonlinear equa-
tions 8>>>>><>>>>>:
Ftj  
P
~f
tj
(tj+1)
Ptj (tj+1)
Etj

tj(
Vtj+1)

= 0;
Htj  
Vtj+1 (1+tj ~ftj ) Vtj
Xtj+1 (1+tj ~ftj )Xtj
Xtj = 0;
Vtj = Ftj + Ctj +Htj ;
(5.4)
where all matrix operations are on an element-by-element basis. An analogous result
holds when rehypothecation of the posted collateral is forbidden.
For each period and for each simulated path, we nd the funding and hedging de-
cisions by solving this system of equations, given the funding and hedging strategies
for all future periods until the end of the deal. We apply a simple Newton-Raphson
method to solve the system of nonlinear equations numerically, but instead of using
the exact Jacobian, we approximate it by nite dierences. As an initial guess, we
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use the Black-Scholes delta position
H0tj = 
BS
tj
Xtj :
The convergence is quite fast and only a small number of iterations are needed
in practice. Finally, if the dealer decides to hedge only the risk-free price of the
deal, i.e. the classical derivative price V , the pricing problem collapses to a much
simpler one. The hedge H no longer depends on the funding decision and can be
computed separately and the numerical solution of the nonlinear equation system
can be avoided altogether.
In the following we apply our valuation framework to the case of a stock or equity
index option. Nevertheless, the methodology extends fully to any other derivatives
transaction. For instance, applications to interest rate swaps can be found in Brigo
and Pallavicini [29] and [30]. We now fully specify our modeling setup.
5.2 Case outline
Let St denote the price of some stock or equity index and assume it evolves according
to a geometric Brownian motion dSt = rStdt + StdWt where W is a standard
Brownian motion under the risk neutral measure. The risk-free interest rate r is
100 bps, the volatility  is 25%, and the current price of the underlying is S0 = 100.
The European call option is in-the-money and has strike K = 80. The maturity T
of the deal is 3 years and, in the full case, we assume that the investor delta-hedges
the deal according to (5.3). The usual default-free funding-free and collateral-free
Black-Scholes price V0 of the call option deal is given by
Vt = St(d1(t)) Ke r(T t)(d2(t)); d1;2 = ln(St=K) + (r  
2=2)(T   t)

p
T   t ;
for t = 0 and is V0 = 28:9 with our choice of inputs. As usual,  is the cumulative
distribution function of the standard normal random variable. In the usual setting
the hedge would not be (5.3) but a classical delta-hedging strategy based on (d1(t)).
We consider two simple discrete probability distributions of default. Both parties
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of the deal are considered default risky but can only default at year 1 or at year 2.
The localized joint default probabilities are provided in the matrices below. The rows
denote the default time of the investor, while the columns denote the default times
of the counterparty. For example, in matrix Dlow the event (I = 2yr; C = 1yr)
has a 3% probability and the rst-to-default time is 1 year. Simultaneous defaults
are introduced and we determine the close-out amount by a random draw from a
uniform distribution. If the random number is above 0.5, we compute the close-out
as if the counterparty defaulted rst, and vice versa.
For the rst to default distribution, we have a low dependence between the
default risk of the counterparty and the default risk of the investor
Dlow =
0BBB@
1yr 2yr n:d:
1yr 0:01 0:01 0:03
2yr 0:03 0:01 0:05
n:d: 0:07 0:09 0:70
1CCCA ; K(Dlow) = 0:21; (5.5)
where n:d: means no default and K denotes the rank correlation as measured by
Kendall's tau. In the second case, we have a high dependence between the two
parties' default risks,
Dhigh =
0BBB@
1yr 2yr n:d:
1yr 0:09 0:01 0:01
2yr 0:03 0:11 0:01
n:d: 0:01 0:03 0:70
1CCCA ; K(Dhigh) = 0:83: (5.6)
Note also that the distributions are skewed in the sense that the counterparty has a
higher default probability than the investor. The loss given default is 50% for both
the investor and the counterparty and the loss on any posted collateral is considered
the same. The collateral rates are chosen to be equal to the risk-free rate. We assume
that the collateral account is equal to the risk-free price of the deal at each margin
date, i.e. Ct = Vt. This is reasonable as the dealer and client will be able to agree
on this price, in contrast to Vt due to asymmetric information. Also, choosing the
Chapter 5. Numerical Results 111
collateral this way has the added advantage that the collateral account C works as
a control variate, reducing the variance of the least-squares Monte Carlo estimator
of the deal price.
5.3 Preliminary analysis without credit risk and with sym-
metric funding rates
To provide some ball-park gures on the eect of funding risk, we rst look at the
case without default risk and without collateralization of the deal. We compare our
Monte Carlo approach to four alternative (simplied) approaches:
(i) Simple discounting of the risk-free Black-Scholes price with a symmetric fund-
ing rate f^ = f+ = f . We obtain
V
(i)
t = e
 f^T  St(d1(t)) Ke r(T t)(d2(t)) ;
assuming a continuously compounded funding rate.
(ii) The Black-Scholes price where both discounting and the growth of the under-
lying happens at the symmetric funding rate
V
(ii)
t =

St(g1(t)) Ke f^(T t)(g2(t))

; g1;2 =
ln(St=K) + (f^  2=2)(T   t)

p
T   t :
(iii) Simple discounting of the forward price with the symmetric funding rate. This
approach can be justied by the fact that the price of a deep out-of-the-money
call option will approximately be equal to that of a forward contract.
V
(iii)
t = St  Ke f^(T t):
(iv) We use the above FVA formula in Proposition 2.3.4 with some approxima-
tions. Since in a standard Black-Scholes setting Ft =  Ke r(T t)(d2(t)), we
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Figure 5.1: Funding valuation adjustment of a long call position as a function of
symmetric funding spreads sf := f^   r with f^ := f+ = f . The adjustments are
computed under the assumption of no default risk nor collateralization.
compute
FVA(iv) = (r   f^)
Z T
0
E0

e rs[Fs]
	
ds = (f^   r)Ke rT
Z T
0
E0 f(d2(s))g ds:
We illustrate the four approaches in the case of an equity call option (long posi-
tion). Moreover, let the funding valuation adjustment in each case be dened by
FVA(i;ii;iii;iv) = V (i;ii;iii;iv)   V . Figure 5.1 plots the resulting funding valuation ad-
justment with credit and collateral switched o under the four dierent approaches
and under the full valuation approach. Recall that if the funding rate is equal to
the risk-free rate, the value of the call option collapses to the Black-Scholes price
and the funding valuation adjustment is zero.
Remark 5.3.1. (Current market practice for FVA). It is important to realize
in looking at Figure 5.1, that at the time of writing this thesis, for a simple call
option most market players would adopt a methodology like (iv) or (ii). Even if
borrowing or lending rates were dierent, most market players would average them
and apply a common rate to borrowing and lending, in order to avoid nonlinearities.
We will discuss the approximation error entailed in this symmetrization later when
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introducing the nonlinearity valuation adjustment. For the time being, we notice
that method (iv) produces the same results as the quicker method (ii), that simply
replaces the risk-free rate by the funding rate. In the simple case of a long position
in a call option without credit and collateral, and with symmetric borrowing and
lending rates, we can show that this method is sound since it stems directly from
our rigorous Formula (3.19). We also see that both methods (ii) and (iv) are quite
close to the full numerical method we adopt. Occasionally, the industry may adopt
methods such as (i), but this is not recommended, as we can see from the results.
Method (iii) is not accurate either, since it ignores optionality, and would not be
used by the industry in a case like this. Overall industry-like methods such as (ii)
or (iv) work well here, and there would be no need to implement the full machinery.
However, once collateral and credit risk are in the picture, and once nonlinearities
due to replacement close-out at default and asymmetry in borrowing and lending are
present, there is no way we can keep using something like (ii) or (iv) and we need
to implement the full methodology.
5.4 Complete valuation under credit risk, collateral, and
asymmetric funding
Let us now switch on credit risk and consider collateralized deals. The recursive
structure of our simulation method makes the pricing problem particularly demand-
ing in terms of computational time, so we are forced to choose a relatively small
number of sample paths. We use 1,000 sample paths but, fortunately, the presence
of collateral as a control variate mitigates large errors. In Tables 5.1-5.2 we con-
duct a ceteris paribus analysis of funding risk under counterparty credit risk and
collateralization. Specically, we investigate how the value of a deal changes for
dierent values of the borrowing (lending) rate f+ (f ) while keeping the lending
(borrowing) rate xed to 100 bps. When both funding rates are equal to 100 bps
the deal is funded at the risk-free rate and we are in the classical derivatives pricing
setting.
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Remark 5.4.1. (Potential arbitrage). Note that if f+ < f  arbitrage opportuni-
ties might be present, unless certain constraints are imposed on the funding policy of
the treasury. Such constraints may look unrealistic and may be debated from view-
point of arbitrageability, but since our point here is strictly to explore the impact
of asymmetries in the funding equations we will still apply our framework to a few
examples where f+ < f .
Table 5.1 reports the impact of changing funding rates for a call position when
the posted collateral may not be used for funding the deal, i.e. rehypothecation is
not allowed. First, for the long position, increasing the lending rate f  while keeping
the borrowing rate f+ xed causes an increase in the deal value. On the other hand,
an increase in the borrowing rate while xing the lending rate, decreases the value
of the short position, i.e. the negative exposure of the investor increases. As a call
option is just a one-sided contract, increasing the borrowing rate for a long position
only has a minor impact. Recall that F is dened as the cash account needed as
part of the derivative replication strategy or, analogously, the cash account required
to fund the hedged derivative position. To hedge a long call, the investor goes short
in delta position of the underlying asset and invests excess cash in the treasury at
f . Correspondingly, to hedge the short position, the investor enters a long delta
position in the stock and nances it by borrowing cash from the treasury at f+,
so changing the lending rate only has a small eect on the deal value. Finally, due
to the presence of collateral, we observe an almost similar price impact of funding
under the two dierent default distributions Dlow and Dhigh.
Assuming cash collateral, we consider the case of rehypothecation and allow
the investor and counterparty to use any posted collateral as a funding source. If
the collateral is posted to the investor, this means it eectively reduces his costs of
funding the delta-hedging strategy. As the payo of the call is one-sided, the investor
only receives collateral when he holds a long position in the call option. However, as
he hedges this position by short-selling the underlying stock and lending the excess
cash proceeds, the collateral adds to his cash lending position and increases the
funding benet of the deal. Analogously, if the investor has a short position, he
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Table 5.1: Price impact of funding with default risk and collater-
alization
Default risk, lowb Default risk, highc
Fundinga Long Short Long Short
Borrowing rate f+
100 bps 28.70 (0.15) -28.72 (0.15) 29.06 (0.21) -29.07 (0.21)
125 bps 28.53 (0.17) -29.37 (0.18) 28.91 (0.21) -29.70 (0.20)
150 bps 28.37 (0.18) -30.02 (0.22) 28.75 (0.22) -30.34 (0.20)
175 bps 28.21 (0.20) -30.69 (0.27) 28.60 (0.22) -30.99 (0.21)
200 bps 28.05 (0.21) -31.37 (0.31) 28.45 (0.22) -31.66 (0.25)
Lending rate f 
100 bps 28.70 (0.15) -28.72 (0.15) 29.06 (0.21) -29.07 (0.21)
125 bps 29.35 (0.18) -28.56 (0.17) 29.69 (0.20) -28.92 (0.21)
150 bps 30.01 (0.22) -28.40 (0.18) 30.34 (0.20) -28.76 (0.22)
175 bps 30.68 (0.27) -28.23 (0.20) 31.00 (0.21) -28.61 (0.22)
200 bps 31.37 (0.32) -28.07 (0.39) 31.67 (0.25) -28.46 (0.22)
Standard errors of the price estimates are given in parentheses.
a Ceteris paribus changes in one funding rate while keeping the other xed
to 100 bps.
b Based on the joint default distribution Dlow with low dependence.
c Based on the joint default distribution Dhigh with high dependence.
posts collateral to the counterparty and a higher borrowing rate would increase his
costs of funding the collateral he has to post, as well as his delta-hedge position.
Table 5.2 reports the results for the short and long positions in the call option when
rehypothecation is allowed. Figures 5.2-5.3 plot the values of collateralized long and
short positions in the call option as a function of asymmetric funding spreads. In
addition, Figure 5.4 reports the corresponding FVA dened as the dierence between
the full funding-inclusive deal price and the full deal price but symmetric funding
rates equal to the risk-free rate. Recall that the collateral rates are equal to the
risk-free rate, so the LVA collapses to zero in these examples.
This shows that funding asymmetry matters even under full collateralization
when there is no repo market for the underlying stock. In practice, however, the
dealer cannot hedge a long call by shorting a stock he does not own. Instead,
he would rst borrow the stock in a repo transaction and then sell it in the spot
market. Similarly, to enter the long delta position needed to hedge a short call, the
dealer could nance the purchase by lending the stock in a reverse repo transaction.
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Figure 5.2: The value of a long call position for asymmetric funding spreads s f =
f   r, i.e. xing f+ = r = 0:01 and varying f  2 (0:01; 0:0125; 0:015; 0:0175; 0:02).
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Figure 5.3: The value of a short call position for asymmetric funding spreads s+f =
f+  r, i.e. xing f  = r = 0:01 and varying f+ 2 (0:01; 0:0125; 0:015; 0:0175; 0:02).
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Figure 5.4: Funding valuation adjustment as a function of asymmetric funding
spreads. The adjustments are computed under the presence of default risk and
collateralization.
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Table 5.2: Price impact of funding with default risk, collateraliza-
tion, and rehypothecation
Default risk, lowb Default risk, highc
Fundinga Long Short Long Short
Borrowing rate f+
100 bps 28.70 (0.15) -28.73 (0.15) 29.07 (0.22) -29.08 (0.22)
125 bps 28.55 (0.17) -29.56 (0.19) 28.92 (0.22) -29.89 (0.20)
150 bps 28.39 (0.18) -30.40 (0.24) 28.77 (0.22) -30.72 (0.20)
175 bps 28.23 (0.20) -31.26 (0.30) 28.63 (0.22) -31.56 (0.23)
200 bps 28.07 (0.22) -32.14 (0.36) 28.48 (0.22) -32.43 (0.29)
Lending rate f 
100 bps 28.70 (0.15) -28.73 (0.15) 29.07 (0.22) -29.08 (0.22)
125 bps 29.53 (0.19) -28.57 (0.17) 29.07 (0.22) -28.93 (0.22)
150 bps 30.38 (0.24) -28.42 (0.18) 32.44 (0.29) -28.78 (0.22)
175 bps 31.25 (0.30) -28.26 (0.20) 36.19 (0.61) -28.64 (0.22)
200 bps 32.14 (0.37) -28.10 (0.22) 32.44 (0.29) -28.49 (0.22)
Standard errors of the price estimates are given in parentheses.
a Ceteris paribus changes in one funding rate while keeping the other xed
to 100 bps.
b Based on the joint default distribution Dlow with low dependence.
c Based on the joint default distribution Dhigh with high dependence.
Eectively, the delta hedging position in the underlying stock would be funded at
the prevailing repo rate. Thus, once the delta hedge has to be executed through the
repo market, there is no funding valuation adjustment (meaning any dependence on
the funding rate ~f drops out) given the deal is fully collateralized, but the underlying
asset still grows at the repo rate. More detailed discussions are carried out later in
Chapter 6. If there is no credit risk, this would leave us with the result of Piterbarg
[68]. However, if the deal is not fully collateralized or the collateral cannot be
rehypothecated, funding costs enter the picture even when there is a repo market
for the underlying stock.
5.5 Nonlinearity valuation adjustment
In this last section we introduce a nonlinearity valuation adjustment, and to stay
within the usual jargon of the business, we abbreviate it NVA. The NVA rst in-
troduced by Brigo et al. in [23] is dened as the dierence between the true price
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V and a version of V where nonlinearities have been approximated away through
blunt symmetrization of rates and possibly a change in the close-out convention
from a replacement close-out to a risk-free close-out. This entails a degree of double
counting (both positive and negative interest). In some situations the positive and
negative double counting will oset each other, but in other cases this may not hap-
pen. Moreover, as pointed out briey in Chapter 1 section 1.2.4 (for a more detailed
analysis, we refer the reader to Brigo et al. [12]), a further source of double counting
might be neglecting the rst-to-default time in the bilateral CVA/DVA valuation,
which is done in a number of industry approximations.
Let V^ be the resulting price of our full pricing algorithm when we replace both f+
and f  by f^ := (f+ +f )=2. We adopt both a risk-free close-out and a replacement
close-out at default, respectively, for this approximated price V^ in our valuation
framework. A further simplication in V^ could be to neglect the rst-to-default
check in the close-out. We have the following denition
Denition 5.5.1. (Nonlinearity valuation adjustment, NVA) The nonlinear-
ity valuation adjustment (NVA) is dened as
NVAt := Vt   V^t;
where V denotes the full nonlinear deal value while V^ denotes an approximate lin-
earized price of the deal.
As an illustration, we revisit the above example of an equity call option and
analyze the NVA in a number of cases. The results are reported in Figures 5.5 and
5.6.
In both gures, we compare NVA under a risk-free close-out and under a replace-
ment close-out. We can see that, depending on the direction of the symmetrization,
NVA may be either positive or negative. As the funding spread increases, NVA
grows in absolute value. In addition, adopting the replacement close-out amplies
the presence of double counting. Moreover, the NVA accounts for up to 8% of the
full deal price V depending on the funding spread - a relevant gure in a valuation
context.
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Figure 5.5: Nonlinearity valuation adjustment (in percentage of V^ ) for dierent
funding spreads s+f = f
+   f  2 (0; 0:005; 0:01; 0:015; 0:02) and xed f^ = (f+ +
f )=2 = 0:01.
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Figure 5.6: Nonlinearity valuation adjustment (in percentage of V^ ) for dierent
funding spreads s f = f
    f+ 2 (0; 0:005; 0:01; 0:015; 0:02) and xed f^ = (f+ +
f )=2 = 0:01.
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Table5.3:%NVAwithdefaultrisk,colateralizationandrehypothecation
Riskfree Replacement
FundingRates %NVA %NVA %NVA %NVA %NVA %NVA
sf fˆ
0bps 100bps 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
25bps 112.5bps 1.65% 1.62% 1.67% 1.79% 1.75% 1.81%
50bps 125bps 3.31% 3.20% 3.39% 3.58% 3.46% 3.68%
75bps 137.5bps 5.02% 4.78% 5.19% 5.39% 5.12% 5.61%
100bps 150bps 6.70% 6.28% 7.01% 7.24% 6.75% 7.62%
i.Fundingspreadsf=f −f+.
i.ThepricesofthecaloptionarebasedonthejointdefaultdistributionDhighwithhigh
dependence.
Table5.3reports(a)%NVAdenotingthefractionoftheapproximateddealprice
VˆexplainedbyNVA,(b)%NVA denotingthefractionofthefuldealpriceV¯,and
(c)%NVAdenotingthefractionofthedealpricewithsymmetricfundingratesequal
totherisk-freeraterexplainedbyNVA.Noticethatforthosecaseswhereweadopt
arisk-freeclose-outatdefault,theresultsprimarilyhighlightthedouble-counting
errorduetosymmetrizationofborrowingandlendingrates.
Weshouldﬁnalypointoutthatclose-outnonlinearitiesplayalimitedrolehere,
duetotheabsenceofwrongwayrisk.Ananalysisofclose-outnonlinearityunder
wrongwayriskisunderdevelopment.
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Chapter 6
Extension and Conclusion
In this chapter, we describe how our model can be extended to address other market
realities. We show with a few adjustments that the consistent valuation framework
can be used to model trades where the trader implements a hedging strategy via the
repo-market, and when the trade is cleared via a central clearing house or governed
by a bilateral Credit Support Annex with variation and initial margins. Moreover,
we explain how we can include the margin period risk into the model by listing all
possible cash ows upon an early default event. The conclusion of the thesis is given
at the end of the chapter.
6.1 Repo-Market
So far, we have more or less silently made the assumption that the dealer hedges
the derivatives position by trading in the spot market of the underlying asset(s).
Nonetheless, to be in business, the dealer might decide or even be forced to imple-
ment a hedging strategy that involves trading the underlying assets through stock-
lending or repo markets or by entering other derivatives positions, e.g., (synthetic)
forward contracts on the underlying risk factors. As a result, the dealer may incur
additional costs or revenues which we obviously need to include when pricing the
deal.
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6.1.1 Incorporating the hedging costs
To address this issue, we introduce two general adapted processes: h t (T ) is the
rate of hedging revenue for lending risky assets from time t to T , while h+t (T ) is
the hedging cost rate for asset borrowing. The corresponding eective hedging rate
~ht(T ) is dened as
~ht(T ) := h
 
t (T )1fHt<0g + h
+
t (T )1fHt>0g :
For example, if the dealer hedges in the stock-lending or repo market, we can apply
the quoted repo rate as the hedging rate.
Another example is hedging by trading in collateralized markets, i.e. markets
where only collateralized nancial contracts are quoted. The money market falls in
this category and contracts traded in this market are collateralized on a daily basis
at the over-night rate. So, if the hedging strategy implies trading directly in the
money market, the eective hedging cost is simply given by the collateral rate itself.
If we assume that the hedging strategy is implemented on the same time-grid
as the funding procedure of the deal, we can sum both the funding and hedging
costs in a single term. This leads us to redene ' in (2.17) so it explicitly takes the
dependence on the hedging strategy into account:
'(t; T ^  ;F;H) :=
m 1X
j=1
1ft6tj<(T^)gD(t; tj)Ftj
 
1  Ptj(tj+1)
P
~f
tj(tj+1)
!
(6.1)
 
m 1X
j=1
1ft6tj<(T^)gD(t; tj)Htj
 
Ptj(tj+1)
P
~f
tj(tj+1)
  Ptj(tj+1)
P
~h
tj(tj+1)
!
;
where the zero-coupon (hedging) bond is dened as P
~h
t (T ) := [1 + (T   t)~ht(T )] 1.
From now on, we assume that rehypothecation is allowed (i.e. Ft = Vt  Ht   Ct).
For the case when rehypothecation is forbidden, analogous results can be obtained.
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If we take the continuous-time limit, we obtain
'(t; T ^  ;F;H) =
Z T^
t
(rs   ~fs)

Vs(C;F )  Cs

D(t; s)ds (6.2)
 
Z T^
t
(rs   ~hs)HsD(t; s)ds ;
which assumes that funding and hedging of the deal takes place in continuous time.
Summing up all the cash-ow streams of the deal: the discounted contractual
cash-ows , the on-default cash-ow , the collateral margining cash-ows  and
the new funding cash-ows including the costs and revenues from the repo market
', we have
Vt =
Z T
t
Et
  
1fs<g(s; s+ ds) + 1f2dsgs(C; ")

D(t; s)

+
Z T
t
Et
h
1fs<g( ~fs   ~cs)CsD(t; s)
i
ds
+
Z T
t
Et
h
1fs<g

(rs   ~fs) Vs   (rs   ~hs)Hs

D(t; s)
i
ds: (6.3)
A simple trading example
We use a trading example in the report [20] as a justication of the above cash-ows.
Suppose that a trader buys a call option on an equity asset St with strike K at time
t < T :
1. The trader borrows Vt amount of cash from the treasury and buys the option.
2. He receives cash Ct from the counterparty as collateral, which is then given to
the treasury.
In order to hedge the deal, he needs to hold a short position in the underlying asset,
which requires him to repo-borrow the stock on the repo-market:
3. He borrows Ht = tSt cash from the treasury as the guarantee for the repo-
borrowing on the repo-market.
4. He then borrows t units of stock and posts cash Ht as guarantee.
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5. The trader sells the stock for Ht and gives the amount back to the treasury.
At time t, the trader owes to the treasury the cash amount Vt   Ct. Denote the
underlying stock price at t + dt by St+dt. Then at time t + dt the trader needs to
return the borrowed stock on the repo-market and engages in the following actions:
6. The trader borrows cash tSt+dt from the treasury.
7. He buys t units of stock and returns to the repo-market to close the position.
8. He receives Ht(1 + ~htdt) amount of cash from the deposit.
9. He then pays tSt+dt cash back to the treasury.
The net value from the repo position is then given by
Ht(1 + ~htdt) tSt+dt =  tdSt + ~htHtdt: (6.4)
10. The trader closes the derivative position, and receives cash Vt+dt, which is
given back to the treasury.
The trader needs to pay the collateral with interest back to the counterparty. To do
so,
11. He borrows Ct(1 + ~ctdt) amount of cash from treasury.
12. He pays the collateral amount with interest back to the counterparty.
The trader's debt to the treasury at time t+ dt is then given by
  Vt+dt + ( Vt   Ct)(1 + ~ftdt) + Ct(1 + ~ctdt) =  d Vt + ~ft Vtdt+ (~ct   ~ft)Ctdt: (6.5)
The total amount of cash ows is (combining (6.4) and (6.5))
d Vt   ~ft Vtdt  (~ct   ~ft)Ctdt tdSt + ~htHtdt:
Assuming that the contract pays a dividend during the time interval [t; t+dt] denoted
as dD, and we have Et

d Vt

= rt Vtdt   dD. No-arbitrage risk-neutral pricing
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requires the price of the above cash-ows to be equal to zero, so we write
0 = Et
h
d Vt   ~ft Vtdt  (~ct   ~ft)Ctdt tdSt + ~htHtdt
i
= (rt   ~ft) Vtdt  (~ct   ~ft)Ctdt t(rt   ~ht)Htdt  dD
= (rt   ~ft)Ftdt+ (rt   ~ct)Ctdt+ (~ht   ~ft)Htdt  dD:
Therefore, we have
dD = (rt   ~ft)Ftdt+ (rt   ~ct)Ctdt+ (~ht   ~ft)Htdt
= (rt   ~ft) Vt + ( ~ft   ~ct)Ctdt  (rt   ~ht)Htdt;
which coincides with the cash ows in (6.3) that come from the collateral margining,
funding and hedging procedures.
6.1.2 Continuous time formulation
If we assume all needed technical conditions to be satised as in Section 2.3.2, we
can switch from the ltration G to the default-free market ltration F , and rewrite
equation (6.3) as follows:
Vt = 1f>tg
Z T
t
Et[ ((s; s+ ds) + ss(C; ")ds)D(t; s; r + )jF ]
+ 1f>tg
Z T
t
Et
h
( ~fs   ~cs)CsD(t; s; r + )jF
i
ds (6.6)
+ 1f>tg
Z T
t
Et
h 
(rs   ~fs) Vs   (rs   ~hs)Hs

D(t; s; r + )jF
i
ds:
We can now repeat the calculations in Chapter 3 to obtain the FBSDE and
the semi-linear PDE for the continuous-time consistent pricing problem including
hedging costs.
We start by introducing the following stochastic process,
Xt :=
Z t
0

s + ss(C; ") + ( ~fs   ~cs)Cs + (rs   ~fs) Vs   (rs   ~hs)Hs

D(0; s; r + )ds:
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Now we multiply by D(0; t; r + ) and then add Xt to both sides of (6.6):
VtD(0; t; r + ) +Xt = Et[XT jF ] : (6.7)
Dene Mt = Et[XT jF ], and dierentiate both sides of (6.7) with respect to t
yielding
  (rt + t) Vtdt+ d Vt +
h
t + tt(C; ") + ( ~ft  ~ct)Ct + (rt  ~ft) Vt  (rt  ~ht)Ht
i
dt
= dMt=D(0; t; r + ):
Observe that
R t
0
dMt=D(0; t; r+) is a local Ft-martingale. Applying the martingale
representation theorem, we can write
R t
0
dMt=D(0; t; r+) =
R t
0
ZudWu for Zu being
a (W )-predictable process.
Dene a stochastic process Yt = Vt. Suppose that there exists a deterministic
linear function H such that Ht = H(t; St; Yt; Zt). Moreover, we postulate that the
close-out amount is taken to be the price of the deal, i.e. "t = Vt, and also that
the collateral account is a function of the adjusted deal price, so that the on-default
cash-ow t(C; ") is a function of the derivative price Vt, denoted as (Yt) for some
measurable function . The (coupled) FBSDE for the consistent pricing equation
including funding and hedging costs is then given by
dSt = (t; St; Yt)dt+ (t; St; Yt)dWt; S0 = s0;
dYt =  B~h(t; St; Yt; Zt)dt+ ZtdWt; YT = 0; (6.8)
B
~h(t; St; Yt; Zt) = t + t(Yt)  ( ~ft + t)Yt + ( ~ft   ~ct)Ct   (rt   ~ht)H(t; St; Yt; Zt);
with s0 being the initial underlying stock price and B
~h(t; St; Yt; Zt) being the driver
of the FBSDE.
Assume that Assumption 3 is in force and all the rates ~f , ~c, ~h and r are bounded.
Following analogous arguments to the proof of Theorem 3.1.5, there exists a unique
solution to the above FBSDE (6.8).
We now focus on the decoupled case. We postulate that, as in section 3.2.1, ~ft =
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f(t; St; Yt), ~ct = c(t; St; Yt), ~ht = h(t; St; Yt), t = (t; St; Yt) and rt = r(t; St; Yt),
where functions f; c; h; ; r are deterministic and bounded. In the decoupled case,
we have (t; St; Yt; Zt) = (t; St) and (t; St; Yt; Zt) = (t; St) for the forward com-
ponent. If we further assume that the price process V has sucient smoothness,
as required in (3.8), we can apply Ito^'s formula to Vt, and compare the drift and
diusion terms with the BSDE in (6.8). We obtain the following for  > t (For the
ease of notation, we denote Ht = H(t; s; (t; s); Zt) in the following),
  ~ft Vt   t Vt + ( ~ft   ~ct)Ct   (rt   ~ht)Ht + t + tt( Vt) + @
V
@t
+ (t; St)
@ V
@S
+
1
2
(t; St)
2@
2 V
@S2
= 0; Zt = (t; St)
@ V
@S
:
(6.9)
Hence, the adjusted deal price with hedging costs V satises the following semi-linear
PDE for all (t; s) 2 [0; T ] R+:
@t(t; s) + (t; s)@s(t; s) +
1
2
(t; s)2@2s(t; s) +B
~h (t; s; (t; s); (@s)(t; s)) = 0;
(T; s) = 0;
(6.10)
with B
~h (t; s; (t; s); (@s)(t; s)) being the driver of the FBSDE dened in (6.8).
6.1.3 Invariance theorem
We now assume that the underlying St is a tradable asset and follows the Black-
Scholes type dynamic. According to standard no-arbitrage theory, the drift of the
underlying asset is the risk-free rate under the risk-neutral probability measure.
Substituting the dynamics of the underlying asset (3.17) to the PDE (6.10), we
have
@t(t; s) + rts@s(t; s) +
1
2
(t)2s2@2s(t; s) +

~ft   t

(t; s) +

~ft   ~ct

Ct
 

rt   ~ht

H(t; s; (t; s); Zt) + t + t((t; s)) = 0; Zt = (t)s@s(t; s):
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If we choose H(t; s; (t; s); Zt) = @s(t; s)s =
Zt
(t)
and assume that the investor
adopts delta-hedging, equation (6.10) collapses to

@t   ~ft   t + L~ht

(t; s) +

~ft   ~ct

Ct + tt + t = 0;
(T; s) = 0;
(6.11)
where the generator is dened as
L~ht (t; s) := ~htHt + L2t(t; s) := ~htHt +
1
2
(t; s)2
@2
@s2
:
The above semi-linear PDE is the pre-default ( > t) PDE for the consistent pricing
problem including hedging costs.
Again, we could solve this equation numerically, but we choose to apply the
reasoning of Section 3.2.3 to reach a similar result as Theorem 3.2.5:
Corollary 6.1.1 (Continuous-time Solution with Hedging Costs). Suppose
that collateral rehypothecation is allowed and that delta-hedging is implemented by
trading on a derivative market where the eective hedging rate is ~h. The consistent
valuation equation in continuous time is then given by
Vt(C;F ) =
Z T
t
E~ht
h
s + ss + ( ~fs   ~cs)Cs

D(t; s; ~f + ) j F
i
ds; (6.12)
where the expectation is taken under a pricing measure Q~h for which the underlying
risk factors grow at the rate ~h if no dividend is paid.
Proof. Assume that (t; St) is a solution to the PDE (6.11), with boundary condition
(T; ST ) = 0, where the process St satises the following SDE
dSt = ~htStdt+ tStdW
~h
t ;
with W
~h
t being the Brownian motion under the pricing measure Q
~h.
For t < s  T , we dene a process
Ys =
Z s
t
F (u; Su; Cu; Vu)D(t; u; ~f + )du+D(t; s; ~f + )(s; Ss);
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where
F (u; Su; Cu; Vu) = ( ~fu   ~cu)Cu + uu + u:
Dierentiating Ys, we get
dYs = dD(t; s; ~f + )(s; Ss) +D(t; s; ~f + )d(s; Ss) + dD(t; s; ~f + )d(s; Ss)
+ d
Z s
t
F (u; Su; Cu; Vu)D(t; u; ~f + )du

= D(t; s; ~f + )

@ss + ~hsSs
@s
@Ss
+
1
2
2sS
2
s
@2s
@S2s
  ( ~fs + s)s + F (s; Ss; Cs; Vs)

ds
+D(t; s; ~f + )sSs
@s
@Ss
dW
~h
s :
Since s is a solution to the PDE, the ds term in the above equation cancels out,
leaving
YT = Yt +
Z T
t
D(t; s; ~f + )sSs
@s
@Ss
dW
~h
s :
Therefore, the process Y is a (Q
~h;F)-local martingale. Taking the conditional ex-
pectation with respect to ltration Ft, we have
E~ht [YT j F ] = E~ht [Yt j F ] = (t; St):
So the solution to the PDE is
Vt = (t; St)
= E~ht
Z T
t
F (s; Ss; Cs; Vs)D(t; s; ~f + )ds+D(t; T ; ~f + )(T; ST ) j F

= E~ht
Z T
t

s + ss + ( ~fs   ~cs)Cs

D(t; s; ~f + )ds j F

:
Analogous to the case of hedging in the spot market, we incorporate the addi-
tional hedging costs by altering the drift of the price processes of the underlying
risk factors. Additionally, by handling hedging costs via a change of measure, we
observe that the explicit dependence on Ht disappears from the pricing equation.
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Moreover, the dependence on the risk-free rate rt dropped out from the valuation
equation as we found for the case without assets lending/borrowing.
Remark 6.1.1. (Invariance of the valuation equation with respect to the
short rate rt). There is no dependence on a risk-free rate rt in equations (6.11)
or (6.12) for valuation under credit, collateral, funding and hedging costs. The
valuation is completely governed by market rates and is invariant to rt.
6.2 CCP cleared or bilateral CSA trades with variation and
initial margins
The growing attention on counterparty credit risk resulted in an increased number of
operations moved from a bilateral OTC agreement under a Credit Support Annex
(CSA) to a cleared trade through central clearing houses (CCPs), while most of
the remaining contracts are traded under collateralization regulated by a CSA with
variation and intial margins. The Tabb group estimated a 2 USD trillion liquidity
impact lead by the full onset of CCPs. A CCP acting as a market participant
interposes itself between two parties, takes the risk of the counterparty default and
ensures the exchange of payments even in case of default. Brigo and Pallavicini in
[30], for the rst time, developed a comprehensive approach for pricing under CCP
clearing, including variation and initial margins, gap credit risk and collateralization.
In this section we explain, based on the study in [30], how the consistent pricing
framework we set up in the previous chapters can be tailored to address trading
through a CCP or via a bilateral CSA with initial and variation margins.
6.2.1 Variation and initial margins
When a client (\C") enters into a CCP cleared trade, he will trade with his clearing
member denoted in the following as \I". There will be no direct obligation between
each client. If the mark-to-market moves against one of the parties, this party will
post collateral margins called variation margin (VM) which protects the clearing
house against credit and market risk. The VM will be passed to the other party by
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the CCP and can be rehypothecated. The VM provider will receive interest on the
posted cash collateral as is done in uncleared bilateral trades under CSA. Addition-
ally, an initial margin (IM) is posted as needed to protect the CCP over additional
risks, for example gap risk, wrong way risk, deteriorating quality of collateral and
so forth, and it will be held in a segregated account by the CCP during the life of
the trade. So the IM is a source of funding costs but does not generate a funding
benet.
In the case of bilateral CSA trades, when initial margins are posted to cover for
additional risks which are not protected by variation margins, such as gap risk, the
approach is similar to that of CCPs.
We now modify the pricing framework set up previously to address variation
and initial margining. The total amount of collateral assets Ct exchanged by the
margining procedure of a derivative trade with variation and initial margins at time
0  t < T (taking the point of view of the investor/clearing member) is dened as
Ct := Mt +N
C
t +N
I
t ; N
C
t  0; N It  0; (6.13)
where we denote the variation margin account as an adapted process Mt, the initial
margin account posted by the counterparty as an adapted process NCt and the initial
margin account posted by the investor as an adapted process N It . Note that the
initial margins are posted without netting to cover for the gap risk. However, when
a derivative trade is cleared by a CCP, only the counterparty (or client) posts initial
margin, the clearing member \I" does not, and we can set N It = 0 in this case.
As in the classical theory, a derivative price can be perfectly replicated by a cash
position F and a risky component of the hedging portfolio H, namely,
Vt = Ft +Ht: (6.14)
When rehypothecation is allowed, the variation margin can be used by the collateral
taker as a source of funding to reduce the costs of funding the deal. In such case,
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we replicate the derivative price by means of the following
Vt = Ft +Ht +Mt: (6.15)
We assume that the variation margin can always be rehypothecated. The results for
the case when rehypothecation is forbidden can be analogously obtained.
6.2.2 Funding costs under CCP clearing and bilateral CSA
In the case of CCP clearing or bilateral CSA with variation and initial margins,
additional cash accounts are needed to implement the collateral margining proce-
dures. The cash ows for the funding of the segregated initial margins, NCs  0
posted by the counterparty and N Is  0 posted by the investor, should be taken into
account when we calculate the funding cash ows. If a party is posting the initial
margin, he is facing extra costs to fund this collateral. On the contrary, the party
that receives the initial margin may book a funding benet, if he is allowed to invest
this collateral.
Recall that when the investor implements its hedging strategy via repo market,
the funding cash-ow ' is dened as (6.2). If we add the additional funding costs
for the initial margins to (6.2), the funding cash-ow can be redened as
'(t; T ^ ) :=
Z T^
t
(rs   ~fs)FsD(t; s)ds 
Z T^
t
( ~fs   ~hs)HsD(t; s)ds (6.16)
+
Z T^
t
(fN;Cs   rs)NCs D(t; s)ds+
Z T^
t
(fN;Is   rs)N IsD(t; s)ds ;
where we assume that funding and hedging procedures take place in continuous
time. We denote processes fN;C and fN;I for the funding rates associated with the
initial margin accounts for the counterparty and the investor respectively. Notice
that the funding rates for the initial margin accounts fN;C and fN;I , in principle,
can be dierent from the funding rate ~f , because the initial margins are not in the
funding netting set of the derivative. Moreover, if the initial margin funding rate
fN;I is greater than the risk-free rate rt, the funding adjustment term will act as a
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penalty for the investor. In the case when the investment of the received IM is not
allowed, the initial margin funding rate fN;C is equal to the risk-free rate rt, and
there will be no adjustment to the derivative price.
We now replace the funding cash-ow in the pricing equation (6.3) with (6.16)
to nd that
Vt =
Z T
t
Et
  
1fs<g(s; s+ ds) + 1f2dsgs(C; ")

D(t; s)

+
Z T
t
Et
h
1fs<g( ~fs   ~cs)MsD(t; s)
i
ds
+
Z T
t
Et
h
1fs<g

(rs   ~fs) Vs   (rs   ~hs)Hs

D(t; s)
i
ds
+
Z T
t
Et

1fs<g
 
(fN;Cs   ~cs)NCs + (fN;Is   ~cs)N Is

D(t; s)

ds: (6.17)
Again, assuming that all needed technical conditions are satised as in Section
2.3.2, we switch from the ltration G to the default-free market ltration F , and
rewrite the above equation (6.17) as
Vt = 1f>tg
Z T
t
Et[ ((s; s+ ds) + ss(C; ")ds)D(t; s; r + )jF ]
+ 1f>tg
Z T
t
Et
h
( ~fs   ~cs)MsD(t; s; r + )jF
i
ds (6.18)
+ 1f>tg
Z T
t
Et
h 
(rs   ~fs) Vs   (rs   ~hs)Hs

D(t; s; r + )jF
i
ds
+ 1f>tg
Z T
t
Et
  
(fN;Cs   ~cs)NCs + (fN;Is   ~cs)N Is

D(t; s; r + )jF  ds:
The above pricing equation takes the form of an FBSDE.
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6.2.3 FBSDE formulation
In the following, we repeat the calculations in Chapter 3 to obtain the FBSDE of the
pricing problem including VM and IM. Firstly, we introduce the following process
Xt :=
Z t
0

s + ss(C; ") + ( ~fs   ~cs)Ms + (rs   ~fs) Vs   (rs   ~hs)Hs
+ (fN;Cs   ~cs)NCs + (fN;Is   ~cs)N Is

D(0; s; r + )ds:
We now construct an F -martingale by multiplying D(0; t; r + ) and then adding
Xt to both sides of (6.18):
VtD(0; t; r + ) +Xt = Et[XT jF ] : (6.19)
We deneMt = Et[XT jF ], and then dierentiate both sides of (6.19) with respect
to t,
  (rt + t) Vtdt+ d Vt +
h
t + tt(C; ") + ( ~ft   ~ct)Mt + (rt   ~ft) Vt   (rt   ~ht)Ht
+ (fN;Ct   ~ct)NCt + (fN;It   ~ct)N It
i
dt = dMt=D(0; t; r + ):
We see that the right hand-side
R t
0
dMt=D(0; t; r + ) is a local Ft-martingale.
Assuming it is adapted to the Brownian ltration (W ), we can apply the martingale
representation theorem, and write
R t
0
dMt=D(0; t; r + ) =
R t
0
ZudWu for Zu being
a (W )-predictable process.
Dene a stochastic process Yt = Vt. Suppose that there exists a deterministic
linear function H such that Ht = H(t; St; Yt; Zt). Moreover, we postulate that the
on-default cash-ow (C; ") is a function of the derivative price Vt, i.e. (C; ") =
(t; Yt) for some measurable function . (In the following, we write t instead of
(t; Yt) for the sake of notation simplication.) The funding risk inclusive valuation
equation including variation and initial margins can be expressed in terms of the
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following (coupled) FBSDE:
dSt =(t; St; Yt)dt+ (t; St; Yt)dWt; S0 = s0;
dYt = 
h
t + tt  

~ft + t

Yt +

~ft   ~ct

Mt  

rt   ~ht

H(t; St; Yt; Zt)
+

fN;Ct   ~ct

NCt +

fN;It   ~ct

N It
i
dt+ ZtdWt; YT = 0;
(6.20)
where s0 is the initial underlying stock price.
Suppose that Assumption 3 is satised and all the rates ~f , ~c, ~h, r, fN;C and
fN;I are bounded. In the case of funding inclusive valuation with variation and
initial margins we can prove the existence of a unique solution to the FBSDE (6.20)
analogously to the proof of Theorem 3.1.5.
6.2.4 Semi-linear PDE
In the following, we consider the decoupled case, where the forward component is
given as (t < u)
dSu = (u; Su)du+ (u; Su)dWu; St = s:
Assume that ~ft = f(t; St; Yt), ~ct = c(t; St; Yt), ~ht = h(t; St; Yt), t = (t; St; Yt),
rt = r(t; St; Yt), f
N;C = fC(t; St; Yt) and f
N;I = f I(t; St; Yt), where the functions
f; c; h; ; r; fC and f I are all deterministic and bounded. Moreover, we postulate
that the price process V satisfy the smoothness assumption (3.8). Applying Ito^'s
formula to Vt and comparing the drift and diusion terms with the FBSDE (6.20),
we obtain the following relations for  > t (For ease of notation, we denote Ht =
H(t; s; (t; s); Zt)),
 

~ft + t

Vt +

~ft   ~ct

Mt  

rt   ~ht

Ht +

fN;Ct   ~ct

NCt +

fN;It   ~ct

N It
+ t + tt +
@ V
@t
+ (t; St)
@ V
@S
+
1
2
(t; St)
2@
2 V
@S2
= 0; Zt = (t; St)
@ V
@S
:
(6.21)
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In other words, the adjusted deal price with variation and initial margins V satises
the following semi-linear PDE for all (t; s) 2 [0; T ] R+:
@t(t; s) + (t; s)@s(t; s) +
1
2
(t; s)2@2s(t; s) + t + tt  

~ft + t

(t; s)
+

~ft   ~ct

Mt  

rt   ~ht

Ht +

fN;Ct   ~ct

NCt +

fN;It   ~ct

N It = 0;
(T; s) = 0:
(6.22)
Now assume that the underlying Su is a tradable asset and follows the Black-
Scholes dynamic for (t < u):
dSu = ruSudu+ uSudWu; St = s;
and also that the investor adopts delta-hedging, i.e. Ht = @s(t; s)s =
Zt
t
. We can
then rewrite (6.22) as follows,
@t(t; s) + ~htHt +
1
2
(t)2s2@2s(t; s) 

~ft + t

(t; s) +

~ft   ~ct

Mt
+

fN;Ct   ~ct

NCt +

fN;It   ~ct

N It = 0;
(T; s) = 0:
(6.23)
The above semi-linear PDE is the pre-default ( > t) PDE for the pricing problem
in the case of trading via CCP clearing or bilateral CSA with variation and initial
margins.
Again, we notice that the risk-free rate rt disappears in (6.23). The PDE is
completely governed by market observable quantities as in the previous set-ups.
Applying similar reasoning as before, we obtain the following result.
Corollary 6.2.1 (Continuous-time Solution for CCP cleared or bilateral
CSA trades with variation and initial margins). Assuming that rehypothe-
cation is allowed and delta-hedging is used, we can solve the pricing problem in
continuous time when trading via CCP clearing or bilateral CSA with variation and
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initial margins. We have
Vt(C;F ) =
Z T
t
E~ht
h
s + ss +

~fs   ~cs

Ms +

fN;Ct   ~ct

NCt +

fN;It   ~ct

N It

D(t; s; ~f + ) j F
i
ds;
(6.24)
where the expectation is taken under a pricing measure Q~h where the underlying risk
factors grow at the rate ~h if no dividend is paid.
We will not go into detail of the proof here as the reasoning is analogous to that
of Corollary 6.1.1.
We see that there is no dependence on a risk-free rate rt in equations (6.24) either.
In other words, the nal adjusted price is invariant to the theoretical risk-free rate
rt.
6.3 Margin period of risk
In the case of early default, the default procedure may take several days to be
completed. The time elapsed between the default event and the completion of the
close-out procedure is called the margin period of risk. During this time period,
the mark-to-market of the derivative may change considerably, resulting in a large
mismatch between the posted collateral and the exposure. Moreover, the surviving
party may default during this period, which should also be considered when we
compute the on-default cash-ow.
In this section, we continue our discussion for the CCP cleared or bilateral CSA
trades following the analysis carried out in Brigo and Pallavicini [30] and discuss
the cash ows occurring upon an early default event taking into consideration the
margin period of risk.
6.3.1 On-default cash-ow
The case of trades where there was a bilateral CSA was discussed in Section 2.1.2.
Here, we extend the study and consider also the initial margins that are posted
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to cover the additional risks. In the case of CCP cleared trades, if the client \C"
defaults rst, the clearing member \I" will take responsibility for the position as in
a bilateral trade and evaluate the close-out amount.
Assume that the default procedure takes time  to be completed. The default
procedure can be considered as though the surviving party at the default time 
enters a deal with a cash-ow  and maturity  + . This cash-ow will depend on
the close-out amount "+ (with consideration of the margin period risk) and the
value of (the pre-default) variation and initial margin accounts denoted respectively
as M  , N
C
  and N
I
  .
Applying the results in Corollary 6.2.1, the adjusted price of such a deal denoted
as # at time  can be expressed as (we take the conditional expectations under the
ltration G , using the same technique as in Section 2.3.2),
# := E
~h

h
+
 
"+;M  ; N
C
  ; N
I
 

D(;  + ; ~fS)
i
; (6.25)
where the expectation is taken under the probability measure Q~h, and ~fS is the
eective funding rate of the surviving party that is funding such a deal.
The above pricing equation depends on the funding rates of both parties. How-
ever, practically, one cannot know the other party's liquidity policy. [30] approxi-
mates the discount factors by assuming that the payment takes place at the default
time  without modelling the funding rates of both parties and points out that the
eects of this approximation are second order compared to the uncertainties of the
recovery rates and close-out values. Therefore, instead of (6.25) we write
# := E
~h


+
 
"+;M  ; N
C
  ; N
I
 

: (6.26)
Bare in mind that in the case of a CCP cleared trade we have N I  = 0.
6.3.2 Close-out netting rule
In order to determine the cash-ow +, we need to investigate the close-out net-
ting rules. We repeat the analysis in [30] here and consider all possible scenarios
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that may happen upon the rst default event. Starting with the case where the
counterparty/client default rst  = C < I , we analyse the following scenarios.
When "+  0 and M   0, the investor has a positive exposure and the
counterparty has posted variation margin. We then have the following cases:
1. The exposure is netted with the variation and initial margins posted by the
counterparty, but the collateral is not enough to cover the exposure, and the
investor can get back his initial margin:
1f"+M +NC g
(RC("+  M   NC ) N I ):
2. The exposure is covered by the variation and initial margins. The investor
does not face a loss and gets back his initial margin:
1f"+<M +NC g
("+  M   NC   N I ):
3. In the case where the exposure is completely covered by the variation margin,
we need to consider two more scenarios:
 The investor does not default or defaults after the margin period. He
faces no loss and gets back his initial margin:
1f"+<M g1fI>C+g("+  M   NC   N I ):
 The investor defaults during the margin period. In this case, the in-
vestor's initial margin can be used to reduce losses:
1f"+<M g1fIC+g
 
("+  M   N I )+
+R0I("+  M   N I )   NC 

:
When "+  0 and M  < 0, the investor has a positive exposure and the
investor has posted variation margin. We then have the following cases:
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4. If the initial margin posted by the counterparty is not enough to cover the
investor's exposure, the investor faces a loss and gets back the initial margin
and the variation margin if it is not rehypothecated:
1f"+NC g
(RC("+  NC ) R0CM   N I ):
5. If the initial margin is enough to cover the investor's exposure, the investor
gets back his initial margin and does not suer a loss unless the variation
margin is rehypothecated:
1f"+<NC g
(("+  M   NC )   R0C("+  M   NC )+  N I ):
When "+ < 0 and M   0, the investor has a negative exposure and the
counterparty has posted variation margin. We then have the following cases:
6. The counterparty expects to get back the variation and initial margins.
 If the investor does not default or defaults after the margin period, the
counterparty gets back the collateral in full:
1fI>C+g("+  M   NC   N I ):
 If the investor defaults before the margin period, the counterparty may
face a loss depending on where the collateral is rehypothecated:
1fI<C+g

RI("+  N I )  +R0I
 
("+  N I )+  M 
 
+
 
("+  N I )+  M 
+  NC  :
When "+ < 0 and M  < 0, the investor has a negative exposure and the in-
vestor has posted variation margin. The exposure is netted with the posted collateral
unless the variation margin is rehypothecated, in which case the initial margin is
used to reduce the losses. We then have the following cases:
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7. If the initial margin is not enough to cover the losses due to the rehypotheca-
tion, the investor suers a loss and gets back his initial margin:
1f"+ M NC g
(R0C("+  M   NC ) N I ):
8. If the initial margin is enough to cover the losses due to the rehypothecation,
the investor gets back his collateral in full:
1f"+ M <NC g
("+  M   NC   N I ):
9. If the investor has to pay a greater exposure, we consider the following two
cases:
 If the investor does not default or defaults after the margin period, the
investor gets back his initial margin:
1f"+<M 1fI>C+gg("+  M   N
C
   N I ):
 If the investor defaults before the margin period, the investor's initial
margin can be used to reduce the losses:
1f"+<M g1fI<C+g
 
("+  M   N I )+
+RI("+  M   N I )   NC 

:
Similarly, we can list the cash ows when the investor defaults rst. If we sum
up all the cash ows for all the possible scenarios, we can reach an expression for
the on-default cash-ow + (see [30] for more details). Substituting + in (6.26)
we see that the price of the on-default cash-ow can be expressed as follows,
# = E
~h
 ["+]  CVA(; T ;M;NC ; N I) + DVA(; T ;M;NC ; N I); (6.27)
where the rst term is the replacement price of the deal, and it is reduced by
Chapter 6. Extension and Conclusion 143
collateralized CVA and DVA terms with
CVA(; T ;M;NC ; N I) := E~h

1fC<I+gCVAcoll()

;
DVA(; T ;M;NC ; N I) := E~h

1fI<C+gCVAcoll()

;
(6.28)
and
CVAcoll(s) =

LGDC
 
("+  NC )+  M+ 
+
+ LGD0C
 
("+  NC )   M  
+ 
;
DVAcoll(s) =  

LGDI
 
("+  N I )   M  
 
+ LGD0I
 
("+  N I )+  M+ 
  
:
(6.29)
Observe that if rehypothecation of the collateral is not allowed, the terms multiplied
by LGD0C and LGD
0
I drop out of the CVA and DVA calculations.
In the case where the trade is cleared by a CCP, only the client posts initial
margin, so we can set N I = 0 in equation (6.27). Moreover, if upon the default of
a clearing member the transaction will be transferred to a backup clearing member,
we can then assume that the loss given default for the clearing member is close to
zero.
6.4 Conclusions and Financial Implications
We have developed a consistent framework for valuation of derivative trades under
collateralization, counterparty credit risk, and funding costs. Based on no arbitrage,
we derived a generalized pricing equation where CVA, DVA, LVA, and FVA are in-
troduced by simply modifying the payout cash-ows of the trade. The framework
is exible enough to accommodate actual trading complexities such as asymmetric
collateral and funding rates, replacement close-out, and rehypothecation of posted
collateral. We also provided a detailed analysis of the adjusted self-nancing con-
dition that incorporates in the new market realities. Moreover, we presented an
invariance theorem showing that the valuation framework does not depend on any
theoretical risk-free rate, but is purely based on observable market rates.
The generalized valuation equation under credit, collateral and funding takes the
form of a forward-backward SDE or a semi-linear PDE. We discussed the conditions
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under which such a forward-backward SDE or a semi-linear PDE has a unique
solution.
The consistent valuation equation can also be recast as a set of iterative equations
which can be eciently solved by a proposed least-squares Monte Carlo algorithm.
Our numerical results conrm that funding risk as well as asymmetries in borrow-
ing and lending rates have a critical impact on the ultimate value of a derivatives
transaction.
Introducing funding costs into the pricing equation makes the valuation problem
recursive and nonlinear. The price of the deal depends on the trader's funding
strategy, while to determine the funding strategy we need to know the deal price
itself. Credit and funding risks are in general non-separable; this means that FVA
is not an additive adjustment, let alone a discounting spread. Thus, despite being
common practice among market participants, treating it as such comes at the cost
of double counting. We introduce the nonlinearity valuation adjustment (NVA)
to quantify the eect of double counting and we show that its magnitude can be
signicant under asymmetric funding rates and replacement close-out at default.
Furthermore, valuation under funding costs is no longer bilateral as the particular
funding policy chosen by the dealer is not known to the client, and vice versa. As
a result, the value of the trade will generally be dierent to the two counterparties.
Conceptually, this should mean that the parties would never close the deal, but
in reality dealers conrm that this was a key factor driving bid-ask spreads wider
during the crisis.
Finally, valuation depends on the level of aggregation; asset portfolios cannot
simply be priced separately and added up. Theoretically, valuation is conducted
under deal or portfolio-dependent risk-neutral measures. This has clear operational
consequences for nancial institutions; it's dicult for banks to establish CVA and
FVA desks with separate, clear-cut responsibilities. Instead, they should adopt a
holistic, consistent valuation approach across all trading desks and asset classes. A
trade should be priced on an appropriate aggregation-level to quantify the value it
actually adds to the business. This, of course, leads us to the old distinction between
price and value: Should funding costs be charged to the client or just included
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internally to determine the protability of a particular trade? The relevance of this
question is reinforced by the fact that the client has no direct control on the funding
policy of the bank and therefore cannot inuence any potential ineciencies for
which he or she would have to pay.
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